Internal mobility in the EU and its impact on urban regions in sending and receiving countries

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Part 1: Policy analysis

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Executive summary

This paper investigates the social, economic and territorial effects of cross-border mobility in the EU on sending and receiving countries and urban regions to answer the questions: (1) What are the main, recent trends in cross-border labour mobility in the EU? (2) What are the social, economic and spatial effects of out-migration on countries and regions of origin? What policy implications do these effects have? (3) What are social, economic and spatial effects of in-migration on countries and regions of destination? What policy implications do these effects have? These questions are answered by desk research. To find out more about local impacts of intra-EU mobility and about more recent labour mobility trends, the desk research has been supplemented by the description and analysis of a selection of urban case studies. These case studies are presented in Part 2 of this paper.

Section 2 answers the first research question by offering an analysis of the main cross-border mobility movements in the EU. The main reasons for EU citizens moving within the EU are: employment, family, study and retirement. This paper focuses on labour migration as one of the major motives for intra-EU mobility. Over the years the Free Movement rights have been broadened to more categories of EU citizens: Not only do more types of internal migrants (e.g. students, pensioners) receive Free Movement rights, but every enlargement of the EU by the addition of new Member States has also led to an enlargement of the territory relevant to these rights. Intra-EU mobility of EU citizens is also impacted upon by the Services directive. Self-employed persons or workers may sell their services (temporarily) in another EU Member State through a company (of their own) or a placement agency that is established in, for example, the Member State of their nationality.

Most of the recent publications about intra-EU mobility relate to the most recent enlargements: eight Central and Eastern European countries (EU-8) in 2004 and Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 (EU-2). There are two main corridors of East-West mobility: of EU-8 movements to the UK, Germany and Ireland, and of EU-2 mobility mostly to Spain and Italy. More recently, free movement has received a new impetus: since the economic crisis, a modest boost in movement of workers from the crisis-hit countries of the south (Spain, Greece, Portugal, Italy, but also Ireland) to the north (but also to non-EU destinations) has been observed.

Every enlargement of the EU by new Member States has led to political and public discussions and debate about the expected levels of intra-EU mobility and about unwanted and even uncontrollable increases in migration movements between new and old Member States. Currently a similar discussion is taking place in some of the Western Member States about the supposed negative effects on receiving countries with a view to the establishment of full rights of Free Movement for Bulgarians and Romanians at the start of 2014. However, there are reasons to doubt that Western Member States will face a mass-migration from the EU-2 Member States: the limited potential left in EU-2 countries, in combination with the preferred destination being Southern Europe.

Section 3 puts the impact of migration into its demographic context. Intra-EU mobility is one type of migration and its impact on the regions depends on other demographic trends. Today, international migration is the most important force behind European population change. Migration and mobility have a significant impact on demographic and labour force developments in Europe. This is clearly shown in an ESPON study (DEMIFER) on the expected impact of demographic trends on regional and urban development between 2005 and 2050. According to this scenario study, affluent regions, including metropolitan areas in Eastern Europe, will gain on migration, whereas poor and peripheral regions will lose. Migration will be a strong factor increasing regional
disparities. Furthermore, regions gaining population (especially the EU15) do so mainly due to immigration by third-country nationals. Intra-European migration will have a greater impact on regions of origin of intra-EU migrants in the CEE countries.

If data on international and domestic migration within countries are combined (for the 2005-2010 period), these show a division between regions in Western and Southern Europe gaining population both internally and externally, and regions outside the metropolitan regions in Eastern Member States losing population internally and externally. If we look at the urban level, the picture again becomes more nuanced; for instance, the metropolitan region around Warsaw has experienced population gain internally and externally between 2005 and 2010. However, the relationship between in-migration of workers and talented young people and urban economic growth and wealth remains relevant.

Section 4 describes and analyses the impact of intra-EU mobility on countries and regions of origin (question 2), focussing on countries experiencing significant outflows to other Member States. This section focuses on East-West mobility in the EU, because of the availability of a growing number of relevant studies. Most studies on the impact of emigration deal with the economic effects at the national level. Analysts conclude that mass outflows from the CEE Member States have both economic advantages and disadvantages for these countries, and that overall the economic advantages outweigh the disadvantages.

In general, benefits include a decline in unemployment rates, lower spending on social benefits and other public services, extra capital inflows (remittances) and brain circulation or return. Furthermore, migration experiences function as one of the modernising factors in societies of origin and generate new attitudes towards consumption and entrepreneurship. The emigration from EU-8 and EU-2 Member States was strongly linked to economic restructuring in the context of the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. Emigration also has its economic disadvantages: losing part of their working-age population may have detrimental effects, for instance skill shortages in certain sectors. In the longer term, outflows of part of the working age population may increase the demographic imbalances in ageing societies, and thus may have consequences for the sustainability of social protection schemes.

There is a wide variation in social and economic impacts across the CEE emigration countries, as well as within those countries. For instance, the outflow from Lithuania and Latvia is substantial and emigrants from these countries are often well educated and are inclined to long-term emigration. This emigration has more profound effects than the often temporary emigration from Poland.

High outflows of migrants have territorial effects on countries and regions of origin. Migration - both domestic and international – tends to reinforce regional disparities within countries. The most striking effects of emigration appear to occur at rural level: depopulation of rural areas. In addition, urban shrinkage is highly characteristic of many cities in Eastern Member States, with emigration as only one of the causes. Shrinkage is not a negative phenomenon as such, but only beyond the threshold at which it endangers the local economic base (“complex shrinkage”).

Countries and regions of origin are confronted with various policy issues regarding emigration. Even though there are regions that view the outflow with great disquiet, governments have few opportunities to stop it. In that case it is better for all parties involved to create conditions to inform mobile citizens, prevent down-
skilling, and support the reintegration of returners. Countries of origin and destination are increasingly cooperating on issues that concern them both. More and more countries are investing in their connections with diasporas; this can increase remittance flows and return migration. Promoting economic regeneration of declining regions and cities may dampen the outflow of young people. However, when demographic and economic decline reinforce each other it is difficult to reverse the tide, and cities and regions have to cope with shrinkage.

Section 5 describes and analyses the impact of intra-EU mobility on countries and regions of destination (question 3). First, the economic and labour market effects are analysed. Country studies generally point to economic advantages for the receiving countries and regions. Research shows that labour mobility from EU-8 and EU-2 countries in general has small yet positive fiscal and labour market effects in and on the EU countries of destination. Yet there are also possible negative effects, including malpractices by employment agencies, complaints about unfair wage competition by bogus self-employment, underutilisation of skills and the development of segmented labour markets.

The possible negative effects require attention and action by governments at various levels. The unfair wage competition may arise by a malfunctioning of the free movement of services. Self-employment by nationals from accession countries has been higher in EU-15 Member States where restrictions on the free movement of workers have been tough. As soon as the transition period for the EU-2 comes to an end and workers from EU-2 may move freely, the use of this “immigration door” and its concomitant negative impacts for the receiving countries may decrease. Public authorities and social partners can take steps to combat unfair competition by bogus self-employment, amongst others by awareness raising, inspections and actions when fraudulent practices are uncovered. Policies against labour market segmentation may need to be developed by improving the position of the individual mobile EU citizen by offering language courses and job training facilities.

Housing and territorial effects are another area of obvious impact of intra-EU mobility. The mobile EU citizens arrive not only in big cities but also in villages and rural areas without immigration experience. Another territorial effect is that mobile EU citizens in cities tend to settle in neighbourhoods already characterized by an accumulation of problems, and where migrants from non-EU countries reside. In addition, problems of overcrowding, exploitation, poor quality housing and homelessness are regularly reported by cities.

Housing needs differ for subtypes of mobile EU citizens. To develop a differentiated policy on housing, one has to distinguish between subtypes of intra-EU migrants. Four subtypes of EU migrants from the new Member States can be distinguished: (1) temporary circular migrants, (2) transnational migrants, (3) settlement migrants, and (4) footloose migrants. Problems of irregular and poor housing, including spatial concentrations, overcrowding, exploitation, poor quality and homelessness, are mostly associated with the temporary circular and footloose EU-8 and EU-2 immigrants. Moreover, these migrants often settle in neighbourhoods characterised by an accumulation of problems and a concentration of migrants from non-EU countries.

Following on from this classification three objectives for future policies regarding houses are: (1) for temporary, circular labour migrants and footloose migrants, there is an urgent need for simple, inexpensive and decent housing; (2) regarding footloose migrants, either to tackle the mechanisms these migrants may encounter, like homelessness and crime, and/or to improve the information on return migration; (3) settlement migrants and
transnational migrants have less urgent needs for their accommodation, their social needs are one stage ahead on the integration path.

The impact of inflows of EU citizens goes beyond its effects on labour market and housing, but includes the quality of life and social cohesion. Labour migrants not only represent a ‘workforce’, but many will stay for varying lengths of time and thus become fully-fledged citizens. Cities face the challenge of timely signalling and responding to developments in local society. Main challenges include: ensuring equal access of migrants to mainstream services, safeguarding decent working conditions, fighting discrimination and racism, language training, and building transnational partnerships with areas of origin. A final challenge is to develop strategic approaches and planning in close partnership with other stakeholders. Strategic planning and adequate public services for a diverse and mobile population require adequate knowledge about their composition and urgent issues.

The concluding section recapitulates the main conclusions and policy recommendations for European, national, regional and local policy makers to tackle potentially negative effects and to strengthen the positive effects of labour mobility in the EU.

These challenges include the following aspects:
- Attention to the uneven territorial distribution of benefits and burdens of free movement within the framework of the EU social and territorial cohesion policy.
- Controlling the negative effects of intra-EU mobility, including unfair wage competition, malpractices of certain employment agencies, and the exploitation of migrant workers.
- Enhancing the positive effects of labour mobility and reducing the negative effects for migrants as well as for countries of origin and of destination: mobility supporting services and measures to turn brain-drain into brain gain, tackling the problem of down-skilling, fighting the exploitation of mobile EU citizens, etc.
- Establishing decent and affordable housing, social and other services for (temporary) EU migrants. Distinguish between the different needs of different sub-types of migrants. Recognise the integration needs of mobile EU citizens and develop appropriate measures, in cooperation with other stakeholders.
- Improve the knowledge base on mobile EU citizens, to support the development of strategic planning and effective policies, for both regions of origin and of destination.

1 Introduction

Lithuania holds the Presidency of the Council of Europe up to 31 December 2013. Urban and territorial issues will be discussed at the meeting of Directors General responsible for territorial cohesion and urban development on 21 November 2013 in Vilnius, Lithuania. On that occasion this paper will serve as the inspiration and a point of departure for roundtable discussions. A first version of this paper was discussed at the combined UDG/NTCCP Meeting on 15 and 16 October 2013.

This paper deals with the issue of intra-EU mobility. This subject is connected to the EUKN research paper produced for the Irish Presidency, which was discussed at the DG meeting in Dublin on the 19th of April 2013 (EUKN 2013). While the paper for the Irish Presidency focuses on youth unemployment and geographic
mobility of young people as one option, this research paper investigates the social, economic and territorial effects of internal, cross-border mobility in the EU on sending and receiving countries and urban regions. Intra-EU mobility is one of the major European challenges with a real urban impact that cannot be tackled by Member States in isolation. Therefore it is a topic for the European Urban Agenda Initiative that is being developed in the UDG and DG meetings. More in particular, the topic is mentioned as one of the examples of major urban challenges in the Annex to the Proposal for the Urban Agenda Initiative.

The current research paper aims to identify the main intra-EU labour mobility movements as well as the main issues for sending and receiving (urban) regions regarding the impact of this kind of mobility. The three research questions are:

1. What are the main, recent trends in cross-border labour mobility in the EU?
2. What are the social, economic and spatial effects of out-migration on countries and regions of origin, and what policy implications do these effects have?
3. What are social, economic and spatial effects of in-migration on countries and regions of destination, and what policy implications do these effects have?

There is already a lot of research on east-west labour mobility between EU Member States, but less is known about the effects on sending and receiving (urban) regions. There is even less knowledge about migration from countries worst hit by the crisis. To find out more about local impacts of intra-EU mobility and about more recent labour mobility trends, the desk research will be supplemented by the description and analysis of a selection of case studies. Cases are selected from both sending and receiving regions.

The term ‘intra-EU mobility’ will be used to refer to cross-border mobility within the EU; this is the preferred official Euro-terminology. However, we will use this term interchangeable with the term intra-EU migration. Migration (immigration, emigration, migrants) is the term commonly used in scientific texts and statistics, including those of Eurostat.

This paper considers the flows and implications of intra-EU mobility. Yet it is sometimes relevant, and at other times unavoidable, also to take into consideration the other types of migration. Three main types of migration can be distinguished within the EU, following from the distinction between nationality and place of birth: (1) international or cross-border migration of third-country nationals (non-EU nationals) into the EU and within the EU; (2) international mobility of EU citizens between EU Member States, and (3) domestic or internal migration of citizens within the borders of a given country.

The paper starts to answer the first research question by offering an analysis of the issue of cross-border mobility in the EU (section 2). Against the background of the description of mobility trends, sections 3 and 4 will provide answers to research questions on the consequences of intra-EU mobility for (urban) regions of origin and of destination respectively. The concluding section provides the main general conclusions of the paper and policy recommendations for European, national, regional and local policy makers to tackle potentially negative effects and to strengthen the positive effects of labour mobility in the EU. Part 2 of this study presents the findings from the case study research on cities located in important sending or receiving EU Member States.
2 Intra-EU mobility of EU nationals

The mobility of EU citizens within the European Union is regulated by rulings on Free Movement that formally started in 1968 with the establishment of the free movement rights of EC workers in EC Member States (Regulation 1612/68). Over the years the Free Movement rights have been broadened to more categories. Not only do more types of internal migrants (e.g. students, pensioners) receive Free Movement rights, but every enlargement of the EC/EU by the addition of new Member States leads finally also to an enlargement of the territory relevant to those rights, albeit that every new enlargement may be accompanied by a transitional period before the Freedom of Movement rights become fully applicable.

Intra-EU mobility of EU citizens\(^1\) is impacted on not only by the regulations of Free Movement, but also by the Services directive (Galgoczi and Leschke 2012). Self-employed persons or workers may sell their services (temporarily) in another EU Member State through a company (of their own) or a placement agency that is established in, for example, the Member State of their nationality. The Services directive is of more recent establishment (since 1996 a European Directive on Posting of Workers has been in place; the Services Directive dates from 2006 and was implemented at the end of 2009) than the Free Movement regulations. This complicates a simple comparison with earlier enlargements where intra-EU mobility was impacted on only by the Free Movement regulations. Restrictions on the Free Movement rights of new Member States might be partially raised by temporary migration under one of the services provisions.

This section on intra-EU mobility will give an overview of the current situation and latest trends in movements of EU citizens across the Member States. It will be based predominantly on existing studies, and cannot pay due attention to all Member States, nor to all specific issues that they may be dealing with. The statistics used are mostly based on existing studies and on Eurostat data on foreign population, labour force survey (LFS) data and international migration statistics. Most of the data sets on intra-EU mobility are available one to two years after the collection of data. Data based on LFS concern only persons in the economically active age group, and as such show a lower foreign population figure if compared to data based on all persons residing in a Member State irrespective of their age.

The available data have their limitations for describing intra-EU mobility. Because EU citizens are allowed to cross borders and stay in other Member States for a short period (three months) without registering with the local authorities, data on stocks and flows of citizens from other EU Member States may underestimate the true extent of intra-EU mobility (Benton and Petrovic 2013). Some countries and cities therefore try to estimate the actual number of arrivals from other Member States. These estimates are often much higher than the registered numbers. Furthermore, capturing the dynamics of intra-EU mobility with statistics inevitably has its limitations. Due to free movement rules and because of shorter travel distances, EU mobility is often of a temporary and short-term nature (Benton and Petrovic 2013). An indication of this mobility is that 10 per cent of EU citizens reported having worked in another Member State at some point in their lives (EC 2010b).

2.1 Intra-EU mobility: recent trends

\(^1\)We are not concerned with intra-EU mobility of third-country nationals. Various EU migration Directives extend mobility rights to various categories of third-country nationals; however they leave much discretion to Member States. The limited statistics available on overall movements of third-country nationals in the EU show that – in absolute terms – these movements remain small when compared with movements of EU citizens across Member States (EMN 2013).
In 2012, Eurostat (STAT/13/88) stated that, based on LFS data, 15.2 million foreign citizens worked in the EU-27, accounting for 7% of total employment. Only 6.6 million were citizens of another Member State, while 8.6 million were third country nationals. Interestingly, the overall employment rate in the EU for citizens of other EU Member States is slightly higher (67.7%) than for nationals (64.6%), but far above that for citizens of countries outside the EU (53.7%).

Figure 1 Citizens from other EU Member States in EU-27 Member States in 2011, by old (EU-15) and new (EU-12) Member States  Abs. numbers x 1,000

Source: Benton and Petrovic 2013

Note: Figures for Romania are missing and so are excluded completely. Figures for the EU-15 (used to calculate the EU-12) are missing for Malta, Cyprus, Luxembourg, and France, for which EU-27 figures are presented.
Source: Eurostat, Population by sex, age group and citizenship.
Most of the recent publications about intra-EU mobility relate to the most recent enlargements of the EU: eight Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries (EU-8\(^1\)) in 2004 and Romania and Bulgaria in 2007 (EU-2). The impact of the accession of Malta and Cyprus in 2004 has hardly been analysed with regard to intra-EU mobility, possibly due to their small populations and relatively good economic standards in those days. See Figure 1 for the absolute numbers of citizens from other EU Member States in EU-27 Member States in 2011, distinguishing between mobile citizens from old (EU-15) and new (EU-12) Member States.

According to the Labour Force Survey statistics the accession of the EU-8 countries has, in absolute numbers, predominantly had an impact on the UK, Germany and Ireland and less so on Italy and Spain (see Figure 3 for the EU-8 population in these five main receiving countries). The EU-8 population increased in Germany and in the UK, irrespective of the economic crisis, while Ireland has shown some decline since the start of the crisis. It should be noted that these countries are main receiving countries in absolute terms. These receiving countries – other than Ireland – constitute the largest EU Member States, and figures departing from numbers of arrivals relative to the population of the receiving countries would produce a very different picture. In the absence of figures showing the relative size of the mobile EU-8 and EU-2 populations in other Member States, Figure 2 shows the share of EU and non-EU foreigners in EU Member States.\(^3\)

Part of the explanation of this selective mobility of the EU-8 population to Germany, the UK and Ireland is the absence of a transitional ruling for the UK and Ireland, in combination with a (temporary) economic boom in sectors such as the construction sector. For Germany, the inflow of EU-8 citizens can be explained by the fact that the country forms a prosperous economy in need of workers, and that it has an existing migration history with selected EU-8 countries to provide for (temporary) migrant workers through specific bilateral arrangements. (Benton and Petrovic 2013). Sweden, the only other EU-15 country that established immediate free movement for EU-8 nationals, did not receive a significant number of EU-8 workers, possibly due to stricter labour market regulation, less demand for and less flexible access to employment in comparison to the UK and Ireland. Language familiarity with German and/or English may have made the choice for Germany, the UK and Ireland easier as well. (Benton and Petrovic 2013). In addition, the travel distance may also play a role in the choice of destination countries.

\(^3\) Luxembourg has the highest share of workers from other Member States, with the Portuguese as the largest group; furthermore, 40 % of the labour force consists of commuters from France, Belgium and Germany. The share of mobile workers from CEE is much smaller, with Polish as the largest group, with more than 2500 Poles in 2010 (Benelux/EUKN 2011).

\(^1\) EU-15: the old member States before the 2004 enlargement; EU-10: the new Member States after the 2004 enlargement; EU-8 equals the EU-10 minus Malta and Cyprus; EU-2: the 2007 enlargement concerned Romania and Bulgaria; EU-12 to refer to all of the most recent Member States (i.e., the EU-8 plus Cyprus, Malta, Bulgaria, and Romania). See Annex 2: Glossary. In the UK, EU-8 and EU-2 migration called A8 and A2 migration respectively.
So where the EU-8 accession has led to a migration corridor from EU-8 countries to Germany, the UK and Ireland, we see that the accession of Romania and Bulgaria has led to a migration corridor to Italy and Spain. The EU-2 populations in Italy and Spain exceed even the EU-8 populations in Germany and the UK (Eurostat, LFS data).

The economic crisis did have an impact on the EU-2 population in Spain though, showing a slight decrease starting in 2009, while the EU-2 population in Italy shows a continuous increase. Irrespective of the economic crisis, Germany and the UK show some increase in the EU-2 population, but the total size of these populations remains relatively small when compared to the EU-8 population. Also the EU-2 population in Ireland has not become very significant (See Figure 4).
2.2 Different types of mobile EU citizens

Not all intra-EU mobility of EU citizens concerns mobility for economic reasons. The main reasons for EU citizens moving within the EU are, in descending order of importance: employment, family (accompanying family, family reunification and family formation), study and retirement (Benton and Petrovic 2013). The major proportion of all mobile EU citizens will in effect be mobile workers, but not necessarily all those relating to ‘migration for work’, such as accompanying family members (children and partners), will be economically active. Some may be retired migrant workers remaining in the Member State of their last job; others are EU citizens who move to another EU Member State after having reached pensionable age and/or a sufficient pension or income to be able to live abroad, for example the intra-European ‘sun-belt migration’. Benton and Petrovic (2013) estimate other EU pensioners in Spain to have been above 200,000 in 2011. Another interesting category is student mobility within the EU, of which a proportion will be registered as internal migrants only if their stay in the host country is long enough to fit the migration registration requirements. To give an impression of the phenomenon: in 2008 EU students ranged from 2% of the foreign population coming from other EU countries in Spain, to 16% in the same category in the UK (Benton and Petrovic 2013).

All examples in the section above may fall under one of the categories of Free Movement of EU citizens within the EU. Since the introduction of a directive on posted workers, and more generally the Services directive, EU citizens have been able (temporarily) to sell their services within the EU at large. Their free movement is not impacted on by the free movement regulations and as such is not hindered by free movement restrictions as is the case in transitional periods. Based on LFS data on self-employment, Galgoczi and Leschke (2012), both working at the European Trade Union Institute, do not observe much evidence of widespread (ab)use of the status of self-employment at the aggregate level of the EU-15 (the EU-15 considered as a whole). However, they do observe higher to much higher self-employment rates among EU-8 and/or EU-2 nationals at the
national level (e.g. in Germany, The Netherlands and Belgium) when compared to the self-employment rates among nationals in these countries. The UK exhibits high self-employment rates among EU-2 nationals (restricted free movement), while the same rates for EU-8 nationals (no restrictions) are in line with the rates for British citizens. The authors conclude that ‘while at the aggregate level (EU-15) we do not see “excessive” recourse to (bogus) self-employment, it clearly does appear to be an adjustment strategy in those countries and by those groups whose access to the labour market is denied or restricted by transitional measures’ (Galgoczi and Leschke 2010).

2.3 Intra-EU mobility, enlargement and the economic crisis

The recent enlargements have undoubtedly increased the number of arrivals of EU citizens in the old member States of the EU. The available data show that new Member States tend to have become involved in intra-EU mobility as sending countries. However, the combined share of mobile workers from other EU countries is still below that of the share of third country workers. In 2011, 4.1% of EU residents were from outside the EU (third-country nationals), and only 2.5% were EU nationals living in another Member State (Benton and Petrovic 2012). This relatively low-key intra-EU mobility emphasises that the integration of European labour markets is still limited. To stimulate mobility, the EC has enacted measures to reduce barriers to free movement, for instance the European Job mobility action plan.

The enlargements have had a very different impact on different Member States: some Member States (UK, Germany, Ireland, Spain, Italy) have received (unexpectedly) large numbers of migrant workers from the new accession states; other Member States have been less attractive as destination countries, due to restrictions of free movement or for other reasons. Some new Member States such as Poland, Romania and Bulgaria have become the main suppliers of internal EU migrants. However, the impact of emigration is still relatively greater on Member States with small populations, such as Lithuania, than on larger Member States such as Poland. Much of the existing research is done from the perspective of the receiving states. Less attention is paid to the impact of the enlargements and the economic crisis on sending states, specifically new Member States that have entered the EU more recently. Proper (comparative) statistics are lacking and make it difficult to report on the relative impact of the loss of workers, students and entrepreneurs on the sending countries.

The current economic recession led to a temporary drop in intra-EU mobility at the onset of the crisis (2009-2010), followed by a rebound since then (EC 2013b). At the onset of the crisis, mobility declined for all groups of EU nationals except for citizens of the Baltic States, possibly due to the deep recession faced by those countries (EC 2013b). During 2011-2012 mobility flows recovered, but were higher than in the pre-crisis period of 2007-2008 only in countries severely affected by the crisis: Greece, Spain, Ireland, Hungary and Latvia (EC 2013b; EC 2013a; See Figure 5). Emigration from these countries increased sharply, while immigration to those countries has dropped significantly. In 2011, high emigration rates in percentages of the total population could be found in Ireland (1.9%), Lithuania (1.8%) and Spain (1.1%) (EC 2013b). Due to the combination of the increase in emigration and decrease in immigration flows, net migration in Spain, Ireland, Portugal and Greece has turned negative since 2010-2011. Most emigrants from Portugal are nationals. However, in 2011 more than half of the emigrants departing from Ireland were returning non-nationals (especially EU foreigners) and more than 80% of the emigrants from Spain were non-nationals, most of them third-country nationals returning home (ibid). Most of the emigrants leaving countries hit by the crisis went to other EU countries,
except for Spain. However, a high proportion of the emigrants leaving Spain for non-EU destinations are non-EU nationals returning to Morocco and Latin America (EC 2013b).

Figure 5 The effect of the crisis: outflows from crisis countries to EU destinations

![Graph showing outflows from crisis countries to EU destinations](image)

Source: Dhéret et al. 2013

Despite the strong increase in mobility from Southern Member States, the figures remain relatively low in absolute terms compared to the size of the labour force of these Member States (except for Ireland), but also in comparison to the much larger mobility flows from the new Member States (EC 2013b). Poland and Romania remain the two main origin countries of mobile EU citizens. In 2011-12, 56% of intra-EU movers came from the EU-12 Member States, and 19% from Southern Member States (ibid). Another effect of the crisis is the shift in destination countries of intra-EU movers: a drop in mobility to Spain, Ireland and Italy, and an increase in mobility to Germany, Austria, the Benelux and Nordic countries. Emigrants from Southern Member States mainly move to the UK, Germany or France (ibid).

If we take a closer look at one of the main destination countries, Germany, we observe that the inflow of EU citizens rose significantly between 2008 and 2012. Most of these EU citizens came from EU-12 countries, and especially from Poland, Romania, Bulgaria and Hungary. Around 405,000 citizens from these countries arrived in 2012. The rise in inflows from Southern Member States is significant in relative terms, but modest in absolute terms: 118,000 persons in 2012 (EC 2013b). Mobile EU citizens from Southern countries are more often longer-term migrants than EU-12 citizens. The UK shows a somewhat comparable picture. Between 2010/11 and 2011/12, inflows of EU nationals to the UK had decreased for many EU-8 countries (-28%) and sharply increased for citizens from Southern Member States (around +25% for citizens from Spain and Portugal). However, the highest inflows are still from EU-12 countries, especially from Poland and Lithuania (EC 2013b). Dutch statistics (statline.cbs.nl) show a recent increase in predominantly Polish nationals residing in the Netherlands, from 43,083 in January 2010 to 74,629 in January 2013. The number of Bulgarians and Romanians residing in the Netherlands is also on the rise, but in January 2013 17.615 Bulgarian nationals and 9.496 Romanians were registered as residents in the Netherlands. Here we do not mention the unregistered population. The annual immigration from Southern Europe (Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain) to the Netherlands

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4 Estimates of the actual number of CEE migrants in the Netherlands are much higher. While in 2010 182,000 mobile citizens from CEE countries were registered in the Netherlands, it was estimated that in that year up to 340,000 mobile citizens from CEE were residing in the Netherlands (Van der Heijden...
between 2007 and 2012 increased by 21%, from 60.460 to 73.300 (the Netherlands’ Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 2013). The mobility of the majority of these Southern European migrants was work-related (statline.cbs.nl). However, the actual numbers will be higher, because EU citizens recently arrived or staying for a short time tend not to register.

2.4 Lifting remaining restrictions on Free Movement rights of EU-2 citizens

Every enlargement of the EC/EU by the addition of new Member States has led to political and public discussions and debate about the expected levels of intra-EU mobility and about unwanted and even uncontrollable increases in mobility movements between new and old Member States. At the time of writing this research paper a similar discussion is taking place in some of the Western-European Member States about the supposed negative effects on receiving countries with a view to the establishment of full rights of Free Movement for Bulgarians and Romanians at the start of 2014.

Politicians in some Western-European countries, including the UK, the Netherlands, Belgium and Germany, express serious concerns about the impact of the expected increased inflows of Bulgarians and Romanians and the lack of urgency in Brussels on this question. For instance, in January of this year, UK Prime Minister David Cameron announced that he would “look at arguments” to make it harder for nationals from EU countries to settle in Britain and claim social security benefits. EU “benefit tourism” is a central term in the UK’s discussion. A Position Paper released by the German Association of Cities (2013) stated “the migration of nationals from Bulgaria and Romania, who sometimes live in the most precarious conditions at home and therefore take the chance to improve their personal situation in the rest of Europe with reasonable motives, becomes a serious problem” for many municipalities. In Germany the debate is being carried out under the slogan “poverty immigration” (“Armutseinwanderung”). In an article in the Independent of 17 August 2013 the Dutch Deputy Prime Minister Asscher and the Director of the British think tank Demos, David Goodhart, expressed serious concerns about the impact of the continuing inflow of citizens from Eastern European Member States (Asscher and Goodhart 2013). In the spring of this year, the interior ministers of the UK, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands sent a letter to the European Commission, warning that some cities in their countries were being put “under a considerable strain by certain immigrants from other member states”. Although the ministers did not mention Bulgaria and Romania, “the letter came ahead of a January 2014 deadline, when citizens from these two EU countries will be granted full access to the EU’s job market”. These concerns partly relate to the mobility of the Roma population of these two countries. One response of the Commission was that there were no figures to back the ministers’ claim. Later that year the Commission published a study that shows that there is little evidence of “benefits tourism” in Europe (Juravle et al. 2013). Some British reports also show that

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2013). Van der Heijden estimated that in 2010 40,000 Bulgarians, 70,000 Romanians and 170,000 Poles resided in the Netherlands (ibid). Moreover, these migrants were concentrated in a limited number of regions. For instance, in the Netherlands the CEE migrants are concentrated in the Western regions (Rotterdam, The Hague, the Westland) and Southern regions (North Brabant and Limburg). See Case Study The Hague: the city estimated that around 30,000 CEE migrants reside in the city, while the city of Rotterdam estimated that it has around 30,000 to 50,000 CEE migrants.


8 http://www.euractiv.com/socialieurope/commission-gets-cold-feet-push-i-news-519366

9 Ibid.

the label 'welfare tourism' does not match EU migrants and that it is unlikely that large numbers of EU-2 migrants will be coming to the UK in 2014 (Rolfe et al. 2013; Dustmann and Frattini 2013).

Thus, several Western Member States fear a large influx of Romanian and Bulgarian citizens. It is no coincidence that these are precisely the Member States that continued to restrict labour market access for Bulgarian and Romanian workers until the end of this year. Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, Malta, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom continue to impose restrictions on the right of Bulgarian and Romanian nationals to work there, while Spain restricts its labour market to Romanian workers only. For some of these EU Member States that have shown to be attractive to immigrants from specific other EU Member States, there is some insecurity as to what may happen to the internal EU migration flows from the very moment that (national) restrictions on mobility from Bulgaria and Romania on the Free Movement are lifted on 1st of January 2014.

In general one may observe that in situations where a migration potential is suddenly unleashed by a lifting of restrictions, that mobility may show a sudden but temporary growth, to decrease again after a number of years. But there are two Preconditions for this to happen; firstly, is there a legal basis for immigration and settlement? And, secondly, is there a real demand in the destination country for these new workers? After the fall of the Iron Curtain, former Western Germany witnessed a major inflow of ethnic Germans, and Jews moved to Israel or the United States, but there were no signs yet of massive inflows of others from former Eastern Bloc countries in that period (they didn’t have a right to live and work in Germany). After a number of years the immigration of ethnic Germans started to decrease. During the economic boom years, a country like Ireland witnessed important EU-8 (notably Polish) inflows, but those days are over now, and a substantial part of the Polish population has actually returned to Poland. The big question is how much potential there is still in EU-2 countries that might be unleashed by the lifting of the existing transitional restrictions to free movement, taking into consideration that free movement for employment can take place only if relevant vacancies can be filled by nationals from the EU-2 countries. There is evidence that the emigration potential of these two countries is limited: the total population of these two countries is smaller than the total population of Poland, both countries have ageing and shrinking populations, and a substantial part of the 20-39 age group is already mobile in the EU (Düvell 2013).

Much will depend on the employment situation in the (potential) destination countries in the EU, but also on the existence of relevant migration networks, recruitment channels and job-search methods. One of the reasons for lower but continued mobility from the EU-2 lies in the continuation of huge disparities between the income levels of the EU-2 and EU-15 countries. On the other hand, the economic conditions in these countries are improving and labour and skill shortages are reported there (Düvell 2013). Earlier examples of enlargement effects on internal EU mobility (Spain, Greece and Portugal) showed a decrease in intra-EU mobility after the end of the transitional period (specifically from Greece and Spain) with (fast) growing home economies in those countries. However, the difference in income levels between EU-2 and EU-15 countries is still too large for one to expect this to happen as well. On the other hand, the current employment problems in most EU-15 Member States will not offer many job opportunities.

A strong increase in inflows of workers from EU-2 countries in, for example, the Netherlands, Belgium or the United Kingdom is less likely, given the fact of rising unemployment and a lack of networks (outside the Turkish

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Bulgarian minority) (Düvell 2013). An increase may occur, due to the huge differences in income levels between Western European Member States and the EU-2 countries, but mobility will be very much restricted by the availability of jobs. The lifting of restrictions in January 2014 may even lead to less interest from individual migrants in using posted worker constructions, since legal migration is possible, and abuse by certain placement agencies can be avoided. What might remain problematic is a possible increase in temporary job seekers and temporary migrant workers (less than 3 months) from EU-2 countries who do not register during their stay. Their job chances in the formal economy may be low, and they may add to existing housing problems like overcrowding and the incidence of homelessness. Countries with relatively large migrant communities from, for example, EU-2 countries, like Italy and Spain, may be confronted with continued inflows from these countries, be it that the flows may be seriously dampened by the current economic crisis. A possible scenario is that, because of the high youth unemployment rates in Italy and Spain, many more Romanians and Bulgarians may choose more economically attractive destination countries. These differences in employment opportunities might also be an incentive for secondary migration of EU-2 nationals in Spain and Italy to Member States with lower unemployment rates. Aside from numbers, another major uncertainty is to which regions of the various countries these EU-2 migrants will go and what sorts of jobs they will seek. For instance, Romanian and Bulgarian migrants in the UK are currently concentrated in London, while Polish-born migrants have spread more widely around the UK (The Migration Observatory 2013). In sum, there are enormous uncertainties about what sort of numbers of Romanian and Bulgarian migrants the different regions in Member States may expect in the future (ibid; Rolfe et al. 2013).
3 The demographic impact of intra-EU mobility

One of the main impacts of mobility relates to population change. “Today, the most important force behind European population change is international migration, but the impact of internal migration is also considerable” (ESPON and NIDI 2010). Now and in the future, natural population development will have only a limited impact on population change in Europe. This section puts the impact of mobility in its demographic context.

3.1 Demographic impact of mobility

Migration or mobility has a significant impact on demographic and labour force developments in Europe. This is clearly shown in two recent studies on the impact of demographic trends on regional and urban development (ESPON and NIDI 2010; Geroházi et al. 2011). This section is based primarily on the results of the ESPON project DEMIFER (Demographic and Migratory flows Affecting European Regions and Cities) (ESPON and NIDI 2010).

There are currently two major divisions with regard to population dynamics worth mentioning within the countries of the European Union: there is an East-West division and a North-South divide. Along these axes, three demographic macro-regions can be distinguished in Europe (Geroházi et al. 2011: 29-30):

1. Western and Northern Europe: high fertility belt of Europe, high level of immigration;
2. Southern Europe and German-speaking countries: low fertility rates, high level of immigration.
3. New Member States in Central and Eastern Europe: low fertility rates, little or no immigration and in some countries extensive emigration.

In addition, each area suffers from extensive ageing. The Eastern European countries have a generally younger age structure than Western Europe, but this advantage is expected to disappear in a decade or two (ESPON and NIDI 2010). The current economic crisis hits both birth rates and international migration. For instance, countries with the sharpest increase in youth unemployment since the start of the crisis (Southern Europe, the Baltic States, Ireland) experience decreasing immigration and increasing emigration (ESPON and NIDI 2010).

Within the above-mentioned trends in EU macro-regions, there are important differences in demographic trends within national borders. These can be made visible using data at the NUTS-2 level. To explore the impact of migration on population change until 2050, the DEMIFER project compared the changes in population between 2005 and 2050 based on two scenarios: a Status Quo Scenario (continuation of the demographic regime of 2005 until 2050) and a No Migration Scenario (continuation of the natural increase/decrease of 2005 while migration is blocked). Map 1 in Annex 1 shows estimates of the impact of migration on the demographic development of the EU (on NUTS-2 level regions): The different colours indicate the difference of the impact of migration on population trends compared to the No Migration scenario. It should be kept in mind that these are scenarios with all their limitations and uncertainties. For instance, the scenarios depart from pre-crisis data. Furthermore, there are all kinds of more fluent forms of migration that

are not sufficiently taken into account due to non-existent official data. Moreover, data availability, the quality of data and comparability of data are notorious obstacles to comparative migration research. For instance, emigration numbers reported by sending countries tend to differ from the corresponding immigration numbers of receiving countries (ESPON and NIDI 2010).  

Some key findings from the DEMIFER study (ESPON and NIDI 2010: 15) are:

- As was to be expected: affluent regions, including metropolitan areas in Eastern Europe, would gain on migration, whereas poor and peripheral regions would lose. Therefore it is expected that migration will be a strong factor increasing regional disparities.
- Regions gaining population (especially the EU-15 Member States) do so mainly due to immigration from third-country nationals. In contrast, intra-European mobility will have a greater impact than migration from outside the EU for a third (32%) of the EU regions, and in particular the regions of Bulgaria, Poland, Romania and Slovakia; here population decreases significantly as a result of intra-EU mobility. Most countries and regions experiencing population decrease do so mainly as a result of natural population decrease.
- International migration cannot compensate for the decline in the labour force in Europe due to ageing, as it would require migration numbers that are many times higher than today’s.

Overviews of domestic or internal mobility in Europe are scarce. The DEMIFER study presents some relevant insights. At the regional level, the DEMIFER study distinguishes two different components of population change through migration: internal migration between regions within the boundaries of a Member State and international migration, without distinguishing third-country nationals and EU citizens. The influence of these components is analysed in the DEMIFER study for the 2005-2010 period: see Map 2 in Annex 1. This analysis shows that regions experiencing internal migration to other regions within national borders are located in the more peripheral regions of all Member States, for instance northern regions in France, Scandinavia and Scotland, eastern regions in Germany, Slovakia and Hungary, and southern regions in Italy and the Netherlands (ESPON and NIDI 2010). The combination of positive internal and positive external (that is, international) migration occurred in most (42%) of the regions, including many regions of Western and Southern Europe, but also the region around Warsaw. Regions with both negative internal and negative international migration (13% of the regions) are mainly located outside the largest metropolitan regions in Eastern Member States (ESPON and NIDI 2010). These regions have to deal with the effects of depopulation and ageing.

3.2 Urban dynamics

The majority of the European population (71%) lives in cities (Geroházi et al. 201: 74). There are a variety of urban dynamics across Europe with regard to population growth and decline (urbanisation, suburbanisation, urban decline, re-urbanisation), age structure (ageing) and economic and entrepreneurial vitality. The diversity in population dynamics of urban regions is the combined result of natural population change and migration (ibid; see also EC 2010a). The urban areas with a shrinking population are concentrated in the Member States

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13 As mentioned in the Afterword of the DEMIFER report, the migration estimates used for this report deviated greatly from the official data of Cyprus: according to the data uses by the researcher Cyprus experienced negative net migration, while the data from Cyprus suggested that net migration was positive (ESPON and NIDI 2010: 64).
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), while most cities in the EU-15 countries are growing (Geroházi et al. 201: 75). However, there are also growing metropolitan areas in CEE, mostly due to internal migration.

The Second State of the Cities Report offers a more nuanced picture. It discerns and compares four types of cities in Europe (EC 2010a: p. 42 ff.), according to their size and economic and administrative function. The largest and most thriving agglomerations are the type A cities: 52 Principal Metropolises in all parts of Europe. The smaller and less dynamic type B cities consist of 151 Regional Centres in all parts of Western Europe, with economic and entrepreneurial activity still considerably above national averages. The type C cities comprise 44 Smaller Centres, mainly in Western Europe and mostly outside its economic core zone. Finally, type D cities are discerned: 82 smaller Towns and Cities of the Lagging Regions in Central and Southern Europe, “which differ from other cities in that they have higher unemployment, lower GDP per head and a regional specialisation, in which manufacturing plays a far more important role” (EC 2010a: 11).

Data from the 2004 Urban Audit reveal that most cities of types A - C gained population due to net immigration in 2003/2004, while almost all smaller cities in the lagging regions (type D) were losing population due to net emigration (EC 2010a: 59). Since 2004, the situation has changed considerably due to the enlargements and the economic crisis. However, the often-observed relationship between in-migration (both of nationals and foreigners) and urban economic wealth and activity remains relevant: “[w]hile vibrant cities in the core zones of the European economy attract many migrants from within and beyond national borders, in peripheral locations, the inflow of migrants from other regions and countries is low” (EU 2010: 16).

In addition to the concentration of (skilled) people, location, the availability of resources and infrastructure - including the transport network – also determine the economic power of cities. Nowadays the fundamental economic units of the world are – according to scientists such as Richard Florida (Florida et al. 2007) and Ross and Woo (2011) – not nations but mega-regions. Mega-regions are a chain of metropolitan centres and their surrounding areas that have developed interconnected economic systems, and shared natural resources and common transportation systems. They are connected by trade, transport, scientific innovation and talent. These mega-regions are magnets of population growth, attracting young, well-educated internal and international migrants, and they sometimes extend state lines. Richard Florida discerns a dozen mega-regions in Europe: Glasgow-Edinburgh, London-Leeds-Manchester-Liverpool-Birmingham, Amsterdam-Rotterdam-Antwerp-Brussels, Rome-Milan-Turin, Barcelona-Marseille-Lyon, Vienna-Budapest, Stuttgart-Frankfurt-Mannheim, and mega-regions around Paris, Berlin, Prague, Madrid and Lisbon.14

4 The impact of intra-EU mobility on regions of origin

4.1 Introduction

This section describes and analyses the impact of intra-EU mobility on countries and regions of origin (research question 2), focussing on countries experiencing significant outflows to other Member States. Research and data that could shed more light on the advantages and drawbacks of intra-EU mobility are still relatively scarce. However, a number of recent studies on the effects of post-enlargement emigration are available. For this reason this section focuses on East-West mobility in the EU. Much less is known about more recent outflows from regions most affected by the crisis. Therefore, we will consider these more recent intra-EU mobility patterns only briefly. Moreover, the case studies will address impacts both from East-West and South-North intra-EU mobility.

Discussions on the positive and negative impacts of migration can cause a lot of disagreement and confusion. Distinguishing different aspects of the impact of migration can clarify some discussions. Migration effects are usually distinguished in various types of impacts (see e.g. Muus 1995). Firstly, effects of emigration or immigration can be experienced at different levels: at the macro-level or at the micro-level of individual migrants and those left behind. Additionally, the impacts can be measured on various macro-spatial scales: EU, national, regional or local level. This paper focuses on the macro-level of cities, regions and countries. Secondly, a distinction can be made between different dimensions: economic/labour market, social/cultural and territorial/spatial effects. Thirdly, one can distinguish between a short-run and a long-run perspective on impacts. Fourthly, a distinction can be made between the assessments of the effects as positive, negative or neutral. The assessment will vary according to the stakeholders’ perspective, for instance the perspective of migrants, relatives left behind, employers, regions of departure and regions of destination.

4.2 Outflows and mobility patterns

Migration and its consequences should be studied in their historical context. Four phases of emigration from the new Member States in CEE can be distinguished (Bélorgey et al. 2012):

(1) the early 1990s (after the fall of the Iron Curtain);
(2) mid 1990s to 2003 (prior to the 2004 accession);
(3) 2004 to 2008 (after the 2004 accession; 2007 for Romania and Bulgaria), and
(4) 2008 up to the present (developments since the economic crisis).

While EU labour mobility from the EU-8 and EU-2 had already gained importance in the second phase, it was highest in the third, post-accession phase. Since the economic crisis, the mobility from CEE to the EU-15 has declined but has not stopped. There is no evidence of mass return migration, although return migration to some countries - for instance, Poland and Slovakia – has clearly increased (Bélorgey et al. 2012). 15

15 At the same time the new Member States are also experiencing immigration. Some countries, including the Czech Republic, have clearly become counties of immigration. Much of the labour migration consists of temporary migration from non-EU countries in CEE. In addition, the new Member States received asylum seekers (for instance, from former Yugoslavia) and function as transit regions for asylum seekers heading to other EU Member States (Lieshaj 2013)
Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Greece and Spain are former emigration countries (until the 1980s) that developed into net immigration countries in the 1990s. However, since the onset of the economic crisis in the Eurozone (since 2008), they have again transformed into net emigration countries.

The impact of intra-EU mobility on countries of origin is a rather new research theme in the context of intra-EU mobility. Still, there is a growing number of studies on this issue for CEE countries. In this section we will consider some of the findings for EU-8 and EU-2 countries. This section relies considerably on the findings of the large research project entitled “Social impact of emigration and rural-urban migration in Central and Eastern Europe”, and especially the Synthesis Report (Bélorgey et al 2012) that draws on country studies on all the EU-8 and EU-2 Member States.

This section will concern five countries with high outflows of mobile citizens in particular: Romania, Poland and the three Baltic states. Romania is a main source country of migrants, with 15% of its population outside its borders (Alexe et al. 2012). Poland is another major emigration countries in the EU: 6.3% of its total resident population had left it during the transition period (1989-2009), and with several regions suffering from much higher emigration rates (Okólski and Topinska 2012) in terms of the percentage of the working age population, Lithuania and Latvia have lost the most significant share of their populations (Woolfson 2013; see also the case study on Lithuania in Part 2). For instance Latvia has lost 9.1% of its population and almost 14% of its labour force since the beginning of the 21st century (Engbersen and Jansen 2013). Emigration from Lithuania and Latvia increased significantly during the recent crisis. Large-scale emigration increases the natural population decline in these countries. In relative terms, the Baltic States, Bulgaria and Romania are most affected by population decrease, to a significant extent due to emigration (see Bélorgey et al. 2012: 15): a population decline between 2001 and 2011 of 7% in Lithuania, 6% in Latvia, 8% in Bulgaria and 5% in Romania.

The impact of out-migration depends on the profile of the emigrants and migration patterns. The profile of the emigrants differs both between countries and over time. For instance, the profile of emigrants from Latvia and Lithuania has changed over the years: the percentage of more highly educated emigrants has increased, and the emigrants are more oriented towards long-term or even permanent migration together with their families to the UK, the USA, Ireland, Norway or Germany (Engbersen and Jansen 2013; Woolfson 2013). These emigrants have a low propensity for return. In contrast, the average Estonian emigrant is a blue-collar worker who moves to Finland to work in construction (ibid). These mobile citizens are more inclined to temporary or circular migration. Polish migration has a predominantly ‘fluid’ (temporary) character as well (Engbersen and Jansen 2013).

The current economic crisis has triggered another mobility pattern in the EU, from countries severely hit by the crisis, especially from Greece, Spain, Portugal and Ireland, to other Member States and to destinations outside Europe. According to Dhéret et al. (2013: 10) 0.7% of the residents of Spain left the country for another EU Member State between 2008 and 2011, 1.7% did so from Greece, and 0.6% from Portugal. Emigration from Italy is lower than from other crisis-ridden countries (focus Migration 2013). Since 2008, 3.6% of the population of Ireland has emigrated (but by no means all to an EU destination).

Much less is known about these recent mobility movements. Initially, many of the emigrants were foreign nationals and nationals born abroad (probably returning migrants), but with the course of the crisis, the emigration of nationals has increased (focus Migration 2013). It appears that a significant proportion of
emigrants from southern Member States consists of young people, well or highly qualified and with foreign language knowledge and international experience (as students). There are even head-hunters from countries including Germany and Austria active in Southern Member States, recruiting targeted personnel in bottleneck areas, for instance doctors and technicians (focus Migration 2013: 17).

4.3 Socio-economic impact of emigration

Studies on the impact of emigration generally deal with the economic effects on the national level. Analysts conclude that mass outflows from the CEE Member States have both economic advantages and disadvantages for the countries of origin (Benton and Petrovic 2012; Dhéret et al. 2013). Figure 6 summarises the positive and negative effects of emigration.

Figure 6 Economic effects of labour emigration on countries of origin

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Positive effects</th>
<th>Negative effects</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Lower unemployment rates</td>
<td>• Negative demographic trends (ageing, lack of territorial cohesion);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Decreased pressure on social protection budgets</td>
<td>• Unbalanced distribution of the available workforce by sector and geographical area;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Remittances support the improvement of living standards</td>
<td>• Business losses due to wage pressure;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Workers abroad facilitate skill transfer and growth</td>
<td>• Brain drain (loss of investment in education and training, lower competitiveness);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• A threat to the sustainability of social protection systems (pension, medical care).</td>
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</tbody>
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Source: Engbersen and Jansen 2013, (based on a presentation of Mereuta on the effects of labour migration on Romania)

4.3.1 Benefits of emigration

In general, the benefits include a decline in unemployment rates, lower spending on social benefits and other public services and extra capital inflows (remittances). The emigration from EU-8 and EU-2 Member States was strongly linked to the economic restructuring in the context of the transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. Areas and countries with the highest unemployment and poverty rates – the Baltic States, Bulgaria, and Romania - have experienced the highest outflows (Bélorgey et al. 2012). In this sense, emigration was a welcome alternative for unemployed youth. There are indications that emigration alleviated unemployment in EU-8 and EU-2 Member States (Benton and Petrovic 2012). This is also the case for the emigration from Southern Member States and Ireland since 2008. Dhéret et al. (2013: 30) estimate that the Spanish government would have spent nearly four billion euros on additional unemployment benefits in 2011 for workers who emigrated to Europe and other regions of the world.

In addition, remittances to family members left behind can constitute a significant advantage for countries of origin. The remittances represented 4.4% of Bulgaria’s annual GDP between 2004 and 2010, around 2% of Polish GDP, and around 4% of Romania’s (Dhéret et al. 2013: 31). Remittances to the Baltic States are relatively high as well, for instance the remittances to Lithuania between 2004 and 2011 were almost 5 per cent of the GDP of Lithuania and between 1.5 to 2.5 per cent of the GDP of Estonia and Latvia (Woolfson 2013: 22).
As a result of the economic crisis, the total volume of remittances decreased markedly in most of the countries. This is related to return migration and to the fact that many migrants work in sectors that were hit by the economic downturn. In Bulgaria, Romania, Poland and the Baltic countries, remittances have a significant economic impact. For instance, in 2010, about 9 per cent of Latvian household consumption was financed by remittances, and slightly less in Lithuania (Woolfson 2013). Remittances may represent an important source of income for the Southern European countries (and Ireland) as well, although the emigration flows are less pronounced and reference GDPs considerably higher (Dhéré et al 2013: 31).

Surveys show that remittances are predominantly used for consumer goods and housing construction. Remittances increase consumption, and thus fuel domestic economic activity. In addition, remittances tend to play a role in poverty reduction. In Romania, it appears that returners and households with migrants are more prone to use remittances for their entrepreneurial activities (Bélorgey et al. 2012; Black et al. 2010). Remittances have potential negative effects, such as inflationary pressure and growth in inequality between remittance receiving and non-receiving households. There is some evidence that the effects of remittances on (increasing) inequality are limited for CEE countries, due to the limited size of remittances compared with welfare transfers in those countries (Bélorgey et al. 2012).

4.3.2 Costs of emigration

Emigration also has its disadvantages from an economic point of view. Losing part of their working-age population may have detrimental effects on countries of origin, especially in the medium and the longer term. Disadvantages are the loss of skilled workers (potential brain drain effects) and skill shortages in certain sectors (related to outflows) that could harm economic growth.

In the short term, the loss of human capital may be limited, especially when mobility is temporary and driven by unemployment (Dhéré et al. 2013). However, the outflow of workers may in certain circumstances lead to labour market shortages. Acute shortages in for instance the Baltic States, Bulgaria, Romania and Poland occurred in precisely those sectors in which the demand for low-skilled workers was highest in the EU-15, namely in the manufacturing, hotel and construction sectors (Benton and Petrovic 2012; Bélorgey et al. 2012). Nevertheless, these labour shortages cannot be attributed exclusively to emigration. Shortages of health professionals are a well-researched subject. Health professional mobility from East to West in the EU may have a negative impact on the performance of the domestic health system, mainly in rural areas of CEE Member States (Bélorgey et al. 2012). The shortage of health professionals in urban areas is filled by the mobility of health professionals from rural areas. In some countries, for instance Poland, shortages in certain sectors were partly filled by the inflow of foreign professionals, especially from Ukraine (Okólski and Topińska 2012).

Emigration of part of the working age population may also increase wages in the countries of origin. Wages in the post-accession countries actually increased, but here again one should be careful in interpreting data: “overall restructuring and business cycle, rather than emigration, may be the key driving factors” behind such labour market developments (Kahanec and Zimmermann 2009).

All CEE Member States report out-migration of highly educated people, in particular scientists, technical professionals and physicians. Highly educated people have also been moving from Southern European countries since the 2008 crisis. The outflow of talented people can be labelled ‘brain drain’ if it threatens the potential economic growth of the country. In the case of the outflow of talented people from the CEE Member States, Bélorgey et al. (2012: 43) speak of ‘brain overflow’ instead of ‘brain drain’, because these Member
States experienced a boost in enrolment in tertiary education while they could not provide enough jobs for highly skilled workers (e.g. in Poland, see Fihel 2011). However, the outflow of talented people may have serious negative effects if it endangers the provision of essential services in the member states, such as health care (Dhéret et al 2013).

In the longer term, outflows of part of the working age population may increase the demographic imbalances in ageing societies and thus may have profound consequences for the sustainability of social protection, including pensions and health care (McAleer 2013). This could especially be the case for countries with the highest outflows, including Bulgaria, Romania and the Baltic States (Bélorgey et al. 2012: 42), as well as Ireland (McAleer 2013). But the real impact will depend on the size and characteristics of the return migrants.

4.3.3 Return migration
The long-term effects of emigration are determined significantly by the remittances and return migration. Many intra-EU labour migrants return temporarily or permanently to their country of origin (Smoliner et al 2012). Return migration varies widely from country to country and is difficult to capture, because many of them may well emigrate again afterwards (Barcevicius et al. 2012). Taking into account the re-emigrating of returners, Eurofound estimated that the ratio of returners in 2010 to the stock of population abroad in 2009 was 12-14% in Poland, 9-14% in Latvia, 7-10% in Hungary and 3% in Romania (Barcevicius et al. 2012). The economic crisis appears to have caused only a minor increase in return migration (ibid).

The effects of returning migrants are not always positive. As Smoliner et al (2012: 5) states, “Skilled return migrants can stimulate knowledge-based development in their home country, but this is dependent on institutional and regional factors as well as context conditions”. The effects will be more positive if the migrants prepare for their return by mobilising resources (human capital, financial capital and networks abroad) and if they stay sufficiently long to accumulate these resources (ibid; Dhéret et al. 2013). However, research provides mixed evidence on the economic effects of return migration to CEE Member States with regard to career opportunities, income and self-employment upon return (Smoliner et al. 2012: 5). The Eurofound study found that the international work experience of highly skilled returnees was appreciated in the home labour markets, while this was seldom the case with the low-skilled mobile workers (Barcevicius et al. 2012). Additionally, skilled workers who worked below their qualification level often face difficulties reintegrating into their home labour markets (ibid). This is called ‘downskilling’ and happens regularly with CEE migrants. Moreover, the extent to which returning migrants can contribute to the economic development of the region of return depends to a large extent on the situation of the economy and the labour market they re-enter. When the return regions are characterised by traditional economy and an oversupply on the labour market – regularly the case in CEE return regions – this offers limited employment perspectives for returning migrants (Smoliner et al. 2012).

4.3.4 Diaspora and return policies
Many countries of emigration eventually develop policies to engage with their diaspora, their nationals abroad. Well known examples are countries with large populations of emigrants living abroad including Israel, Mexico, Morocco, Scotland and Ireland. For instance, the Irish government has initiated an ‘Irish Abroad Unit’ to coordinate financial support to Irish community organisations engaged in the delivery of services to vulnerable Irish communities abroad (Engbersen and Jansen 2013). The Baltic States have started to develop diaspora
policies as well. For instance, Estonia has developed the portal “Talents back home!”, to provide potential returners with strategic information about job opportunities in Estonia (Engbersen and Jansen 2013). In 2011, the Lithuanian government also launched a programme to maintain links with its diaspora.

One should distinguish between policies to engage with diasporas and policies to encourage emigrants to return and support for their reintegration into their countries of origin. To start with the latter issue, governments can ensure that migrants have access to relevant and adequate information on the labour market situation and opportunities in their countries of origin. These services should take into account the great diversity among emigrants. Subsequently, governments can do much to improve the conditions for the reintegration of returners into the labour market. These should differentiate between the needs of the heterogeneous population of returners, provide language support and skill recognition for returning emigrants and their families, but should not unfairly favour emigrants over non-emigrants (Engbersen and Jansen 2013).

Actually, several countries experiencing emigration have implemented some policy initiatives to attract returners and to support their re-integration (Barcevicius et al. 2012). Poland is one of the countries that developed a return policy when returns increased by the combination of the effects of the economic crisis and the relatively good condition of the Polish economy. It developed and implemented various activities at the national, regional and local levels to facilitate the return process, focusing on reintegration into the labour market and - in the case of children – into the educational system (Lesińska 2013). Activities include an information campaign, online services for returners, removing tax barriers for returning Poles, and engaging with specific target groups such as highly skilled professionals (ibid; see also the Polish case study in Part 2). However, there are signs that the labour market performance of returners shows a mixed picture. Returners are more exposed to the risk of unemployment than non-migrants (Engbersen and Jansen 2013). This seems to indicate that downskilling – working abroad in jobs that do not match their qualifications – hinders skill transfer (ibid). However, in the absence of this reintegration policy, the results of return would probably have been worse. Thus a key challenge for emigration countries is to create favourable conditions for the reintegration of return migrants.

Not all emigrants will (soon) return. Therefore, governments try to engage with diasporas for various reasons. If emigrants stay attached to their country of origin, they will be more inclined to send remittances or to do business with the country of origin. This is a two-way process, for emigrants generally maintain affective and material ties to their countries of origin. Experience and evidence show that fruitful diaspora projects that release the development potential of emigrants often come from within diasporas. The most effective approach for diaspora policies is to build on and support successful existing initiatives (Engbersen and Jansen 2013; Ionescu 2006). Further important guidelines are: avoid policies that explicitly favour emigrants over non-migrants (to avoid tensions between these groups) and policy makers need to respect the private nature (ownership) of remittances (Engbersen and Jansen 2013). Furthermore, authorities can make efforts to improve the administrative, legal and infrastructural conditions for economic activity to facilitate investments and the entrepreneurial activities of emigrants and returning migrants. Of course there is more to learn from successful diaspora policies around the world. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) and the Migration Policy Institute (MPI) published a handbook on this subject, offering policymakers and practitioners a practical guide on the state of the art in governmental diaspora initiatives (IOM/MPI 2012).
4.4 Social and territorial impact of emigration

4.4.1 Social impact

Emigration affects the social situation in the region of origin: the situation of family members left behind and the local population. Family members left behind include partners, children and parents. A number of the case study reports note an increased burden on women left behind, in terms of care-giving and responsibilities (Bélorgey et al. 2012: 96). Although males are overrepresented among the labour migrants, there are many women who migrate to work as well, for instance, as care or domestic workers. Children in particular are affected by cross-border mobility of one or both parents. There are no figures indicating how many children are involved though. According to estimates of a coalition of NGOs ‘Children left behind’, some 500,000 children of migrants are left behind in the EU. The majority of these children are in Romania and Poland, and smaller numbers in the Baltic States (Bélorgey et al. 2012: 98). In Poland, this issue has become a subject of public and policy concern. However, research evidence on the effects on children left behind is rather sparse and mixed (ibid). Much depends on how long parents are away for – for instance, in Poland in 40% of the cases the parent(s) were abroad for less than 2 months - and with whom children lived. Reviewing available research, Bélorgey et al. (2012: 99) conclude that “whilst migration may be a stress factor in relation to psycho-social well-being, school performance, and the like, it cannot be treated in isolation from socio-economic status and, above all, the quality of the child’s care network”. It is certainly a subject that authorities and schools should pay due attention to.

The special links between migration and older people are rarely an issue of research and policy interest (Bélorgey et al. 2012: 99). More generally, due to internal and international emigration, some regions experience a significant increase in the proportion of older people and, consequently a decrease in informal caring networks and formal community-based care services. The impact of ageing on regions and cities does receive attention in policies for and studies on shrinking areas.

The temporary or permanent return of migrants will have a social impact on the areas of return. The return of vulnerable groups deserves special attention, and especially the return of Roma migrants. In Romania, the international emigration of Roma tends to occur at a higher degree in less impoverished Roma communities. Large-scale Roma emigration occurred in some regions of Romania (in South West and Central regions). Traditionally, the majority of Roma migrate to Latinate speaking countries, and migration tends to involve a larger extended family (Bélorgey et al. 2012: 102). When Roma migrants return as ‘failed migrants’, that is, returning in a more desperate situation than they had been in before leaving, this tends to worsen their situation. In the past few years, the mobility of Roma EU citizens has raised concerns in some destination countries. A number of countries, including France and Italy, have returned Roma migrants, citing public security and health reasons (Collett 2013a).

Temporary and circular migration will have many other social, cultural and economic consequences for the regions and communities of origin. There is evidence that it generated new lifestyles and new attitudes towards consumption in for instance Bulgaria and Romania, and thus migration experiences functions as one of the modernising factors in these societies (Black et al. 2010; Sandu 2010). Changes in views and value systems brought about by migration experiences contribute to the development of new work ethics, knowledge and skills employed in the home villages and cities of returners (ibid). Returning temporary migrants are more inclined to start businesses and to improve their houses and physical environment than non-migrants, utilising
their increased financial and network capital (Sandu 2010). These changes in personal lifestyles have effects at the community level as well. The modernisation of value systems and the temporary separation from families may also have negative effects on marriages (more divorces) and lower birth rates (Sandu 2010).

4.4.2 Territorial impact

High outflows of migrants have territorial effects on countries and regions of origin. Migration - both domestic and international – tends to reinforce regional disparities within countries (Gleroházi et al. 2011). Urbanisation has already reached a high level in CEE countries; therefore rural-urban migration levels are in general modest (Bélorgey et al. 2012: 23). However, suburban migration of young, well-educated individuals has been substantial in some countries, including Poland (Zborowski et al. 2012; Steinführ and Haase 2007). In most rural areas with a shrinking population, natural decrease is the main factor of depopulation, but out-migration may exacerbate this process. Young people and more highly educated people are more prone to mobility to vibrant cities within and across the national borders.

The most striking effects of emigration appear to occur at rural level: depopulation of rural areas or ‘rural shrinkage’ (Haase et al. 2012). In all EU-8 and EU-2 Member States remote rural areas and old industrial zones experienced high out-migration, both internally and internationally. Some border regions traditionally have been characterised by commuting mobility, including Polish regions bordering Germany. The Baltic States experienced a high out-migration (mainly directed to Russia) from industrialised regions strongly oriented towards the Russian market. These selective outflows reinforce the trend of the accumulation of the elderly, less well-educated and less well-endowed in rural, peripheral and old industrial regions (Bélorgey et al. 2012). Poverty, social exclusion and limited access to social services form part of the so-called ‘vicious circle’ of poverty, increasing the problems caused by poverty and exclusion (Bélorgey et al. 2012: 51). As a result of these developments, there are large and growing disparities between capital cities and large urban centres on the one hand and rural areas reliant on single industries on the other hand (ibid). Regional variations in rates of severe material deprivation are particularly pronounced in Poland, Bulgaria and Romania (Bélorgey et al. 2012: 52).

Cities in these regions have to deal with a shrinking population. For instance, the regional urban centres in these shrinking rural areas will be affected by depopulation of the surrounding areas for which they provide services and facilities. Nonetheless, cities in shrinking regions can even grow. The city of Rzeszów in the Subcarpathian region in Poland is an example of this; it attracts internal migrants due to its economic performance and lower unemployment rates (see the case study in Part 2 of this paper). Another example is Saxony in the eastern area of Germany, a region characterised by a number of strong local growth centres within a shrinking periphery (Geroházi et al. 2011: 72). This is the result of a regional strategy to focus on the limited available resources to remain a dynamic region within Germany.

Urban shrinkage is an urgent challenge for many cities in CEE (Steinführ and Haase 2007; Geroházi et al. 2011). One should not forget that urban shrinkage is a development that occurs all over Europe and most shrinking cities in the last 50 years were located in Western countries (Geroházi et al. 2011: 77). However, currently urban shrinkage is highly characteristic of many cities in Eastern Member States. Shrinking cities have become the majority in these countries. Urban shrinkage is a complex process, a combination of various macro-level developments: (1) economic decline and job-related out-migration, (2) suburbanisation and a change in the settlement system, and (3) demographic change (natural decrease in population and ageing). Urban
shrinkage in cities in CEE is partly caused by changes that have to do with the post-socialist transformation of those states into market economies. “Whilst industrial change or economic decline is frequently a key cause of population loss, out-migration can then exacerbate problems in the city in a cycle of decline” (Brent et al. 2012).

The issue of shrinking cities is not typically an emigration phenomenon, but emigration may leave its specific marks. For instance, migrants leave family behind and seasonal migrants return occasionally. Moreover, international migrants from rural areas may choose to return to urban areas and larger cities. In that case, return migration may further increase the development gaps between regions and cities, for example between cities in western and eastern Poland (Geroházi et al. 2011). Such particular migration effects on urban areas receive scant attention in studies on shrinking cities.

A shrinking urban population does not necessarily constitute a serious problem for cities. The consequences vary, depending on the volume and pace of shrinkage, whether the loss is temporary or sustained, and the socioeconomic background of the city. Shrinkage is not a negative phenomenon as such, “until the point where it endangers the local economic base” (Geroházi et al. 2011: 97). The consequences are serious only “when the population decline coincides with a decline in economic performance and substantially less demand for public services and housing” (Geroházi et al. 2011: 79). This is referred to as “complex-shrinkage” (ibid). In this respect, main cities in CEE are not in such a bad condition. Medium sized cities all around Europe, but most of them located in CEE and the Mediterranean area, occupy a worse position (ibid). One of the problems of urban shrinkage is the problem of an oversized infrastructure in relation to the number of households. Cities in CEE have an advantage in this sense; due to their pre-transition legacy, they experienced housing shortages and low levels of infrastructure that could not be made up for in 20 years (Geroházi et al. 2011: 95).

There are remarkable differences in policy reactions to urban shrinkage within Europe. In the ‘Shrink Smart’ project, a research consortium distinguished two different approaches across Europe: “1) holistic explicit growth or stabilization strategies in Western countries, dealing implicitly with consequences of shrinkage, and 2) pro-growth strategies in post-socialist countries “emphasizing job-creation, based on attraction of inward investment and European funding, and rather not regarding the causes and consequences of shrinkage” (Bernt et al. 2012: 9).

There has been much research on urban shrinkage in Europe, and governments have experimented with policies in different circumstances of shrinkage. Recently shrinking cities can learn from the longer experience of those cities which have already developed knowledge and capacities to address the consequences (Bernt et al. 2012). Learning to accept shrinkage, trying to cope with it and to utilise the advantages of urban shrinkage to improve the quality of life for the existing residents is the most fruitful strategy, but pose major challenges to governments in shrinking cities across Europe (Haase et al. 2012; Haase et al. 2013, Rink et al 2010). For instance, it is advisable that cities that experience long-term shrinkage replace their growth-oriented strategies with qualitative decline-oriented strategies of ‘regrowing smaller’ (Geroházi et al. 2011; Wiechmann 2006). This smart-decline oriented strategy implies: restructuring the local economy, downsizing the housing market and introducing new forms of housing, creating new green areas after the demolition of housing objects, and introducing flexible solutions to secure the quality of public services (Geroházi et al. 2011: 97-98). Depopulated rural areas have come up with original solutions, such as multifunctional accommodation, e-health and local services run by citizens, which are of interest for shrinking cities as well (Haase et al 2012).
Coping with urban shrinkage “is a governance process in which many actors, such as local government, corporations, schools, business networks, local associations and – last but not least – citizens, have a role to play” (Haase et al 2012: 27). Urban shrinkage is a complex and comprehensive issue and coping with it requires the involvement of many stakeholders. These include multi-level governance and co-operation on a regional scale, the involvement of the private sector, but also of the civil society. Cooperation of local authorities with citizens to find ways to maintain the quality of life in their city can comprise several types of citizen participation, ranging from consulting to community-owned services (Haase et al 2012).

Cities with many citizens temporarily or permanently resident elsewhere face extra challenges. They can try to influence the out-flow and return of residents and to attract migrants from other regions. Geroházi et al. (2011: 109-110) present some examples of such mitigating types of policies in various cities across Europe: schemes to encourage talented international students to stay after they have finished their studies, improve the national and international transport links to the city, lure emigrants back, for instance by offering attractive housing, and improving employment opportunities for well-educated youth. Geroházi et al (2011) present mainly examples from Western and Southern Member States; according to them the EU-8 and EU-2 Member States pursue a more market-oriented and laissez-faire strategy regarding these issues, and “make little effort to influence migration processes” (ibid, p. 111). However, there are enough examples of initiatives in CEE Member States that aim to encourage migrants to return home and to create more favourable conditions to prevent skilled and talented residents from departing (see Engbersen and Jansen 2013; see the Polish case study in Part 2). Maintaining contacts with the diaspora with a view to trade, transnational entrepreneurial activities and investments, and return migration is a complementary strategy. Often emigrants make use of migration networks and settle in a limited number of destination regions. For instance, different migration patterns can be discerned among Romanian emigrants: in the Eastern part of the country migration to Italy dominates, and in the southern part that to Spain, and to Hungary from parts of Romania with high proportions of ethnic Hungarians (Sadu 2005). Regions of origin may focus their diaspora policies on such pockets of immigrant countrymen.

4.5 Conclusions

Temporary and permanent emigration provides emigration countries with many economic and social advantages, but it has its drawbacks as well for the countries of origin and for the transnational families involved. The economic benefits often appear to outweigh the disadvantages, but the disadvantages can be concentrated in certain regions and among certain groups. (Temporary) migration also has social effects, such as modernisation of values systems and temporarily separated families. It is striking that the urban dimension of emigration receives hardly any attention in research studies. Emigration is not only an urban issue in CEE, but it may well be that it has specific implications for cities.

Countries and regions of origin are confronted with various policy issues, dilemmas and choices regarding emigration. Some main issues and policy options are:

• Labour mobility information services at regional, national and EU levels to turn brain-drain into brain gain or brain circulation (Bélorgey et al. 2012: 144): prepare emigrants with adequate information, inform and
support emigrants abroad, improve the international recognition of credentials, assist returning migrants – especially long-term migrants and migrants who have worked below their skills level – in re-integrating into the labour market and educational system, recognise qualifications acquired abroad and implement a regional development strategy based on a wider and better skills base to make better use of the skills of returning migrants (Barcevicius et al. 2012; Smoliner et al. 2012). There are already various European initiatives to support job seekers in learning about opportunities in other Member States (EURES) and getting foreign qualifications recognised\(^{16}\), but advice from local mobility centres can offer more accessible and tailored guidance. Migration supporting policies do not intend to encourage emigration; instead, they respond to a situation in which part of the population intends to migrate or has already left the country.

- Cooperation with destination countries to coordinate the recruitment of skilled workers (to prevent acute labour market shortages), to prevent down-skilling, to inform and support emigrants abroad, and to assist in the return of emigrants (for instance homeless emigrants).

- Develop diaspora policies to keep contact with nationals and diaspora organisations abroad, in cooperation with receiving regions. Habitually, migrants themselves tend to cultivate connections with their home country. These links facilitate the re-integration process upon return. They also strengthen the economic and social ties between countries of origin and destination, and this is conducive to trade and flows of remittances and investments between those countries (Dhéret et al. 2013).

- Economic regeneration of declining regions and cities. The diaspora can play a role in the development of regions severely affected by migration. Along this line, some countries provide support for strategic investments or tax incentives for entrepreneurs in disadvantaged areas. Addressing the development of disadvantaged regions requires a long-term, comprehensive policy. It is a key priority to provide favourable conditions for economically active inhabitants and students to stay in the region, by a combination of good quality public services, good accessibility of the city (regionally and nationally), a certain degree of economic specialisation and affordable high-quality housing (EC 2010a: 17).

- Coping with challenges of shrinking regions: there is a body of knowledge on how to cope with shrinkage. An example is the ‘smart decline strategy’: restructure the local economy, develop new forms of housing, and stimulate flexible solutions public services.

- Developing policies requires the gathering of adequate data on migration outflows, return migration and their local impacts. Apparent gaps in data availability and programme evaluation hinder the development of effective policies.

5 The impact of intra-EU mobility on regions of destination

Mobile EU workers head for regions or countries with real job opportunities, irrespective of the specific demographic constellation of the area that attracts labour migrants. In section 3 we saw that current internal mobility in the EU has taken place both to countries with a relatively high fertility rate (Ireland until the start of the economic crisis, UK and, to a lesser degree, The Netherlands), and to countries with a relatively low one (e.g. Germany, Spain and Italy). This section gives an overview of the impact that intra-EU mobility has on the regions of destination. Here the focus will mostly be on the country level, as the specific impacts of internal EU mobility on cities (urban level) are not often studied in international comparative research. In Part 2 of this paper, the case studies will be devoted to a selected number of cities where EU immigration or emigration plays a role. The specific impact on the individual level of the EU migrant (and his/her family) is only taken up in the case of policy relevant issues such as the exploitation of internal EU migrants.

5.1 The impact on the labour market

The types of impact studied most in the realm of the labour market and economics in general mainly concern impacts on wages, employment and unemployment and on the question of foreign labour as a substitute for or as a complement to the existing workforce.

Here we take up conclusions of chapters in a study published by the OECD (2012) and a Dutch study on temporary migration (SEO 2012). Research shows that labour mobility from EU-8 and EU-2 countries in general has small yet positive effects in and on the EU countries of destination. The impact on wages and (un)employment is limited. Impacts may be different among other countries though, due to different migration histories and different local labour markets. In the absence of existing insights into the impacts on all destination areas and/or countries we limit ourselves to mentioning impacts in a number of important destination countries. These studies show a less alarming picture of the supposed negative impacts of internal EU mobility as put forward in current public debates in some destination countries.

5.1.1 Ireland: strong responses intra-EU mobility on huge economic fluctuations

Allen Barrett (2012) identifies two phases in the internal EU mobility to Ireland in relation to the 2004 and 2007 enlargements: a strong net migration from 2004 to 2008, and a negative net migration starting in 2009 due to a deep recession. Barret is positive about the advantages for Ireland of the employment of mobile EU-10 citizens. Their educational level is above that of the native population, while the wage disadvantage for EU-10 migrants was 18% in comparison to natives. The wage disadvantage is practically zero for low income earners but rises at higher skill/educational levels. The very fact that labour mobility responded to the huge fluctuations in the Irish economy (huge inflow when needed, negative net migration after the onset of the crisis that hit Ireland hard) is in a way a showcase of the potential balancing effects of intra-EU mobility for destination areas in the EU. While the impacts on Ireland’s economy and labour market may have been positive, the recession has had a severe impact on Ireland’s, mostly EU-8, immigrants.
5.1.2 UK: impacts on the main receiver of mobile EU-8 citizens

Besides Ireland, the United Kingdom was one of the three Member States that opted for direct access to free movement for the EU-8 countries. The inward mobility of EU-8 citizens has been impressive from 2004 onwards. The majority are overqualified for the jobs they are registered for. The largest national group (two thirds) among the EU-8 immigrants is from Poland. Recently the proportion of Poles has been decreasing and that of Latvians and Lithuanians is on the rise. According to Salt (2012) most EU-8 workers are young, show high employment rates, tend to work in lower skilled jobs and as such are on average paid less than natives. London has received the largest number of EU-8 migrants, but there are also important settlement areas in East Anglia and the Midlands. The different national groups show even more diverse regional settlement patterns.

The inward mobility of EU-2 nationals in the UK has been much more restricted, to seasonal work in agriculture and very small numbers of more highly skilled workers in, among others, health care (Salt 2012).

The fiscal and labour market impacts of post-enlargement inflows in the UK are probably small, but the research results remain a little unclear in the end. Most studies find the impact on wages or employment of natives small or non-existent. The economic crisis has had an effect on migrant employment, specifically a negative one in construction and the hospitality sector, but less so in agriculture and food processing. In other words, migrant employment in cities has been more and negatively impacted on than in rural areas. (Salt 2012)

Recent British reports show that the label ‘welfare tourism’ does not match EU migrants (Rolfe et al. 2013; Dustmann and Frattini 2013). Recent EEA immigrants contributed considerably to the UK’s public finances: between 2001 and 2011 they contributed 34% more to the fiscal system than they took out, with a net fiscal contribution of about 22.1 billion GBP (Dustmann and Frattini 2013). Furthermore, they participated more in the labour market than British citizens.

5.1.3 Italy: impacts on a main destination of mobile EU-2 citizens

Italy, like Spain, has received large inflows of workers from the new Member States in the past decade. As we saw before, the inflow from Romania and Bulgaria (EU-2) is impressive in both countries. The Italian case (Monti 2012) is interesting in this respect: from 2007 onwards, EU-2 workers have fallen under a transitional arrangement in Italy. They were kept out of the quota policy and allowed to enter the country if highly skilled and/or applying for work in strategic sectors. The last include, among others, work in construction, domestic and personal care, hotel related services, agriculture and fishery. All in all, one might conclude that Italy has applied the free movement of workers’ rights for EU-2 nationals in those sectors and professions where labour market needs exist(ed) to a relative high degree.

Paola Monti (2012), in her study on the free movement effects for the Italian labour market, states that her findings are consistent with the outcomes of other studies (Fic et al. 2011; Kahanec and Zimmerman 2010 and Brueckner et al. 2009): the Italian labour market has not suffered from recent migration from new Member States. The average effects on wages and unemployment are very low. These data fit the idea that immigrants tend to select Italy’s high-wage and low-unemployment regions (e.g. the northern and central regions). These regions offer the best employment opportunities for those who want to work in unskilled/lower skilled professions or below their educational or skill level. However, Monti (2012) also finds evidence for imperfect substitution between immigrants and the native population, leading to competition between established
immigrants and new EU immigrants. Immigrants tend to specialise in manual routine jobs, while natives move towards more complex jobs. The top three occupations of immigrants into new Member States are in cleaning, construction, restaurants and food services.

Monti (2012, p.143) refers to findings of some higher welfare dependency among immigrants than among natives, but after controlling for geographical locations, family characteristics and income levels, the differences become less pronounced. Higher welfare dependency is mainly caused by migrants’ lower incomes, large families and their living/working in regions with more generous local welfare policies.

5.1.4 Netherlands: fast growth among temporary workers from CEE

A study carried out by SEO (2012) on temporary workers from new Member States has shown that the number of workers working in temporary jobs (less than 4 months) is growing fast (over 100,000 during peak months). Formally they are not registered as migrants but they are registered in social security statistics. The economic and fiscal impacts of these workers are generally positive, as they contribute more than they consume in terms of social security and health care. Substitution effects are not observed for this category. Here we are confronted with the new modern aspect of internal EU mobility, a much higher temporality of stay of predominantly young migrants, and a possibility of a high incidence of return migration, when compared to more traditional stable and permanent aspects of internal EU mobility. While the SEO’s study (2012) generally leads to positive conclusions about this modern temporary migration within the EU, it also points to a number of problems in the domain of the (proper) accommodation of these temporary migrants and some additional problems that may arise from more concentrated forms of accommodation in specific localities. Attention will be given to this aspect in the paragraph on social impacts. The very fact of the non-registration in the population registers of these short term/temporary migrants (less than 4 months stay) is a serious problem for policy makers.

5.1.5 Conclusions about the labour market impact of intra-EU mobility

Most of the attention of recent studies on the impact of internal EU mobility is on migration from new accession states (EU-10 and EU-2). The first issue that arises is in what way the conclusions on the impact of mobility from those states are also applicable to the already existing free movement of persons between the old EU-15 member states. Also, this research paper is predominantly on the most recent internal EU mobility.

Most policy makers and researchers seem to focus on the impact of the free movement of persons and less, or not at all, on the impact of the free movement of services. The above-mentioned country studies generally point to economic advantages for the receiving countries and regions, as for example the relatively high employment rates of EU immigrants and the very low substitution of native workers by EU-8 or EU-2 mobile workers. One could wonder if the current attention given to negative impacts, like the existence of bogus self-employment with the help of placement agencies in the countries of origin, or the unfair wage competition that may arise by a malfunctioning of the free movement of services is currently often confused with the impacts of the free movement of workers and enlargement. These supposedly negative impacts should be treated under the proper label: the free movement of services. As such they bear no relationship to the enlargement process and the impact of the transitional rulings. As we saw in section 2, indications are that self-employment by nationals from accession countries has been specifically higher in EU-15 Member States.
where restrictions on the free movement of workers have been tough. This may lead to a decrease in the use of this “immigration door” and its concomitant negative impacts for receiving countries as soon as the transitional period for the EU-2 comes to an end on 1 January 2014 and workers from Romania and Bulgaria can move freely within the EU.

This is not meant to explain away the dark sides (negative effects) of the free movement of workers and services regularly publicly discussed in receiving societies. Fraud and exploitation of mobile EU workers and bogus self-employment arrangements have to be investigated thoroughly and addressed by appropriate action by local, national and EU authorities in collaboration. Even if the charges of unfair competition eventually prove to be mistaken, those charges have to be taken seriously to maintain sufficient support from the population in affected regions. Of course, all this is also about a clash of different views on the future direction of the European labour market at a vital crossroads: more flexibility or more security, a race to the bottom in competition with low wage countries, or a race to the top by investing in people and innovation (Asscher 2013).

The labour market outcomes for the impact of mobility from the new accession countries to the EU-15 may be slightly positive for the countries or regions of destination. However, there are also signs that the outcome is not always positive for immigrants themselves, and one could wonder about the long term effects of a labour market where nationals from different EU countries take different but complementary positions in a labour market segmented by national origin. In the long run this might even lead to serious problems of integration and social cohesion. In other words, while the fact that EU post-enlargement immigration has no serious impact on wages and/or the (un)employment of natives might be seen as a positive outcome, it might also be seen as a warning against a labour market segmented by national origin.

Policies against labour market segmentation may need to be developed by improving the position of the individual intra-EU migrant by offering language courses and job training facilities for those migrants who intend to stay in another EU country. Employment offices might offer assistance in the evaluation of ‘foreign’ diplomas. There is more on these policies in the section on integration.

Finally, there are serious registration problems. Partly they concern the non-registration of short-term temporary workers (less than 3 months), but partly they also concern under-registration of migrant workers who stay in another EU Member State for 3 months or more. In both cases solutions must be found, for the first category without clashing with the freedom of travel for EU citizens within the EU.

In this section we have not considered the impact of migration from crisis-ridden countries in Southern Europe, simply because it is a recent phenomenon on which no literature can be found. The impact will be much more limited because it concerns relatively small numbers. In public opinion in, for instance, Germany this kind of labour mobility has been considered mainly positively, due to the profile of the immigrants: young, well-trained and motivated to learn German (focus Migration 2013).
5.2 The impact on the housing market and on neighbourhoods

A strong inflow of migrants initially will have a noticeable impact mainly on local housing: an increase in the demand for low-cost housing and often poor housing conditions. Housing needs differ for subtypes of mobile EU citizens. The accommodation of seasonal workers in agriculture or horticulture will differ from the accommodation and housing needs of more permanent migrants who may be accompanied by their families. European literature on migration from CEE Member States stresses the diversity among these migrants. Departing from these scientific sources, Engbersen et al. (2013) distinguish four subtypes of EU migrants from the new Member States: (1) temporary circular migrants, (2) transnational (bi-national) migrants, (3) settlement migrants, and (4) footloose migrants.

These subtypes are further detailed and examined on the basis of research among migrants from Poland, Bulgaria and Romania in the Netherlands. The four types are based on the relative strength of attachment to the country of origin and/or destination: Temporary migrants (attachment to the country of origin) and settlement migrants (attachment to the country of destination) are classical migrant types. Transnational migrants are mostly highly skilled and have strong attachments to both countries. Footloose migrants have weak attachments to both countries of origin and destination. They are often low-skilled, just starting their career in foreign work in the Netherlands. They appear to be the most marginal category: they often do not speak Dutch, have few contacts with native Dutch, and are often either unemployed or working informally. Many footloose migrants do not intend to stay very long in the Netherlands (ibid). The composition of the migrant categories in terms of temporality or settlement will be different in terms of duration, country of origin and destination. In the Netherlands, settlement migrants are more often Romanians or Bulgarians, and circular migrants more often Polish. This difference is probably related to the distance to the home country. Older migrants are predominantly circular migrants. Migrants’ attachments and transnational involvements may change over the course of time: footloose migrants and circular migrants may become settlers or transnational migrants in time. Footloose migrants dominate among the more recent CEE migrants in the Netherlands (ibid).

It is difficult to discuss briefly the housing of mobile EU workers, not only because their housing needs vary according to their characteristics and intentions as regards staying, but also because of the huge differences in housing markets across Europe. The share of owner occupied housing, private rental or social housing differs greatly among EU Member States. Furthermore, a sudden influx of migrants may cause housing problems because it coincides with a shortage of affordable housing due to, for instance, the decline in the number of new-builds because of the crisis. Moreover, there are huge variations in the housing market in central, metropolitan and peripheral regions. Mobile EU citizens generally spread more evenly across urban areas in countries in Western Europe and even across rural areas, depending on the location of employment opportunities. This is supported by free movement rights and improvements in transport links and means of communication (Gebhardt and Guentner 2009).

Engbersen (in WRR 2013), in a study on the Netherlands, takes up irregular and poor housing - spatial concentrations, overcrowding, exploitation, poor quality and homelessness - as part of the local social problems, mostly associated with the temporary circular and footloose EU-8 and EU-2 immigrants. Moreover, these migrants often settle in neighbourhoods characterised by an accumulation of problems and where migrants from non-EU countries reside.
Similar problems are reported in the UK (Rolfe et al. 2013), Belgium (Benelux/EUKN 2011) and Germany (German Association of Cities 2013). The case studies (The Hague, Munich, London) show that receiving cities face comparable immigrant housing problems. In a study on Wales in the UK (Cymru 2010) on EU-8 and EU-2 migrants, the authors point to initial problems of problematic housing and homelessness for many immigrants, and some continuing problems may exist for those who live in tied housing, where the employer or the employment agency provides the accommodation as well. New migrants often end up in the least desirable accommodation in the private rented sector, where demand is lowest. The poor housing conditions are frequently the result of low income, but also of discrimination and a lack of information (Gebhardt and Guentner 2009). Temporary migrants regularly prefer to sub-let in order to reduce housing costs (Rolfe et al. 2013). Problems because of a sudden increase in the demand for housing are temporary phenomena, and they are more often characteristic of rural than urban areas (Rolfe et al. 2013).

Engbersen (in WRR 2013) arrives at the following three objectives for future policies:

1. with a view to temporary, circular labour migrants and footloose migrants, there is an urgent need for simple, inexpensive and decent housing;
2. regarding footloose migrants, either tackle the mechanisms these migrants may encounter, like homelessness and crime, and/or improve information on return migration (free movement includes a return home if the EU migrant fails to generate income);
3. settlement migrants and transnational migrants have less urgent needs for their accommodation; their social needs are one stage ahead on the integration path, and concern for example language education and proper education for their children.

In the Dutch case an interesting Declaration of Intent has been signed by, among others, representatives of national and local government, some major cities (The Hague, Rotterdam), trade unions, immigrant organisations, (certified) employment agencies and housing corporations: “The National Declaration on (temporary) Housing of EU labour migrants, (28-03-2012)”. The signatory parties strive for the realisation of temporary housing for EU immigrants, in both urban and rural settings. Progress will be followed by half-yearly evaluation reports. In various countries, all kinds of local initiatives and manuals have been developed (e.g. UK Housing and Migration Network 2012).

One of the final questions dealt with in the EUKN background paper for the Cyprus Presidency (2012, p. 23) on Immigrant integration in European cities is equally valid for EU immigrant integration in European cities:

“What is the potential role of urban planning and development in supporting migrant settlement and integration in cities and neighbourhoods? Realising equal access to affordable and decent housing and adapting housing schemes to the needs of for instance temporary migrants is an important objective. Next, urban planning and development strategies may contribute to the liveability, community relations and opportunities for ethnic entrepreneurship in cities and neighbourhoods. ... Finally city planning should take into account the impact of migration and diversity on cities and neighbourhoods.”
5.3 The social and territorial impacts of intra-EU mobility

The impact of inflows of EU citizens goes beyond its effects on the labour market and housing, and affects the quality of life and social cohesion of local communities. Labour migrants not only represent a ‘workforce’, but many will stay for varying lengths of time and thus become “future citizens who need to be socially integrated” (Gebhardt and Guentner 2009: 7).

The importance of policies for social inclusion and participation is also clear from the perceived, experienced and publicly and politically discussed negative effects of the massive influx of mobile EU workers in some regions, including the development of segmented labour markets; homelessness and problematic housing; spatial concentration in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and their impact on inter-group relations and participation (Benelux/EUKN 2011; Snel et al. 2011). There are regular complaints in local society about noise, drinking problems, overcrowding and insecurity (fire safety of their lodgings) (ibid). Some researchers (e.g. Friberg 2012) highlight the risk of long-term integration problems among CEE migrants settling in other European countries due to their marginalisation in a segmented labour market and their vulnerability in times of economic crisis.

The absence of an integration policy for EU immigrants is striking (See also Collett 2013a). Mobile EU citizens have largely the same rights as nationals, but the fact that they have similar integration needs to third-country nationals is often overlooked (Collett 2013a). From an EU perspective, mobile EU citizens are not considered to be migrants. One of the consequences is that it is not possible to employ European funds for integration (the European Integration Fund) for initiatives aiming at the integration of mobile EU citizens, for these funds are meant only for the integration of third-country nationals. Due to this strong distinction between third-country nationals and EU citizens, integration policies in European Member States are habitually aimed at (categories of) third-country nationals only. One may wonder if it has ever been the intention of EU lawmakers that not allowing specific mandatory policies for fellow EU citizens who live in another EU Member State might be a side-effect of the non-discrimination paragraph of the European Union Treaty. One might argue that it still leaves room for policies that are voluntary in essence. An increasing number of cities and countries actually are making a start on developing policies for these groups or opening up integration facilities to them.

At the same time the increasing volatility of mobility – seasonal workers, cross-border commuters, but also mobile retirees and international students – poses new challenges for key institutions. New developments in transport and communications narrowed the distances between places, and they fuelled more and more temporary forms of mobility (Gebhardt and Guentner 2009). Many mobile EU citizens do not intend to settle on a long term basis, and consequently invest less in community participation than long-term migrants (Collett 2013a). These transient residents may be isolated from the broader community, and this places different demands on social cohesion. It is difficult to develop policies for a fluctuating population of EU residents and volatile forms of mobility. Dominant integration models have to be reconsidered to take into account the increasing volatility of mobility and the diversity of integration needs of migrant populations.

Main challenges for cities are timely signalling and response to developments in local society, in close partnership and coordination with civil society organisations and the business sector, and in coordination with higher authorities. Overall, studies on integration point to the same key factors in immigrant integration

17 Furthermore, funding projects for mobile EU citizens by the European Social Fund is often not possible as well, for ESF funding aims at promoting employment while most mobile EU citizens work (Benelux/EUKN 2011).
Ensuring equal access of migrants to mainstream services and institutions is one of the main challenges for public authorities (see EU Common Basic Principle No. 6). Integration outcomes are significantly determined by the quality of general services and institutions and their accessibility to migrants. “Promoting good quality standards and easy accessibility to these key services is the most important practical help that cities can offer to migrants, both in the arrival phase, and later on” (Gebhardt and Guentner 2009: 27).

The impact of mobility and migration on public services relates to different issues: (1) the impact of (substantial) immigration on levels of demand for the services; (2) migrants’ access to and usage of services; (3) additional demands due to special needs, for instance the specific housing needs of temporary migrants; (4) special attention for vulnerable groups, for instance Roma and the homeless.

Overall, basic services in several regions were not well prepared for the arrival of substantial numbers of mobile citizens from CEE and responses were not well coordinated (for example, Rolfe et al. 2013; Benelux/EUKN 2011). Some tentative, main conclusions regarding the impact on key services based on an examination of the literature on the impact of EU-8 and EU-2 migration to Western Member States are: (1) especially rapid, unplanned massive influxes into localities cause problems for services such as housing; these influxes may be too unpredictable and too massive to utilise the available policy instruments; (2) there is a lack of overview of the numbers and problems, precisely because of the fluid forms of mobility and the shortcomings of data based on registrations; (3) these problems are not always quickly resolved due to problems of governance: who is is responsible for services to EU-citizens?; in addition, there is a blind spot for the integration needs of EU migrants; (4) initially, insufficient account was taken of the variety of needs of different subtypes of migrants.

The influx of migrants has a clear spatial dimension that has to be taken into account. Intra-EU mobility poses new challenges for locations that are not accustomed to inflows from abroad, such as rural areas and smaller towns and villages. Migrants arrive in areas and villages not accustomed to accommodating them, sometimes in a rapid influx. This may create tensions, while local authorities are unfamiliar with this phenomenon. Local and regional authorities play a critical role in addressing the sudden increase in immigrants into their region. But there are also positive responses. For instance, shrinking areas in southern provinces of the Netherlands see this influx rather as a gain and encourage these temporary migrants from CEE to settle. But the inflow of migrants into urban areas already accommodating many migrants may well aggravate existing problems of housing and liveability.

Ensuring equal access of migrants to mainstream services first of all requires counselling and reception services for newcomers. There is much research evidence on the importance of providing relevant information for the participation of newcomers in society (Spencer 2006). Various local and national governments already have general introductory orientation services in different forms: booklets, or web-based, or ‘one stop mobility

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shops’, to support newcomers to find out how to apply for housing, education, and health services (see Gebhardt and Guentner 2009: 28-29 for local examples). The case studies in Part 2 of the paper present some examples, with the remarkable example of Barcelona’s Human Mobility Centre as a service advising both immigrants and prospective emigrants.

Next, services have to adapt to the new situation in order to cope with the increased demand and increased diversity of the clients. Some services will have to be adapted to meet the temporary needs of migrants and “take into account and plan for the different stages a migrant may go through” (Gebhardt and Guentner 2009). This may imply a more differentiated infrastructure and flexible services for transient residents. This poses new demands on, for example, doctors/GPs, emergency services, schools and housing. Access to health services should receive due attention. For instance, in the UK there are some indication that the low rates of GP registration are caused by language barriers, difficulties in taking time for appointments, opening hours and a lack of knowledge of the peculiarities of the health care system and services (Rolfe et al. 2013).

Intra-EU mobility has implications for educational institutions as well. Although the number of Central and Eastern European pupils has been limited hitherto, these pupils are often in schools in deprived areas. In addition the volatility of intra-EU mobility makes planning difficult for school authorities: children may be in the city for only a year or less (Gebhardt and Guentner 2009). This poses problems also for funding for schools (Rolfe et al. 2013). Various local governments and schools with relatively more children from CEE, amongst others in the Netherlands and Belgium, reported problems with pupils’ poor command of Dutch, poor communication with parents, school absenteeism, educational deficiencies, and poor socio-economic conditions, often in combination with poor housing conditions (Dutch House of Representatives 2011; Benelux/EUKN 2011).

Access to appropriate work, ensuring decent working conditions and the protection of employment rights are obviously essential for migrant workers. Although the responsibilities of local authorities on labour issues are limited, they can play a role in cooperation with higher authorities, NGOs, employers and employment agencies and authorities of countries of origin. Alleged unfair competition, exploitation of EU migrants and downskilling are three of the main drawbacks of intra-EU mobility (WRR 2013; Geroházi et al. 2011). Authorities have to improve the monitoring of labour conditions and need to gain better control over labour recruitment agencies and provide migrants with advice on their rights (Gebhardt and Guentner 2009). The business sector has to take responsibility for itself; good practice is the code of practice on employing migrant workers by ‘Business in the Community’ in Northern Ireland (Europe on the move 2013).

EU migrants regularly work below their skills level or level of qualifications. Many intra-EU mobile workers work in manufacturing, construction, agriculture, hospitality, retailing and private households (Gebhardt and Guentner 2009). That EU migrants tend to work below their skills level is related to their poor language skills, as well as the inability of the host country to recognise skill levels of migrants. In the long term this is detrimental to both migrants and employers, both to the country of residence and the country of origin when they return. Vocational training, language learning and skills recognition are essential to help reduce skills waste and to improve up-skilling (Collett 2013a; Biffl and Pfeffer 2013). Some of these are especially the responsibility of employers and social partners, but there are important responsibilities for authorities as well. Governments should establish dialogues and partnerships with social partners with respect to making better use of the potential of migrants (Collett 2013a/2013b). It is almost inevitable that local authorities will
cooperate with countries of origin on this issue of brain waste. The common standard set by the European Qualifications Framework (EQF) provides a common reference framework which assists in comparing the national qualifications systems, frameworks and their levels. However, foreign credentials recognition is only part of a much wider process of acculturation to the destination labour market (Sumption 2013). To be able to work at their skills level, foreign professionals often also need additional training to fill specific skill gaps, acquiring professional language proficiency, and familiarisation with the peculiarities of the host country’s work practices and job-specific knowledge (ibid). This requires collaboration by social partners, educational institutions, governments at various levels, and countries of origin and of destination. For instance, in Belgium the Brussels Welcome Office offers newcomers freely available services, including support in the procedure to recognise qualifications and help in identifying any necessary vocational training (Europe on the move 2013).

Apart from access to key services, separate services for mobile EU citizens may be required. This is especially the case for investing in language tuition. Courses in the host country language have proven to be crucial for the participation and integration of migrants, their contacts with natives and decreasing vulnerability to exploitation (Spencer 2006). Many western European states have already developed language and integration programmes for third-country nationals, but they are not always accessible to mobile EU citizens and they are sometimes over-subscribed (Europe on the move 2013). These programmes are rarely proactively promoted to EU nationals. Some countries (e.g. NL, Flanders) have compulsory integration for migrants; however, it is not possible to make such courses obligatory for EU citizens. Nevertheless, voluntary courses can be effective as well, as is shown in Luxembourg (Europe on the move 2013). In Luxembourg, all foreign newcomers are offered an optional 2-year Welcome and Integration Contract (CAI) that offers some benefits for the signatories. They have to participate in orientation sessions, a civic course and language training.

Many EU citizens remain for a short stay only; thus alternative orientation and language programmes have to be considered, such as condensed orientation courses and online courses (Eurocities 2012). Temporary workers usually do not have the motivation - and time - to invest a lot of time in language learning. Flexible forms of language tuition are being developed, for instance e-learning and courses during working hours in collaboration with employers and employment agencies. Condensed introduction programmes for EU citizens could even be added to pre-departure information provided by the EURES portal (Collett 2013a).

The distances in Europe have become shorter not only for migrants, by means of new communication technologies and cheap and fast transport links, but also for local authorities. Cities are taking an increasingly active role in improving the management of mobility and integration through cooperative projects and partnerships with migrants’ areas and countries of origin (Gebhardt and Guentner 2009). In general, building transnational partnerships and cooperation with areas of origin will benefit the management of the labour and social participation of EU immigrants. For instance, the city of Rotterdam collaborates with the Polish authorities on the management of Polish migration by regular dialogue on issues of migration and the participation of Polish migrants (Geröházi et al 2011). National and local governments have little or no ability to regulate the migration processes of EU citizens, but this can be compensated for by more cooperation and coordination between countries of origin and destination on issues such as: skills recognition, recruitment of health professionals, and problems with and return of vulnerable and homeless citizens (Collett 2013a).

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Finally, one of the main challenges for local authorities is to develop strategic approaches and planning, in close partnership with other stakeholders. For instance, the cities of Rotterdam and The Hague in the Netherlands developed action plans especially for this group of CEE migrants (see case study report; Gebhardt and Guentner 2009). In addition, traditional instruments for managing migration and integration are not always appropriate for mobile EU citizens. New actors are becoming relevant in immigration and integration policy, for instance universities (regarding international students) and employment agencies (SVR 2013). However, there are also many similarities in the barriers against and needs of both mobile EU citizens and third-country nationals, and questions such as promoting equal access to basic services for migrants have to be considered for all groups of migrants (see: SVR 2013).

Strategic planning and adequate public services for a diverse population require knowledge about the composition of and change in the local population. Currently, cities rely on a mix of data sources to assess the situation, including census data, official surveys, population registers, statistics on work permits and registrations for access to social services. None of these sources provides a complete and up-to-date picture of EU migrants. Combining data from these sources or local governments conducting their own surveys, often in partnership with research institutions, are ways to improve the knowledge of the local population (Gebhardt and Guentner 2009). There is in particular a lack of information on short-term flows and on the sectors these migrants are occupied in (Dhéret et al 2013). Improving the knowledge base requires research and alternative methods of collecting population data (e.g. in addition to census data) to support planning. This underlines the importance of developing relationships with the migrant communities — and with the country of origin - to ensure the availability of adequate information and data. Yet, limits will remain for cities in planning ahead, because of the unpredictability of volatile mobility movements. Cities must learn to cope with this.

The EUROCITIES study on economic migrants developed a Good practice toolkit for cities based on a collection of good practices, with still highly relevant guidelines for local government and national and EU authorities (Gebhardt and Guentner 2009: 39-41). This toolkit contains essential elements such as free or low priced language courses, cooperation with private recruitment agencies and a communication strategy that addresses both the migrant population and the host society. In addition, it presents recommendations for European and national policy makers to support cities in their work on social inclusion for these migrants and to remove existing legislative and other barriers to this task.

5.4 Conclusions

This section has analysed the impact of intra-EU mobility on receiving regions. The economic impact of the Free Movement of workers in the wider European Union is generally believed to be slightly positive for the destination countries, with (almost) no negative effects on the wages of the existing workforce or on substitution of the native workforce. However, the intra-EU mobility of workers has some possible negative effects in receiving regions, including the development of segmented labour markets, (alleged) unfair competition, malpractices of employment agencies, and de-skilling.

Part of the negative impact of the Free Movement of persons within the EU is due to malpractices with a view to the Free Movement of Services, and bears no relation to the Free Movement of Workers. Bogus self-employment or unfair wage competition between the “self-employed” and native workers, malpractices of
certain employment agencies may all lead to the exploitation of EU immigrant workers and wage discrimination against the existing workforce. Local, national and EU governments have an important role here in specifically controlling the way in which the Free Movement of Services actually takes place.

Many of the problematic aspects of the Free Movement is in establishing decent and affordable housing for (temporary) EU migrants. The most obvious negative impacts on housing are overcrowding in the rental sector and homelessness among the short stayers. (Local) governments and stakeholders in the domain of housing and interested parties may start to co-operate in order to achieve sufficient (temporary) housing for mobile EU citizens. Policies will be different for urban and rural settings and for different migrant categories. Mobile EU citizens tend to settle in urban neighbourhoods already characterized by an accumulation of problems and where many migrants from non-EU countries reside. Housing policies for (temporary) EU migrants should be incorporated in general social cohesion policies for all inhabitants of those neighbourhoods.

Intra-EU mobility has social effects on local communities, on the quality of life and social cohesion. Labour migrants not only represent a ‘workforce’, but many will stay for varying lengths of time and thus become fully fledged citizens who need to be socially integrated. Due to their EU citizenship status, it is often overlooked that these migrants have similar integration needs to third-country nationals. The development of policies for the reception and participation of mobile EU citizens is still in its infancy and local governments typically are taking the lead.

Main challenges for cities are timely signalling and response to developments in local society, in close partnership and coordination with civil society organisations, and – if relevant – the business sector, and in coordination with higher authorities. Ensuring equal access by migrants to mainstream services and institutions is one of the main challenges for public authorities. This requires first of all counselling and reception services for newcomers. Adequate provision of information will support new migrants to participate in the local community, neighbourhood and at work. Next, services have to adapt to the new situation in order to cope with the increased demand and increased diversity of the clients: these are health services, education, housing and labour market services. A differentiated infrastructure and flexible services are required for mobile workers to address the needs of the different categories of temporary and seasonal migrants as well as long-term migrants. In addition, authorities have to address territorial effects, including concentration in disadvantaged neighbourhoods and new challenges for rural areas. Apart from access to key services, separate services for mobile EU citizens may be required, and especially investment in language tuition for migrants. Orientation and language courses have proven to be crucial for local participation and access to relevant services. These courses should take into account the differences in intentions to stay, as well as the different stages of residence of the migrants. Finally, local authorities have to develop strategic approaches and planning in close partnership with other stakeholders. Strategic planning and adequate public services for a diverse population require knowledge about the composition of and changes in the local population. Here, solutions have to be provided to problems concerning the registration of temporary EU migrants. Cooperation and co-ordination between regions of origin and of destination will be conducive to increasing the benefits of intra-EU mobility for all parties involved.
6 Conclusions and policy recommendations

Intra-EU mobility has gained new momentum with its successive enlargements and the current economic crisis. This paper describes and analyses some of the social, economic and territorial effects of cross-border labour mobility in the EU on sending and receiving countries and urban regions, as well as some policy responses. There are many types of mobile EU citizens: workers, posted workers, the self-employed, students, pensioners and family / marriage migrants. Work is the main motive for mobility in the EU. Mobility of international students in the EU is linked to labour mobility; the subject of student exchange is already covered in the paper for the UDG meeting in Ireland (EUKN 2013). In this paper for the UDG meeting in Lithuania we focus on the various forms of labour mobility that dominate east-west mobility in the EU. There is much more knowledge about east-west labour mobility than about the more recent south-north mobility from countries worst hit by the crisis. Both migration “corridors” are considered, but due to the limitations of the literature the paper focuses on east-west mobility. This concluding chapter recapitulates the main findings and presents some policy recommendations and points for discussion.

There is a fairly broad consensus among researchers that, by and large, labour mobility within the EU benefits the economies of both countries of origin and of destination. The economic benefits generally outweigh the disadvantages for the countries concerned, but the disadvantages can be distributed unevenly and concentrated in certain regions and among certain groups. Furthermore, intra-EU mobility of workers goes well beyond the challenges of national labour market policies and also exhibits the characteristics of international labour migration. Therefore, issues of integration and the return of migrants, but also the influence of differences and disparities in wealth, educational systems and labour markets, have to be considered.

The governments of regions and countries of origin can improve the situation relating to mobility to maximise its positive and mitigate its negative effects. This requires coordination and cooperation between the various authorities, levels of government and other stakeholders in countries of origin and countries of destination, but also between governments in both countries and at the EU level. Below we will formulate policy recommendations for countries and regions of origin and (temporary) settlement, as well as challenges at the EU level.

Key challenges and policy recommendations for authorities of urban regions and countries experiencing substantial outflows:

- Develop labour mobility information services on regional, national and EU levels to turn brain-drain into brain gain or brain circulation. Authorities cannot stop their citizens from temporarily working elsewhere in Europe, but they can provide appropriate advice to potential mobile workers, and inform and support mobile citizens abroad, and address practical problems in the international recognition of credentials. There are already various EU initiatives to support job seekers and to get foreign qualifications recognised, but more personalised career guidance at, for instance, local mobility centres can offer more accessible and tailored support. Here is a task for local and regional authorities.

- Develop supporting measures for return migrants – especially long-term migrants that have worked below their skills level – to reintegrate successfully into the labour market and educational system. Recognise the qualifications acquired abroad and implement a regional development strategy based on a wider and better skills basis to make better use of the skills of returning migrants.
• Cooperate with destination countries and regions to coordinate the recruitment of skilled workers to prevent acute labour market shortages, to prevent down-skilling, to inform and support emigrants abroad, and to assist in the return of emigrants (for instance homeless emigrants).

• Develop diaspora policies to keep contact with nationals and diaspora organisations abroad, in cooperation with receiving regions. These links facilitate the re-integration process upon return. They also strengthen the economic and social ties between the countries of origin and destination, and this is conducive to trade and flows of remittances and investments between these regions. These are tasks for all levels of government.

• Pay attention to the uneven territorial distribution of the benefits and burdens of the free movement of EU citizens within Member States. The burdens of emigration are unevenly distributed, and authorities in rural areas and cities in peripheral regions in particular face the consequences of the outflow of well-educated young inhabitants. This creates problems of economic development, but also of maintaining an acceptable level of social services in regional urban centres. Addressing the development of disadvantaged regions requires a long-term, comprehensive policy. One of the challenges for these urban areas with a shrinking population is: learning to accept shrinkage and trying to utilise its potential and the advantages of urban shrinkage; restructure the local economy, develop new forms of housing, and stimulate flexible solutions for public services. The diaspora can play a role in the development of regions severely affected by migration. How can national authorities – as well as EU (Social Cohesion) policy – support local authorities in this process of adaptation?

• Offer advice and support to family members left behind on issues such as social security and education. Special attention is required for vulnerable categories, including children and the elderly. For instance, the educational careers of children accompanying their mobile parents will be adversely affected. To address this problem, a school in Vilnius (Lithuania) offered long-distance learning programmes for children who accompanied their parents abroad (Bélorgey et al 2012).

• Improve the knowledge base on mobile citizens. To develop policies, the gathering of adequate data on migration outflows, return migration and their local impacts is required. Apparent gaps in data availability and programme evaluation hinder the development of effective policies. This is a task not only for National statistics, but also for regional and local governments.

Key challenges and policy recommendations for authorities of urban regions and countries experiencing substantial inflows:

• Control the negative effects of intra-EU mobility, and at the same time promote the protection of the rights of mobile Europeans. Part of the adverse impacts of the Free Movement of persons is due to malpractices with a view to the Free Movement of Services. Bogus self-employment or unfair wage competition of the “self-employed” with native workers and malpractices of certain employment agencies may all lead to the exploitation of EU immigrant workers and wage discrimination against the existing workforce. (Local) governments have an important role here in controlling specifically the way in which the Free Movement of Services actually takes place and in fighting the exploitation of EU migrants. However, there is also a role for the EU in addressing these malpractices.

• Create conditions for the optimal use of the potential of mobile EU citizens, to counter down-skilling. Tackling this problem effectively requires cooperation between all stakeholders, for instance on improving the international recognition of formal and informal skills, offering relevant information, personalised counselling and language courses before departure and after arrival in the destination region, and supporting measures for the successful labour market reintegration of returners.
• Increase the capacity of the city and its services to react to an unexpected inflow of migrants, for instance through short-term action plans.
• Recognise the diversity of subtypes of mobile EU citizens in policies addressing housing needs: simple and inexpensive housing for temporary migrants and integration into the mainstream housing market for long-term migrants. Footloose migrants or adventure seekers require yet another approach, for instance improving information on return migration. EU migrants tend to settle in neighbourhoods already characterized by an accumulation of problems and where migrants from non-EU countries reside. Housing policies for (temporary) EU migrants should be incorporated into general territorial and social cohesion urban policies for all inhabitants of these neighbourhoods.
• Have an eye for the spatial impact of EU mobility. Villages and rural areas without immigration experience also face an inflow of mobile EU citizens to work in agriculture and horticulture. Local governments are in need of support from higher authorities to develop appropriate policies.
• Recognise the diversity of mobile EU citizens (as well as other types of migrants) and the different life stages of migrants in developing reception and integration policies. Recognise the integration needs of mobile EU citizens intending to stay for a medium or long period. Due to EU citizenship status, it is often overlooked that many mobile EU citizens have similar integration needs to third-country nationals. Local governments typically are taking the lead in developing reception and participation policies for mobile EU citizens, but effective policies require the involvement of governments at national and EU levels.
• Ensure equal access of migrants to mainstream services. Separate services for mobile EU citizens may be required, especially investing in language tuition for migrants. Orientation and language courses have proven to be crucial for local participation and access to relevant services. These courses have to take into account the differences in intentions to stay, as well as the different stages of residence of the migrants.
• Improve the knowledge base on mobile EU citizens. The current lack of information and data hinders the development of strategic planning and effective policies. There is in particular a lack of information on short-term flows and on the sectors these migrants are occupied in. Combining data sources and conducting one’s own surveys are options. Cooperation with regions of origin and developing relationships with migrant communities can be helpful in improving information on migration movements. Yet, there will remain limits in cities’ ability to plan ahead, because of the unpredictability of volatile mobility movements. Cities must learn to cope with this.

Key challenges and policy recommendations at the EU level:

• Recognise that labour mobility in Europe also has its drawbacks. Even though it is advantageous overall, the costs are unevenly distributed between and within countries, regions and cities.
• Support national and regional authorities in addressing the dark sides of intra-EU mobility, including unfair competition, bogus self-employment, and the exploitation of mobile EU citizens.
• More attention is needed within the framework of the EU social and territorial cohesion policy for the uneven distribution of the benefits and burdens of the free movement of EU citizens, including the challenges of depopulating regions.
• Support local authorities in providing appropriate reception and housing facilities to manage the inflow of significant numbers of mobile EU workers.
• Consider opening up structural European funds, and especially the European Integration Fund, for initiatives aiming at the reception and integration of mobile EU citizens. Recognise that many mobile EU workers have similar integration needs to third-country nationals.
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Online sources
## Annex 1: Table foreign population

Table 1 Foreign and foreign-born population by group of citizenship and country of birth, 1 January 2012

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>EU-27 (1)</th>
<th></th>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>thousand</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>thousand</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>thousand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreigners</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Citizens of other EU Member States</td>
<td>Citizens of non-EU countries</td>
<td>Born in other EU Member States</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
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<td>17,700.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
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<td>1176.6</td>
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<td>55.3</td>
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<td>0.2</td>
<td>41.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
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<td>Czech Republic</td>
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<td>1.6</td>
<td>281.0</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>38.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
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<td>1.7</td>
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<td>1.4</td>
<td>71.4</td>
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<tr>
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<td>3.7</td>
<td>7244.6</td>
<td>3.4</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
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<td>1.3</td>
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<td>90.9</td>
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<td>176.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Cyprus</td>
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<td>11.5</td>
<td>221.2</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>8.3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Latvia</td>
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<tr>
<td>Lithuania</td>
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<td>25.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
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<td>0.4</td>
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<td>174.1</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<tr>
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<td>527.0</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
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<td>2.5</td>
<td>478.4</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iceland</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
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<td>463.2</td>
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<td>9.1</td>
<td>1564.9</td>
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<td>Croatia(2)</td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** EUROSTAT
Annex 2: Migration maps

Map 1 Impact of migration on population in 2050

Impact of Migration on Population in 2050, calculated as the difference in population between the Status Quo and No Migration scenarios in % of the population in the No Migration scenario.

Source: ESPON 2013 Database 2010; Origin of data: Eurostat, NSIs, MIMOSA, ESTAT, Estimations, 2009-2010
Map 2: Net migration: internal and international migration balance in the NUTS2s in 2005-2010

Source: ESPON-NIDI 2010
Annex 3: Glossary of terms

CEE: abbreviation of Central and Eastern Europe: former communist countries in Central, Eastern and Southeast Europe

Circular migration: fluid movement of people between countries, including temporary or more permanent movement (THP/UNESCO 2008).

Domestic or internal migration: The process of moving within a given country, but across subdividing boundaries, with the intention of establishing a new permanent or semi-permanent residence

Emigrants are people leaving the country in which they usually reside and effectively taking up residence in another country (EUROSTAT).

EU-8: the 8 CEE Member States that acceded to the EU in 2004 (EU-10 minus Malta and Cyprus) Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia

EU-2: Bulgaria and Romania: the 2 new Member States that acceded to the EU in 2007

EU-8+2: EU-8 + EU-2

EU-10: the 10 new Member States after the 2004 enlargement: EU-8 + Malta and Cyprus.

EU-12: all of the most recent Member States: the EU-10 plus the EU-2.

EU-15: Member States of the European Union prior to the accession of 10 candidate countries on 1 May 2004: Belgium, Greece, Luxembourg, Denmark, Spain, Netherlands, Germany, France, Portugal, Ireland, Italy, UK, Austria, Finland, Sweden.

EU-25 (1 May 2004 - 31 December 2006): EU 15 + Cyprus (CY), Czech Republic (CZ), Estonia (EE), Hungary (HU), Latvia (LV), Lithuania (LT), Malta (MT), Poland (PL), Slovakia (SK) and Slovenia (SI)

EU-27 (1 January 2007 - 30 June 2013): EU-25 + Bulgaria (BG) and Romania (RO)

EU-28 (from 1 July 2013): EU-27 + Croatia (HR)

GDP Gross domestic product

Intra-EU mobility or intra-EU migration: changes of residence across borders in the EU, both of EU citizens and of (some categories of) third-country nationals.

Immigrants are people arriving or returning from abroad to take up residence in a country for a certain period, having previously been resident elsewhere (EUROSTAT).

Migrant: a person undergoing a (semi-)permanent change of residence which involves a change of his/her social, economic and/or cultural environment (THP/UNESCO 2008). Migrants are called ‘emigrant’ from the perspective of the country of origin, and ‘immigrant’ from the perspective of the receiving country (Bélorgey et al. 2012).
**Migration**: changes of residence to or from a given area (usually a country) during a given time period (usually one year). (EUROSTAT)

**Net migration** is the difference between immigration to and emigration from a given area during the year (net migration is positive when there are more immigrants than emigrants and negative when there are more emigrants than immigrants) (EUROSTAT). A net immigration country tends to experience net immigration (greater immigration than emigration).

**Temporary migration**: a non-permanent migration implying return or onward movement (THP/UNESCO 2008).

**Third country national** is any person who is not a citizen of the European Union (EU), including stateless persons - see Art. 2.1 (i) of Council Regulation (EC) no 862/2007 (EUROSTAT).