The position of Muslims in the Netherlands

FACTS AND FIGURES

Factbook 2010

FORUM INSTITUTE FOR MULTICULTURAL AFFAIRS
COLOPHON

Publication by
FORUM – Institute for Multicultural Affairs
Postbus 201, 3500 AE Utrecht, Netherlands
www.forum.nl
www.foruminternational.org

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PREFACE

For some years, the position of Muslims in the Netherlands has been subject of fierce debate in the Netherlands. The nature and size of this debate also finds a response across the border, something on which the media report frequently. Much can be said about the characteristics of this debate, its causes and the actual and perceived problems underlying it. In any case, we note that the debate concerning Muslims is often based on perceptions which have little or no connection with reality, that is to say, with the actual lives and social situations of Muslims in the Netherlands. In our view, public debate is of crucial importance in a democratic state based on the rule of law. But to ensure that such debate remains constructive, it is important that the facts be given a fair chance.

The first fact book on the position of Muslims in the Netherlands was published in 2008. New information and research published in the meantime justify an update. This publication not only includes more recent figures on a number of topics, it also adds several new topics and provides a classification according to themes, which should make it easier to find the information.

The aim of this fact book is to present information on Muslims in the Netherlands. With the exception of several (also recent) publications, no research is being conducted into Muslims in the Netherlands. However information is gathered and published regularly about ethnic groups, in particular the four largest of these, which include Turks and Moroccans. Because the great majority of Turks and Moroccans adheres to the Islamic faith (87% and 92% respectively), the information in this fact book tends to concentrate on these groups. Muslims are also represented in other ethnic and national groups, such as Iraqis, Afghans, Iranians and Somalis. But these groups are rarely the subjects of research and surveys, so they are largely and inevitably ignored here.

We do not claim to be comprehensive, but we feel that this fact book can play an important role providing background information, context or factual material for journalists and other who follow or report on the debate in the Netherlands.

Sadik Harchaoui
Chair of the Board of Directors
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Part I: Demography
1 THE NETHERLANDS: AN OVERVIEW

Location
The Netherlands is located in continental Western Europe. It is bordered by the North Sea in the north and west, by Germany in the east and by Belgium in the south. Amsterdam is the capital, and The Hague the seat of the government. The Netherlands is divided into 12 provinces. The Netherlands, the Dutch Antilles and Aruba collectively form the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

Figure 1.1: Map of the Netherlands

History
In 1581, the Republic of the Seven United Netherlands declared independence from Spain. During the 17th century, the Republic experienced a Golden Age in terms of its economic and cultural achievements. The Netherlands became an international trading nation and the centre of world trade. Following twenty years of French occupation, in 1815 the United Kingdom of the Netherlands was formed. During the First World War, the Netherlands remained neutral. During the Second World War, the Netherlands was occupied by the Germans for five years. Today, the Netherlands is an open and affluent country with strong international ties. The Netherlands was one of the founders of NATO and the European Economic Community (EEC), the forerunner of the European Union (EU). In 2002, the Euro was introduced as the currency of the Netherlands, replacing the guilder.

Population
The Netherlands has a population of 16,485,787 (2009). The population density of 396.8 inhabitants per square kilometre (2009) is one of the highest in the world. Compared with the rest of Europe, the Dutch population has increased rapidly: 3 million in 1850, 5 million in 1900, 10 million in 1950 and 16 million in 2000.

Economy
The Netherlands is an affluent country with an open economy and a reliance on international trade. The economy is characterised by stable relations, moderate inflation and cautious financial policies, and by its role as a major transport hub for the rest of Europe. The main economic activities are agriculture, food, drink and tobacco industry, chemicals industry and financial services.
**Government**

The Netherlands is a constitutional monarchy and parliamentary democracy. The cabinet forms the executive branch of government and is formed by political parties which make up the House of Representatives. As no single political party has ever held a majority, it is always necessary to form a coalition government. The Cabinet consists of ministers and state secretaries and is headed by the Prime Minister. At the time of writing (January 2010) the Prime Minister is Jan Peter Balkenende, who leads a coalition consisting of the Christian Democratic Party (CDA), the Labour Party (PvdA) and the Christian Union (CU).

The States-General forms the legislative branch of government and consists of two chambers: the Senate with 75 seats and the House of Representatives with 150 seats. The members of the House of Representatives are elected in direct elections which are held every four years. The members of the Senate are elected by provincial councils.

The monarch is formally the head of state, but does not hold any formal government powers, and has a largely symbolic function. Since 1980, Queen Beatrix has been head of state. Her eldest son, Willem-Alexander, Prince of Orange, is the heir to the throne. He is married to Princess Máxima.

**Distribution of seats in the House of Representatives**

Figure 1.2: Distribution of seats in the House of Representatives, November 2006

![Distribution of seats in the House of Representatives](source: www.parlement.com)
2 HISTORY

The arrival of Muslims in the Netherlands

The first mention of Muslims in the Netherlands dates from 1879. According to the census of 1889, there were 49 “Mohammedans” in the Netherlands. These early Muslims were immigrants from the Dutch East Indies (now Indonesia), and they lived in The Hague. Until the Second World War the number of Muslims never exceeded a few hundred.

In the 1950s, the number of Muslims increased as a result of immigration from Indonesia. The first mosque – a wooden structure – was built in the village of Balk in the province of Friesland in 1951 by a group of Moluccan soldiers who had served in the Dutch colonial army. The first stone mosque, the Mobarak mosque in The Hague, was built in 1955.

After 1960, tens of thousands of Turkish and Moroccan ‘guest workers’ arrived in the Netherlands to work in the country’s industrial sector. In the 1970s and 80s, many of these economic migrants were joined by their families. The idea of an early return to their home country faded into the background and together with their families, the migrant workers sought to establish a place in Dutch society. This included finding space to practise their faith. The number of mosques increased rapidly. The first mosques were often “living room mosques”; offices, schools and club houses were subsequently rented or bought.

The former Dutch colony of Surinam became independent in 1975. The Surinamese population was worried that they would eventually be banned from settling in the Netherlands. Until the transitional arrangements of 1980, around 300,000 Surinamese took the opportunity to move to the Netherlands. Around 10% of the Surinamese in the Netherlands are Muslims, mostly of Indian or Javanese ancestry.

It was not only economic migration and family reunification which spurred the growth of the Islamic population. From the late 1980s, the numbers also increased as a result of a growing influx of political refugees and asylum seekers from the Middle East and East Africa.

At the start of 2009, there were an estimated 900,000 Muslims and 475 mosques in the Netherlands.
3 THE NUMBER OF MUSLIMS IN THE NETHERLANDS

Countries of origin
Based on figures published by Statistics Netherlands (CBS)1, there were an estimated 907,000 Muslims in the Netherlands at the start of 2009. This was equivalent to 6% of the population.

Table 3.1: Numbers of migrants and Muslims in the Netherlands, as at 1 January 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of origin</th>
<th>1 January 2009 (in 000s)</th>
<th>% Muslims</th>
<th>estimated 2009 (in 000s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native Dutch</td>
<td>13,198</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Western migrants</td>
<td>1,478</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-Western migrants</td>
<td>1,809</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>378</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>329</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>342</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>314</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghans</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iraqis</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Somalis</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistanis</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iranians</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
<td>593</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>16,486</td>
<td></td>
<td>907</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Estimate by FORUM based on 2009 population figures (CBS/Statline) and estimate of the percentage of Muslims by CBS (CBS/POLS 2006)

Ethnic origin
Of all the Muslims in the Netherlands, 73% are of Turkish or Moroccan origin, and the remaining 27% are originally from another country.

Around 45% of all non-Western migrants are Muslims. The 13,000 Muslims of native Dutch origin include both converted native Dutch and “third generation immigrants”, that is to say, the children of second generation non-Western immigrants, who are not included in the category “migrants” according to the CBS definition”.

Figure 3.2: Muslims in the Netherlands by country of origin, 2009

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1 In its “Permanent Onderzoek Leefsituatie” (“Permanent Survey on Living Conditions”), Statistics Netherlands (CBS) asks about religious affiliation, offering “Islam” as a specific response option. The latest figures date from 2006. These figures were used to calculate which percentage of the nationality in question was Muslim. The CBS came to a figure of 857,000 Muslims in 2006. Based on population growth since then, we estimate that the number of Muslims is now 40,000 higher. (Source: CBS, “Bevolkingsstrends 3e kwartaal 2007”, van Herten and Otten, “Naar een nieuwe schatting van het aantal islamieten in Nederland”).

2 The CBS defines “migrant” as a person with at least one parent born abroad. The third generation (i.e. with both parents born in the Netherlands) thus falls outside the category of “migrant”.
4 CHANGES IN THE NUMBER OF MUSLIMS

New calculation method
In the past, Statistics Netherlands (CBS) overestimated the number of Muslims in the Netherlands. An improvement to the calculation method introduced in 2007 means that the figures prior to 2007 are not strictly comparable with those of subsequent years.

Expected trend in the future
The Netherlands Interdisciplinary Demographic Institute (NIDI)\(^3\) has made a scenario calculation of how the number of Muslims will change in the future. It is expected that some 7.6% of the Dutch population will be Muslim by 2050. This is equivalent to 1,339,000 Muslims or 432,000 more than in 2009 (see figure 3.1). The number of Muslims is growing both as a result of migration (first generation) and births (second generation). In this scenario, the NIDI did not take into account factors such as people abandoning Islam or converting to it.

Figure 4.1: Number of Muslims in the Netherlands, 1971-2009 and projected to 2050

Source: CBS/Statline

Less likely scenarios
In response to public discussions about the growing numbers of Muslims in the Netherlands, the NIDI has calculated what the percentage of Muslims would be if the migration and birth figures were appreciably higher than considered likely at the moment. In that case, it estimates the number of Muslims to be 2.1 million (or 11% of the population) by 2050. If it is furthermore assumed that all migrants from Africa and Asia will be Muslims, then the number of Muslims in 2050 would be 24%. The CBS rates the probability of such a scenario as very low.
5 COCOMPOSITION AND DISTRIBUTION OF MUSLIMS

Demographic composition
Of all the Muslims in the Netherlands, 48% are women and 52% are men. Compared with the average Dutch population, Muslims have a younger age structure. The average age is 25, while the average age of the Dutch population as a whole is 38. Around 310,000 Muslims are younger than 18, while 11,000 are older than 65.

Figure 5.1: Age distribution of Muslims (2007/08) and in the Netherlands as a whole (2009)

There is a positive correlation between religious affiliation and family size. Women aged between 33 and 42 with a Muslim father have an average of 2.8 children, while the average number of children for all women in this age group is 1.8.

The number of children born by Turkish and above all Moroccan women has fallen over the past decade: among Moroccan women from 3.1 to 2.6, and among Turkish women from 2.2 to 1.7.

Regional distribution
Nearly 80% of Muslims live in urban municipalities. Indeed, most Muslims live in the Randstad conurbation.

Table 5.2: Muslims in the Netherlands by province, 2003, in percent

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Groningen</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Friesland</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drenthe</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overijssel</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flevoland</td>
<td>6.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gelderland</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Utrecht</td>
<td>7.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Holland</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Holland</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zeeland</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Brabant</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limburg</td>
<td>3.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Netherlands</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.7</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS/Statline

Source: CBS, 2009, “Religie aan het begin van de 21e eeuw”; CBS/Statline
6 MUSLIMS IN EUROPE

In Europe, Islam is the second largest religion after Christianity. There are large indigenous Muslim minorities in the Balkans and other Eastern European countries. In Western Europe, the majority of Muslims are migrants from predominantly Muslim countries and their offspring. These migrants were either recruited in the 1960s and 1970s as ‘guest workers’ from Turkey and Morocco, or were part of the extensive post-colonial migration (also from Pakistan, Algeria and Surinam). Following family reunifications, substantial communities of Turks and Moroccans began to emerge in the Dutch cities from the mid 1970s onwards. These communities grew further as a result of births and marriages with people from the countries of origin. The Muslim community in the Netherlands also grew as a result of the arrival of political refugees from countries such as Iraq and Afghanistan.

Within Western Europe, Germany has the largest number of Muslims, followed by France, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands.

Table 6.1: European countries with the largest Muslim populations, in estimated numbers and percentages, estimated 2009

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Percentage of total population</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Russia</td>
<td>16,482,000</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>4,026,000</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>3,554,000</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Albania</td>
<td>2,522,000</td>
<td>79.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kosovo</td>
<td>1,999,000</td>
<td>89.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
<td>1,647,000</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bosnia-Herzegovina</td>
<td>1,522,000</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>946,000</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bulgaria</td>
<td>920,000</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Macedonia</td>
<td>680,000</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other Europe</td>
<td>3,814,000</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Europe</strong></td>
<td><strong>38,112,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>5.2</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total world</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,571,198,000</strong></td>
<td><strong>22.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Part II: Social participation
Primary education
Many Turkish and Moroccan children start their education with a deficiency in language and arithmetic, and also tend to perform less well in the CITO test (i.e. the assessment to determine which type of secondary school a child should go) in these areas than native Dutch and Western migrant pupils. The lack of language skills means that these children are more likely to enter lower forms of education.

Leaving school early
An important problem for young Turkish and Moroccan job seekers is that a relatively large percentage leaves school without any qualifications. For example, in the 2007/08 academic year, 8.6% of Moroccan pupils left the education system early, which is double the number of native Dutch children. Turkish and Moroccan girls are more likely to obtain a diploma or qualification than boys.

Figure 7.1: School leavers without qualifications, by ethnic origin, 2004/05-2007/08 (in percent)

Further education
Although Turks and Moroccans achieved higher secondary general education (HAVO) and preparatory university education (VWO) qualifications relatively less frequently than native Dutch, the proportion of young people from these ethnic groups entering higher education has increased substantially over the past 10 years. Turkish and Moroccan women are doing better than men. Thus the proportion of 18-20-year-old Moroccan women entering further education more than trebled between 1995 and 2007, from 14% to 47%.

Figure 7.2: Migrants in further education compared with 18-20 year olds in the total population, 1995, 2000 and 2007 (in percent)

As mentioned in the Preface, because of a lack of data on Muslims, the figures here refer to Turks and Moroccans, the overwhelming majority of which consider themselves Muslims.
8 EDUCATION LEVEL AND LANGUAGE SKILLS

Education level
The native Dutch labour force (i.e., those aged between 16 and 65) is considerably better educated than the Turkish and Moroccan labour force. This difference can be attributed in particular to the first generation of immigrants, most of whom came to the Netherlands as unskilled ‘guest workers’. The education level of Turkish and especially Moroccan women is higher than that of men.

Figure 8.1: Education level of the labour force (15-65 years), by ethnic origin and gender, in 2003 and 2008

Source: CBS/Statline

Muslims from countries such as Iraq, Iran and Afghanistan tend to be better educated. Many of these migrants are political refugees who graduated from further education in their country of origin.

Command of the Dutch language
An important precondition for integration into society is command of the Dutch language. Some 50-60% of the Turks and Moroccans say that they have no problems with the Dutch language. However, around 20% say that they often or always have problems with Dutch. Moroccans perform better in this respect than Turks.

Figure 8.2: Problems with Dutch language skills, by ethnic origin, 2006 (in percent)

Source: SCP, “Jaarrapport Integratie 2007”

The Dutch language skills of Turks and Moroccans are improving, particularly thanks to the performance of the second generation.
9 EMPLOYMENT

Labour market participation
Net labour market participation among 18-64 year-old Muslims stood at 57% for men and 35% for women in 2004-2006. More recent figures are only available for Turks and Moroccans. In 2008, net labour market participation among Moroccans and Turks was 55% and 51% respectively, compared with 69% among native Dutch. The participation rate of Moroccan and Turkish women is particularly low, although it has been rising steadily in recent years.

Unemployment
Since the 1980s, unemployment among Turks and Moroccans has been (very much) higher than among native Dutch. Unemployment in these two groups peaked in 2004 and then fell gradually. However, unemployment has risen again as a result of the recession in 2009.

Entrepreneurs
Between 1998 and 2005, the number of self-employed entrepreneurs grew sharply among Turks and Moroccans. The number of entrepreneurs of Turkish origin is now comparable with the number of native Dutch. The number of self-employed entrepreneurs among Moroccans continues to lag behind.

First generation entrepreneurs of Turkish and Moroccan origin tend to start up retail and catering businesses, cleaning companies and job agencies. Second generation entrepreneurs often start consultancies or software companies. The main reasons among Turks and Moroccans for starting a business are the same as among the native Dutch: the will to succeed, exploiting market opportunities, the desire for financial independence, and using one’s personal talents. First generation entrepreneurs also cite other motives: discrimination in the labour market, the relatively limited value of educational qualifications obtained abroad and the desire to acquire social status. Second generation entrepreneurs are motivated by a lack of career opportunities with native Dutch employers.
10 INCOME

Disposable income
The average net disposable annual income for Turks and Moroccans is estimated at EUR 23,200 and EUR 21,300 respectively, compared with EUR 30,200 for native Dutch.
A major reason for this difference in income is that Muslim immigrants are much more likely to be dependent on welfare benefit.

Social security benefits
In 2007, 16% of Moroccan women received welfare benefit, compared with 2% of native Dutch women. The number of Turks and Moroccans receiving welfare benefit has been falling since 2005. The proportion of refugees who are on benefit is even higher. Nearly 60% of Somali and Afghan refugee households, more than half of Iraqi households and one third of Iranian households had incomes at welfare benefit level in 2003. Because of the relatively high number of Muslims who are dependent on benefit, poverty is more widespread among these groups. Figures from 2005 show that nearly one third of Moroccan and Turkish households lived on benefit. Among Moroccans, there has been a slight fall in the number of benefit recipients compared with the three previous years, but not among any other groups.

Figure 10.1: Potential labour force (15-64 years), by benefit type and ethnic origin, 2009

Source: CBS/Statline
11 REMITTANCES TO COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN

Many migrants who have family in their country of origin send part of their income to their home country. This takes the form of both money and goods.

Table 11.1: Remittances: total amounts of money and volume of goods

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country</th>
<th>Number of households</th>
<th>Percentage sending remittances</th>
<th>Average remittance per household (in EUR)</th>
<th>Total remittances (in EUR millions)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>134,039</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>624</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morocco</td>
<td>113,324</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Afghanistan</td>
<td>12,906</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>825</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Schuyt et al., “Geven in Nederland 2009”

Interestingly, the number of second generation migrants who send money and/or goods to their home country is the same as for the first generation. However, the amounts and volumes involved are smaller among the second generation.

Migrants send money and goods not only to family but also to friends, former neighbours and charities. For example, one third of Afghans send money or goods to charities.
12  CHOICE OF MARRIAGE PARTNER

Mixed marriages

More than 80% of Turkish and Moroccan men and women choose a marriage partner from the same ethnic background. Around 10% choose a native Dutch partner, and a similar percentage marries a partner of a different ethnic origin. There has been little change in these figures over the past seven years.

Increasingly, Turks and Moroccans – above all the second generation – choose partners who already live in the Netherlands. In 2001 one third of Moroccan bridegrooms chose a Moroccan bride from the Netherlands; by 2007 this figure had doubled to 70%. Turkish men are also much more likely to choose a Turkish bride who already lives in the Netherlands. Virtually the same trend is evident among women.

Figure 12.1: Moroccan and Turkish marriage partners, by origin, 2001-2008 (in percent)

Regulations for the immigration of marriage partners were tightened in 2004. Among Turkish men in particular, this has seemed to accelerate the decline in the choice of a partner from Turkey. The new Civic Integration Abroad Act (WIB), adopted in 2007 and which makes passing a citizenship exam in the country of origin a condition for immigration to the Netherlands, does not (yet) seem to be having an effect.

Free choice of partner

Turkish and Moroccan Dutch citizens increasingly regard the free choice of a marriage partner as a matter of course. Kurds, Hindustanis (Muslims, Christians or Hindus) and Pakistanis are at an intermediate stage in this respect. Arranged marriages are still the norm for them, but those with higher education and the economically independent have more freedom of choice. Among groups that have only been in the Netherlands for a short time, such as the Afgans, there is very little sign that the notion of free choice of marriage partner is being considered.

Although forced marriages still occur in some groups, this concept is widely condemned among all the groups studied.

There is now another group of young people aged around 30 with higher education qualifications and jobs whose families accept that they are not married.

8 Bartels, 2008.
13 HEALTH AND HEALTHCARE

Health perceptions and health risks
Relatively little is known about the health of the Muslim populations in the Netherlands. Figures from Statistics Netherlands (CBS) show that in 2006 Muslims in the Netherlands had a more negative perception of their own health than Roman Catholics and non-religious people.

Information on unhealthy lifestyles shows that alcohol consumption among Muslims is much lower than among Roman Catholics and non-religious people. But obesity is more common among Muslim women.

Figure 13.1: Health perceptions and health risks: self-perception of health, obesity, drinking and smoking, by religious group, 2006 (in percent)

Healthcare use
The fact that more Muslims perceive their health as "less good" is reflected in a higher frequency of visits to the family doctor, especially by Muslim men. In respect of visits to specialists and dentists, Muslims do not differ from other religious or non-religious groups.

Figure 13.2: Visits to family doctor, specialist or dentist over the past 12 months, 2006 (in percent)

9 Roman Catholics have been chosen as a comparison group here because they are the largest religious group in the Netherlands.
14 VOLUNTARY WORK

Number of voluntary workers
Voluntary work – broadly defined as unpaid work for an institution or organisation – is less common among Muslims in the Netherlands than among native Dutch. In 2008, 26% of Muslims engaged in voluntary work, compared with a national average of 42%.10

Table 13.1 shows that Muslims tend to do voluntary work for religious organisations and schools. In terms of participation in these areas of voluntary work, they do not differ from the total Dutch population. Differences in participation are most evident with respect to sports clubs, care institutions and hobby associations. In these areas, Muslims are clearly less involved in voluntary work than the average Dutch population.

Table 14.1: Involvement in voluntary work, population aged 18 years and older, 2008 (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of organisation</th>
<th>Muslims</th>
<th>Total Netherlands</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Youth</td>
<td>4%</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>School</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Care</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sport</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hobby</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Culture</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religion</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Work</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Politics</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housing</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neighbourhood</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: CBS, 2009, “Religie aan het begin van de 21ste eeuw”

15 LEISURE AND MEDIA CONSUMPTION

Leisure activities
Turks and Moroccans make less use of leisure facilities in the areas of culture, sport and recreation than native Dutch. Half of them engage in sports (at least 12 times over the past year), compared with two thirds of native Dutch. Three quarters visited recreational amenities (attractions, nature areas etc). One quarter of Turks and Moroccans participate in all three areas, while 14% do not participate in any of them.

Figure 15.1: Participation in leisure activities (frequency per year) among population aged 6 years and older, 2005-2007 (in percent)

Muslim participation in formal culture (canonical culture) is much lower than among the native Dutch. This also applies to practising arts and crafts (as amateurs). In contrast, Turks and Moroccans are more likely to attend a form of informal culture, such as a party with live music. They also have a strong preference for cultural products from their own heritage, such as a concert during a party, a film or television programme from their own culture or a book in their own language.

Media
Around one quarter of Turks and Moroccans read a Dutch newspaper or magazine every day, the same number as those who never do so. Half of Turks and three quarters of Moroccans watch Dutch television programmes every day. In addition, two thirds of Turks and 42% of Moroccans watch television from their country of origin on a daily basis. The second generation and those with higher education tend to watch Dutch stations relatively more and country-of-origin stations relatively less. In the four big cities, fewer Turks and Moroccans watch Dutch stations, especially in neighbourhoods with high concentrations of their own ethnic group.

Figure 15.2: Media consumption, reading newspapers or magazines and watching television stations, 2006 (in percent)
16 PARTICIPATION IN POLITICS

The Cabinet
No members of ethnic minorities were appointed Minister during the government terms of office between 1982 and 2008. However, in the fourth Balkenende administration (2007 to the present), the Labour Party (PvdA) supplied two state secretaries, Ahmed Aboutaleb and Nebahat Albayrak, of Moroccan and Turkish origin respectively.

The House of Representatives
The House of Representatives and the Senate form the States-General. The House of Representatives monitors government policy, is co-legislator, and represents the general population. The members of the House of Representatives are elected directly by popular vote. Around 8-9% of its members are currently of non-western origin. The House has four members of Turkish origin and three of Moroccan origin.

Senate
The Senate of the States-General has the authority to accept or reject new laws, but does not have the right to initiate new laws or propose amendments. Of the 75 senators, one is of Turkish origin.

Provincial Councils
The Netherlands is divided into 12 provinces, which are governed by Provincial Authorities. Aspects of healthcare, spatial planning and public transport are administered at this level of government. The Provincial Council monitors the provincial authority. The Council members are elected by voters in the province concerned every four years. In 2007, 16 of the 564 members (2.8%) across the provinces were of Turkish origin, and three were of Moroccan origin. The next national elections are due to take place in June 2010.

Municipalities
The Netherlands has 443 municipalities. These administer the most visible aspects of daily life. The municipality is governed by a Municipal Executive (mayor and aldermen). These are monitored by the municipal council, whose members are elected by popular vote. Of the more than 9,500 municipal council members across the country, 163 are of Turkish origin and 66 of Moroccan origin (together 2.4% of the total).

Figure 16.1: Municipal council members of Turkish and Moroccan origin, election years 1994-2006

The number of Turkish and Moroccan municipal council members has risen at each election since 1994. Turks in particular are becoming strongly represented in active politics.
The right to vote: electoral turnout and party preference

In 1986 non-naturalised migrants were granted active and passive voting rights at local level. One condition was a period of five years’ legal residence in the Netherlands. This change was intended to stimulate the integration of ethnic minorities into Dutch society.

Immigrants have made varied use of these new rights. A national survey several weeks before the municipal elections in March 2010 estimated that one third of Turks and Moroccans would vote. This turnout would be much lower than in 2006, when an identical survey predicted that 52% of Turks and 39% of Moroccans would vote. The lower willingness to vote in the 2010 election has been linked to the finding that immigrants’ interest in politics has fallen, and that their satisfaction with and confidence in government (both local and national) has increased. The urgency to register a protest vote, as occurred in 2006, thus seems to have disappeared.

Turks and Moroccans traditionally vote for left-wing parties. The Labour Party (PvdA) is able to attract the most votes, especially among Moroccans (see table 16.2). The Dutch Muslim Party (NMP), which participated in the 2010 elections for the first time in a small number of cities, has the support of around 7% of Turkish and Moroccan voters.

Table 16.2: Party preferences of Turks and Moroccans, 2010 (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Turks</th>
<th>Moroccans</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labour Party (PvdA)</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Green Left (GroenLinks)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialist Party (SP)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Democrats 66 (D66)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dutch Muslim Party (NMP)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>People’s Party for Freedom and Democracy (VVD)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian Democratic Party (CDA)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prefer not to say</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Don’t know</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


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12 FORUM, 2006
13 According to an opinion poll (TNS/NiPO) published in February 2010, the turnout of native Dutch voters at the 2010 municipal elections will also be lower than in 2006.
14 Dutch Muslim Party.
17 CRIME

Percentage of suspects
Of all the people suspected of crimes in the Netherlands, 15% are of Turkish or Moroccan origin. Young people are particularly heavily overrepresented in these statistics. Some 10% of 18-25 year-old Moroccans have been suspected of a crime at one time or another, compared with a rate of 2.5% among their native Dutch counterparts. Young people of Turkish origin have a suspect rate of 5.3%, between the other two groups. A striking aspect is that the clear ethnic differences within this age group largely disappear in the older age group (over 25s).

Figure 17.1: Crime suspects among 18-25 year olds and over 25s, by ethnic origin, 2006 (in percent)

Types of crime
Many Moroccan suspects are accused of property crimes, with nearly half of them suspected of this type of crime. Among Turkish suspects, violent crimes are the most common. Among native Dutch suspects, acts of vandalism and disruptions of public order are the most common.

Figure 17.2: Types of crime among 18-25 year olds, by ethnic origin, 2006

Source: CBS/Statline
18 RADICALISATION

Terrorist attacks in other countries (New York and Madrid) and the murder of Theo van Gogh in 2004 have fuelled fears in Dutch society of terrorism and radicalisation. Besides actively tracking and countering groups and individuals with terrorist plans, the authorities, policy makers and researchers have become more interested in the process of radicalisation among Muslims.

Phases in radicalisation
The process of radicalisation among Muslims began in the 1990s, and is characterised by involvement and support (both financial and ideological) by mosques and Islamic organisations from Arab countries. Funds were donated for the construction of mosques, the foundation and maintenance of organisations, and imams were sent to preach radical and uncompromising messages to Dutch Muslims. The radicalisation of young second generation Muslims since 2001 marks the start of the second phase. These radicals concentrate on the Dutch situation and are motivated by feelings of frustration and anger at their perceived discrimination in society. This phase is characterised by amateurism, fragmentation and selective ideological underpinning.

In 2005 a new phase emerged, which has been called “Islamic neo-radicalism”. A new generation of radical imams rejects the use of violence (at least in the West). They reject the ideas of the jihadists, who regard violence as an acceptable means to achieve their goals. But these new imams not only reject violence, they also reject democracy, choose Islamic law over Dutch law and are very intolerant of those who hold different views.

Extent
According to the General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD)16, in 2007 there were around 15 experienced fundamentalist imams active in the Netherlands, whose sermons attracted an average of 100 Moroccan Dutch. Radical Muslim imams were said to be active in around 30 of the country's 475 mosques. It was estimated that 25,000-30,000 Muslims were susceptible to radicalisation, of whom around 5,000 could be radicalised to such an extent that they would espouse violence and thus pose a danger to society. At the end of 2008, the number of radicals was estimated to be around 250.17 The AIVD annual report of 200818 concluded that the Dutch Muslim community had become more opposed to radical tendencies. An example quoted was the constructive reactions by Dutch Muslims to the film Fitna by Geert Wilders. Furthermore, there had been no rise in the number of extremist statements by radical Islamists on Dutch websites. In late 2009, the AIVD19 concluded that the jihadist threat against the Netherlands had eased since 2006. Recruitment by transnational networks was no longer observed. The reasons cited for these changes were an active stance by the government and greater vigilance within the Muslim community concerning recruitment of young people. Another factor was said to be the absence of leadership and the emergence of alternatives, including political salafism, which can be included under the umbrella of “Islamic neo-radicalism” (see above).

Characterisation
Young Dutch people of Moroccan, Somali and Arab origin are the most susceptible to radicalisation. According to the AIVD, these would be young people who do not feel respected or accepted and who have difficulties connecting with Dutch society.20

Radicalised Muslim women are a small minority, but their number seems to be growing. They are said to be carrying out specific tasks, such as translating and disseminating radical material on the internet.21

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16 AIVD, 2008.
17 Tweede Kamer, 29754 no. 141, 2008.
18 AIVD, 2008.
20 AIVD, 2008.
21 Ibid.
Part III: Living together
19 FEELING AT HOME IN THE NETHERLANDS

Feeling at home
In 2006, 60-70% of religious Moroccans and Turks claimed to feel at home in the Netherlands. Religious Muslims felt slightly less at home than non-religious Muslims. Moroccans, both religious and non-religious, felt more at home in the Netherlands than Turks.22

Figure 19.1: Feeling at home in the Netherlands, 2006 (in percent)

Feeling at home in the Netherlands is linked to education level. Highly educated migrants are more likely to feel at home than the less well educated. At the same time, they also feel less accepted.23 The phenomenon that migrants who are most integrated (highly educated) feel the least accepted is called the “integration paradox”.24 A possible explanation for this phenomenon, which is particularly evident among Moroccans, is that the highly educated take greater interest in public and political debates on the problems of a multicultural society and may consequently perceive the social climate as unfavourable.25

Homesickness
Religious Moroccans and Turks are more likely to feel homesick for their country of origin than non-religious Moroccans and Turks. As in the case of feeling at home in the Netherlands, Turks are more often homesick than Moroccans.

Figure 19.2: Homesickness for the country of origin, 2006 (in percent)

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22 A FORUM survey (FORUM, 2008) among second generation migrants revealed the opposite: more young Moroccans did not feel at home in the Netherlands than their Turkish counterparts.
23 SCP, “Jaarrapport Integratie 2009”.
24 Ibid.
25 Ibid.
20 CONTENTMENT AND HAPPINESS AMONG YOUNG PEOPLE

Happiness
Asked in a FORUM survey about their level of happiness, two thirds of young Turks and Moroccans said that they felt happy. Native Dutch young people scored higher: 78%. Some 10% of young Turks and 12% of young Moroccans felt unhappy (compared with 7% of their native Dutch counterparts).

Contentment with home and neighbourhood
A large majority of young Turks and Moroccans (as well as young native Dutch) said that they were reasonably or completely content with their home and their neighbourhood.

Figure 20.1: Feeling at home in the neighbourhood, by ethnic group, 2008 (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Not at all at home</th>
<th>Not very at home</th>
<th>Reasonably at home</th>
<th>Completely at home</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native Dutch</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FORUM, 2008

Contentment with Dutch society
More young Turks and Moroccans are content with Dutch society than young native Dutch. Around half of Turks and Moroccans are content, compared with one third of native Dutch. A slightly larger number of young Moroccans are dissatisfied with Dutch society (compared with their counterparts from the other two ethnic groups), especially within the 15-25 age group.

Figure 20.2: Contentment with Dutch society, 2008 (in percent)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Dissatisfied</th>
<th>Neither dissatisfied nor satisfied</th>
<th>Satisfied</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Native Dutch</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: FORUM, 2008
21 IDENTIFICATION

Identification with the Netherlands

Two thirds of religious Turks and half of religious Moroccans identify more with their country of origin than with the Netherlands. Religious Turks and Moroccans identify somewhat more with their country of origin than non-religious people from their ethnic group.

Figure 21.1: Identification with the Netherlands, by ethnic group and religiosity, 2006

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnic Group</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Not Religious</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>31%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The identification with the Netherlands or the country of origin depends on such factors as education, generation and residence in ethnic neighbourhoods. The highly educated and the second generation identify more with the Netherlands. By contrast, Turks and Moroccans living in ethnic neighbourhoods identify less with the Netherlands.

Identification with the city

In a survey of second generation Moroccans and Turks in Amsterdam and Rotterdam, the respondents were asked about their identification with their own ethnic group, with the city they lived in and with the Netherlands. It emerged that the strongest identification was with one’s own ethnic group, but that identification with the city or place of residence was also strong. Identification with the Netherlands was weakest (around one third to half).

Figure 21.2: Identification of the second generation, by ethnic group, 2006/07

Source: TIES (2008), “The position of the Turkish and Moroccan Second Generation in Amsterdam and Rotterdam”. Done!
22 MUTUAL PERCEPTIONS

Native Dutch about Muslims
The public debate in the Netherlands is reflected in the attitude of native Dutch towards Muslims. A considerable number of native Dutch have a negative view of Muslims, as becomes evident from responses to specific statements about Muslims. A slight change in attitude in a positive direction can be observed since 2006.

Figure 22.1: Views of native Dutch (18-80 years) on the way of life of Muslims, 1998-2008/9 ("agree" in percent)

Turks and Moroccans about native Dutch
The SCP put similar statements about native Dutch to Turkish and Moroccan respondents. Compared with the native Dutch, a much smaller number of Turks and Moroccans agreed that the Western way of life was incompatible with being a Muslim. A majority of Turks and Muslims believe that Dutch people’s perceptions about Islam are too negative. Moroccans believe this more than Turks.

In 2006, around 70% of Moroccans and Turks expected tensions between various groups in the Netherlands to increase in the future.

Figure 22.2: Views of Turks and Moroccans on tensions and violence between groups, 2006 ("strongly agree" and "agree" in percent)

Source: SCP, “Jaarrapport Integratie 2009”
23 CONTACTS WITH NATIVE DUTCH

Contacts
Turks and Moroccans have far more contacts with members of their own ethnic groups than with native Dutch. Two thirds of the religious among them have more contacts with their own group than with native Dutch. Non-religious Turks and Moroccans, especially the latter, have significantly more contacts with native Dutch. Incidentally, these groups have far more contacts with native Dutch than vice versa.

Figure 23.1: Contacts between immigrants and natives, 2006

The larger the ethnic group, the smaller the chance of meeting a native Dutch person. Consequently, the likelihood of immigrants meeting native Dutch in the four big cities is declining. Thus the statistical probability of Turks meeting native Dutch in Amsterdam declined from 51% in 1998 to 43% in 2008. Between 1994 and 2006, the composition of circles of friends and acquaintances of the second generation became steadily more one-sided, in the sense that they consisted more and more of people from the same ethnic group. This applies most to the Turkish second generation.

Visits
Nearly half of religious Moroccans and Turks never receive visits from native Dutch. Non-religious (or only nominally religious) Moroccans and Turks are visited more often by native Dutch; in some cases these visits are even frequent. Once again, native Dutch people visit migrants far less than vice versa.

Figure 23.2: Visits by migrants to natives and vice versa, 2006

Source: SCP/CBS, SIM

28 SCP, “Jaarrapport Integratie 2009”.

FORUM - Institute for Multicultural Affairs
Fact book Muslims in the Netherlands, March 2010


**24 DISCRIMINATION AGAINST MUSLIMS**

On 12 February 2008, the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), a non-governmental organisation set up by the Council of Europe, published a report\(^{29}\) about the situation pertaining to discrimination in the Netherlands. The ECRI concluded that the tone in the public and political debate in the Netherlands had deteriorated dramatically in recent years and had led to an alarming polarisation. The ECRI appealed to the Dutch government to be more active in countering discrimination and to change its policies. The Cabinet did not accept ECRI’s conclusion about the sharp tone of public debate. It argued that this helped to address actual problems.

**Extent of discrimination**

In a 2005 survey, around half of Turkish and Moroccan respondents claimed to have experienced discrimination (on grounds of country of origin, religion and/or colour) during the preceding year.\(^{30}\) Moroccans reported more serious incidents and a wider range of incidents than Turks. Young people reported more incidents than older people.

**Table 24.1: Serious and less serious experiences of discrimination, 2005 (in percent)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Experience of serious incidents</th>
<th>Experience of less serious incidents</th>
<th>Number of respondents</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>268</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>269</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Monitor Rassendiscriminatie, 2005

The actual extent of discrimination against Muslims is difficult to measure. The reliability of the recording of incidents by anti-discrimination centres and the police firstly depends on victims’ knowledge of these centres and their willingness to contact them, and secondly on the willingness of police to record incidents.

In 2007, the anti-discrimination centres in 33 municipalities recorded 151 complaints of discrimination lodged by Turks and 315 by Moroccans.\(^ {31}\) The number of reports of discrimination on grounds of origin, colour or race lodged by Moroccans and Turks has remained relatively stable since 2002.

In 2008, an analysis of incidents of discrimination by the police\(^ {32}\) showed that 15% of the 2,240 incidents targeted Turks, Moroccans and Muslims. The actual extent of discrimination is thought to be much more widespread.

According to the Reporting Centre for Discrimination on the Internet (MDI), most of the discriminatory statements reported on the internet were related to hatred against Muslims.\(^ {33}\) The number of such reports was lower than in 2007, which the MDI described as remarkable because the debate on Muslims reached a climax in 2008, in part because of the release of the film *Fitna*. The MDI did record an increase in hate statements against Moroccans.

**Discrimination on the labour market**

The Netherlands Institute for Social Research (SCP) conducted numerous practical tests in 2008\(^ {34}\) to see whether migrant applicants had the same chances of being invited to a job interview as native Dutch applicants with the same qualifications. The study relied on both written and telephone applications to job advertisements. It emerged that non-Western migrants were significantly less likely to be invited to a job interview. Discrimination was more common in lower and middle-ranking jobs, more common for men than women, more common in the hospitality sector and retail industry, and more common for jobs with customer interactions. Interestingly, Moroccans were more likely to be invited to a job interview than Turks.\(^ {35}\)

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\(^{30}\) Monitor Racisme, 2005.


\(^{33}\) MDI, “Jaarverslag 2008”. The MDI records reports submitted by e-mail of discriminatory and hateful statements on Dutch websites, investigates the reports, decides whether criminal proceedings should be initiated, and undertakes specific actions.

\(^{34}\) SCP, “Liever Mark dan Mohamed?”, 2009.

\(^{35}\) 51% against 47%. Ibid.
Part IV: Islam
25 RELIGIOUS OBSERVANCE

Active religious behaviour

Although most Turks and Moroccans (including the second generation) consider themselves Muslims, there are significant differences in religious behaviour and attitudes. In a survey conducted in 2006, a majority of respondents said that they ate halal food every day and fasted during Ramadan. Moroccans were more active in their religious behaviour than Turks. One quarter of Muslims visited a mosque at least once a week, while half did so rarely or never. Mosque attendance was largely a men’s affair. One third of Muslim men visited a mosque once a week, compared with 14% of Muslim women.36

Figure 25.1: Turkish and Moroccan Muslims by active religious behaviour, 2006

The number of Turks and Moroccans who describe themselves as Muslims but do not (or no longer) visit a mosque has increased. In 2006, one quarter of Turks did not visit a mosque, compared with 10% in 1998. In this respect, the first generation is not very different from the second generation. The number of first generation Moroccan Muslims who did not visit a mosque rose from 28% to 38% during this time. By contrast, more second generation Moroccan Muslims visited a mosque in 2006 than in 1998.

Religious views

Although compared with Turks, Moroccans have more contacts with native Dutch people, are more modern in their attitudes to relationships between men and women and family ties, and are less concerned about retaining their own culture, figure 25.1 shows that religion plays a more important role in their daily lives than among Turks. Moroccans are also more likely to believe that Muslims should follow the rules of Islam and that Islamic women should wear a headscarf in public. Interestingly, Turkish women are more insistent on religious observance than Turkish men, while Moroccan women actually have more relaxed views than Moroccan men. Sending their children to Islamic schools and converting Dutch people to Islam are important for only a small minority of Muslims.

Figure 25.2: Views of Moroccan and Turkish Muslims on Islamic rules, 2006

Source: SCP, “Jaarrapport Integratie 2007” (SIM’06)
Number of mosques

In 2007 there were an estimated 475 mosques in the Netherlands. Around half are managed by Turkish organisations, around one third by Moroccans and around one-tenth by Surinamese.

Table 26.1: Summary of mosques, by ethnic group, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population group</th>
<th>Number of mosques</th>
<th>Percentage of mosques</th>
<th>Number of mosques per 10,000 Muslims</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turks</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccans</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>16.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Van Oudenhoven et al., 2008

Nearly half of all mosques are located in the two provinces of North Holland and South Holland. Islam has a number of currents and movements, which is reflected in the management of the mosques. Table 25.2 below seeks to classify the mosques by Islamic current.

Table 26.2: Mosques, by religious affiliation, 2007

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Current</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percentage of total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Turks - Diyanet</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>30.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks - Süleymani</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks - Milli Görüş</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turks - other</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Moroccan</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>37.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese – Sunni</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surinamese - Ahmadiyya</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: Van Oudenhoven et al., 2008

Social function

Unlike in the countries of origin, mosques in the Netherlands are not only places where Muslims can fulfil their religious obligations or receive religious education (prayers, Friday sermon, teaching of the Koran, lectures on religious topics). They are often also meeting places, where members of the community can seek advice on a range of issues, where they can get information, engage in sport and recreation, relax, shop or have a meal. Mosques often also have contacts with churches (and sometimes also synagogues) within the context of inter-faith dialogue.

A survey of 120 mosques has shown that 79% of mosques also fulfil other social functions besides their religious functions. Mosques with a Turkish or Pakistani background are particularly active in the social sphere.

37 Van Oudenhoven et al., “Nederland daagt”, 2008. This calculation is made on the basis of an address list maintained by the Islamic Foundation for the Promotion of Integration (ISBI), supplemented with other address lists. Ibid. pp. 52-53.
38 Ibid., p. 54.
39 Canatan et al., 2005.
40 Canatan et al., 2003.
27 ISLAMIC EDUCATION

Freedom of education
Like all other forms of denominational education, Islamic education is based on article 23, section 2 of the Dutch constitution, which states: “All persons shall be free to provide education, without prejudice to the authorities' right of supervision and, with regard to forms of education designated by law, its right to examine the competence and moral integrity of teachers, to be regulated by Act of Parliament”. Like all education, Islamic education is financed by the central government.

Primary and secondary education
The Islamic Schools Governing Boards Organisation (ISBO) was established in 1990. This is an umbrella organisation for Islamic primary and secondary schools.
There are currently 43 Islamic primary schools in the Netherlands, teaching 9,331 pupils. There are two Islamic secondary schools, one in Amsterdam and one in Rotterdam; together they teach 1,179 pupils.41

University education
The Free University Amsterdam (VU) has established a Centre for Islamic Theology, where students can follow a Bachelor’s degree in Islamic theology and a one year Master’s programme in Islamic spiritual care. The VU also offers Master's programmes in Islamic youth care and Islamic religious education (with internships in the youth care and education systems).
Leiden University offers Bachelor's and Master's degrees in Islamic theology. The Bachelor's degree offers a broad theological education, covering all Islamic currents. The one year Master's degree in Islamic theology (which is taught in English) concentrates on modern Islam in Europe.
In addition, there are two Islamic universities in the Netherlands: the Islamic University Rotterdam (IUR) and the Islamic University of Europe (IUE) in Schiedam. Neither is recognised or funded by the government.

Imam education
The only imam training course available is at the INHolland College. This course trains participants to become an imam and Islamic spiritual care worker at higher vocational (HBO) level and has been designed in cooperation with a number of mosque organisations affiliated to the Muslims and Government Contact Platform (CMO). The course comprises three qualifications: imam, Islamic spiritual care worker and Islamic educational worker.
At the moment there is no imam training course at university level. Leiden University plans to launch the first university-level imam training course in the near future, in cooperation with an umbrella organisation of Moroccan and Turkish mosques. The VU is currently developing a three-year Master's degree in Islamic theology, which includes imam training at mosques and institutions.

41 Cfi Informatieproducten, October 2008.
28 ISLAMIC ORGANISATIONS

Islamic contact groups
The Netherlands has two official national Islamic organisations with which the Minister of Housing, Neighbourhoods and Integration maintains contact and consults on a range of issues: the Muslims and Government Contact Platform (CMO) and the Contact Group Islam (CGI).

The CMO was acknowledged as an official contact platform by the Minister for Immigration and Integration in November 2004. It consists of ten organisations (most of them Sunni), including five Turkish mosque umbrella organisations, one national Moroccan mosque umbrella organisation, one regional Moroccan mosque umbrella organisation, one Surinamese umbrella organisation (including mosques and mosque organisations), an association of predominantly Moroccan imams, and an organisation of predominantly Iraqi Shias. In addition to providing a forum for these affiliates, the CMO also maintains cooperation arrangements and consultation structures with 11 different organisations, including the Rijnmond Islamic Organisations Platform (SPIOR), Al Nisa, the Brabant Islamic Council (BIR) and the Bosniak Association.

In January 2005, the CGI was recognised by the Minister for Immigration and Integration as a second contact group. The CGI consists of Sunni, Ahmadiyya and Alevi organisations, including a Turkish umbrella organisation of Alevi social and cultural associations, a mosque umbrella organisation of the Surinamese Lahore Ahmadiyya, and an umbrella organisation of several ethnic organisations including Bosnian and Indonesian mosques.

Islamic organisations
The Netherlands has several organisations of Muslim women. Al Nisa is a well-known voluntary organisation of Dutch Muslim women based in Amsterdam. The National Islamic Women Network (LIVN) is a network organisation for women and women’s organisations committed to the participation and emancipation of Muslim women.

There are many local and regional youth and student organisations. Some of these focus on the Islamic identity, while others explicitly do not.

Muslim broadcasting service
The Netherlands has had a broadcasting organisation specifically aimed at Muslims since 1986. In 1993, the functions of the Islamic Broadcasting Foundation (IOS) were taken over by the Netherlands Muslim Broadcasting Foundation (NMO), a public-service broadcasting company based on Islamic principles. Since 2007, the NMO has had to share its broadcasting time with the Netherlands Islamic Broadcasting Organisation (NIO), which was established in 2005. The broadcasting licences for both organisations will be withdrawn with effect from 1 September 2010. At the end of 2009, the Media Authority authorised the new Muslim Broadcasting Organisation Netherlands (SMON) to broadcast 58 hours of television and 175 hours of radio from September 2010.
The following paragraphs give an overview of the main constitutional freedoms which dominate the public debate on Integration in the Netherlands.

**Freedom of expression (article 7 of the Dutch constitution)**

Freedom of expression is the freedom for citizens to express their opinions without fear of persecution by the government. In the Netherlands, freedom of expression is guaranteed by article 7 of the constitution, which states:

"(1) No one shall require prior permission to publish thoughts or opinions through the press, without prejudice to the responsibility of every person under the law.

(2) Rules concerning radio and television shall be laid down by Act of Parliament. There shall be no prior supervision of the content of a radio or television broadcast.

(3) No one shall be required to submit thoughts or opinions for prior approval in order to disseminate them by means other than those mentioned in the preceding paragraphs, without prejudice to the responsibility of every person under the law. The holding of performances open to persons younger than sixteen years of age may be regulated by Act of Parliament in order to protect good morals."

The Dutch freedom of speech is part of the constitutional article on the freedom of the press. The concept of press essentially entails readable signs and images. This article considers the basic right to express feelings and thoughts without having to ask for advance permission. One is only answerable to the criminal code, which regulates such things as slander, defamation and insult, and only when it concerns published work.

The development of the Internet has increased the opportunities to practise one’s freedom of expression without being accountable to the law. Online screen names and data havens (like Freenet) provide many freedoms, because technology ensures that material cannot be removed (censored) and that the author cannot be easily linked to a specific person or organisation. It is not uncommon for Dutch citizens to be tried and convicted for material they publish on the Internet and for Dutch websites to be taken down for the views they put forward. Many sites also practise self-censorship, in that they remove unwanted comments. There are also organisations like the Reporting Centre for Discrimination on the Internet (MDI), which follows up on complaints about discriminatory remarks on the Internet and attempts to get them removed.

**Freedom of the press (article 7 of the Dutch constitution)**

The Dutch freedom of the press is part of the constitutional article on the freedom of expression. "Press" is defined as material comprised of text and/or images. This article grants everyone the right to use the printing press to express feelings or thoughts without having to ask for advance permission. Citizens are only accountable under the provisions of the Penal Code limiting defamation, slander, libel and so on, and only after they have published the item in question.

**Discrimination (article 1 of the Dutch constitution)**

Article 1 of the Dutch constitution states that “All who are in the Netherlands will be treated in an equal manner. Discrimination on the basis of religion, faith, political affiliation, race, sex or any other ground is not permitted”.

Articles 137c to 137g of the Penal Code cite more specific grounds which are considered discriminatory. For all these articles, intent to discriminate needs to be proven:

- 137c: intentionally insulting a specific group of people;
- 137d: stirring up hatred or discrimination of or inciting violence towards a specific group of people;
- 137e: publishing and distributing insulting material;
- 137f: participating in or assisting discriminatory activities;
- 137g: intentionally discriminating based on race when working in a professional setting.

In addition, articles in the Civil Code prohibit specific forms of discrimination, but do not carry a criminal sentence. These apply in such areas as voiding a contract or granting civil damages.

**Freedom of religion (article 6 of the Dutch constitution)**

Freedom of religion is the oldest fundamental right in the Netherlands, laid down in the Union of Utrecht. Freedom of religion is enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in article 6 of the Dutch Constitution, which states: “Everyone has the right to freely practise their religion or faith, individually or with others. This is only limited to one’s accountability before the law. Outside buildings and
non-common spaces, the law can limit this right in the interest of public health and traffic regulation or to prevent disturbances to the peace.

**Civic Integration Abroad Act**
The main provision of the Civic Integration Abroad Act is that all foreign nationals with permanent residence rights have an obligation to integrate into Dutch society. This obligation is also specifically imposed on spiritual counsellors, including imams, even though they cannot apply for a permanent residence permit. Spiritual counsellors play a major role in the community and as such have an impact on the integration process of their followers. They must also be able to respond adequately to questions from their followers about the new society. The concept of spiritual counsellor is defined in article 1 of the Civic Integration Abroad Act. Anyone who works for a religion or a place of worship is covered by the Act.

**Integration of imams**
The Dutch government has stipulated (Vc 2000 B5/4.1) that foreign nationals who want to work in the Netherlands as religious teachers or leaders must have a work permit.
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