Internal mobility in the EU and its impact on urban regions in sending and receiving countries:

Part 2: Case studies

Discussion paper for the Joint Meeting of the Directors General responsible for Territorial Cohesion and Urban Development,
21 November 2013, Vilnius, Lithuania

These case studies are part of the paper written by EUKN on behalf of the Lithuanian Presidency of the Council of the European Union (The Ministry of Environment). The research was co-funded by the Dutch Ministry of the Interior and Kingdom Relations.
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1 Introduction to the case studies

This is part 2 of the EUKN research paper supporting the Lithuanian EU Presidency 2013. Both parts of the paper will serve as inspiration and a point of departure for roundtable discussions on urban and territorial issues to be discussed at the meeting of Directors General responsible for urban development on 20 and 21 November 2013 in Vilnius, Lithuania.

This second part of the research paper presents the findings from the case study research on cities located in main sending and receiving EU Member States. The research paper analyses the main, recent trends in intra-EU mobility and their social, economic and spatial effects on countries and regions of origin and destination. Many of the sources used for the first part of the study focus on developments at national level; much less is known about the effects on sending and receiving cities and urban regions. There is even less knowledge about mobility from countries worst hit by the crisis. To find out more about local impacts of intra-EU mobility and about more recent labour mobility trends, the desk research has been supplemented by the portrayal of a selection of immigration and emigration cities as urban cases.

Cases are selected from both sending and receiving regions. The selected cases are cities in immigration regions, emigration regions and immigration regions recently faced by increasing emigration due to the economic crisis. The following cases have been selected:

(1) The Hague, the Netherlands
(2) Greater London area, the United Kingdom
(3) Munich, Germany
(4) Barcelona and Catalonia, Spain
(5) Rzeszów and Subcarpathian, Poland
(6) Vilnius, Lithuania

The main questions asked in the case studies are the same as those in the paper, except for a stronger emphasis on policies developed at local level. Thus, the main questions are: what are the main, recent trends in intra-EU mobility faced by the city (and region); what are the social, economic and spatial effects of these mobility trends; and what policies have been developed for this purpose? In line with these questions, the case studies start with presenting the background and data on relevant migration flows and stocks, then the impacts and challenges are discussed, and finally the case studies focus on some relevant policies developed to address the challenges.

The description of the case studies is based primarily on interviews and postal contact with experts on the developments and development of policies in the case study city, complemented by information from resources, partly provided by those experts.
2 The Hague, Netherlands

Interview with Tamar Hilversum and Biendoe Ramdhani, from The Hague’s Integration Department.

2.1 Data and background

The Hague has 506,366 inhabitants and about 50% of these are migrants or have a migrant background. The biggest groups of migrant descent from non-EU countries are: Surinamese (9.2%), Turkish (7.6%) and Moroccan (5.7%). The people of Western descent (the statistics include Europe, except Turkey; and North America, Japan, Oceania and Indonesia) constitute 15.5% of the population. The number of EU migrants has almost doubled since 2007, to 33,000 in 2013.

The Hague has since 2009 annually issued a monitoring report on the flows and situation of its labour migrants (from CEE countries), and since 2013 also on the group of migrants from Southern European countries (Spain, Portugal, Italy, Greece). The reports provide data on the numbers of migrants each year, their distribution in the city’s districts, their ages and gender, the number of people attending schools, work with NGOs, and the results of the city’s initiatives, amongst other data.

Central and Eastern Europe: It is estimated that 50% of CEE migrants are not registered (Risbo 2009), which results in an estimation of 30,000 CEE migrants living in the Hague. Polish is the most numerous nationality; it has tripled since 2007 with 7,696 registered migrants in 2013. Bulgarians follow with 4,568 migrants registered in 2013, showing the biggest increase (they were only 254 in 2007). The percentage of registered migrants living in the city for more than 2 years has increased from 29% in 2009 to 59% in 2013. The city authorities expect the number of Bulgarians and Romanians to grow as frontiers fully open on January 1, 2014 and the requirement for a work permit will lapse.

Southern Europe: The number of Southern Europeans in The Hague increased by 67% between 2008 and 2013 from 3,572 to 5,962. Nationwide the number of Southern Europeans grew between 2007 and 2012 by 21%. The group of Greeks in The Hague grew most strongly in recent years (+182% compared to 2008), making them the largest group of southern Europeans in the city, closely followed by Italians and Spaniards. In order to prepare for the expected increase in Southern European migrants, The Hague has commissioned a study from the Lize foundation to understand the nature, distribution, living conditions, problems and needs of the new migrants.

2.2 Impacts and challenges: Housing and homelessness

Labour Market: In The Hague, most CEE migrants work in greenhouses in the Westland, a region of horticulture - one of the main Dutch export sectors; in Rotterdam in the harbour and elsewhere in construction. Almost half of Polish migrants work more than 40 hours per week. It is estimated that Polish labour migrants in the Netherlands deliver a positive contribution of 0.31% to the long term growth of the Dutch economy (NPCH 2001). Many Turkish Bulgarians settle with the established Turkish community, working informally. After the 1st of January they may become visible in the data.

Impact on neighbourhoods: The main social impacts are felt at the level of neighbourhoods, with overcrowding in flats and homelessness. Migrants rent houses themselves or through job agencies, often being
concentrated in poor neighbourhoods where unemployment is high. Thanks to a service in which citizens can complain about problems like overcrowding in flats or other forms of nuisance, it became clear that many immigrants are not registered and live in overcrowded flats.

A significant number of migrants are homeless, due to losing their jobs, dishonest job agencies or unprepared arrivals. At a certain time there were more than 250 homeless people, mostly Poles. Many of the homeless had no right to use The Hague’s shelters, because they were not registered in the city. Consequently, some neighbourhoods became perceived as unsafe. Due to the Perspektywa project the number of homeless migrants was reduced to an average of 55 people per month.

The city sees it as a challenge to support migrants, to act on the complaints and concerns of the neighbourhoods so as not to let them escalate, and at the same time to be accountable for the efforts spent in integration, especially in times of economic crisis.

2.3 Policies: tackling social impacts and fostering Integration

The Hague has several programmes that aim to tackle the different impacts on the city. A programme focusing on CEE labour migrants was developed under which several initiatives deal with social integration (decreasing the risk of unemployment and homelessness by language learning and education); facilitating extra accommodation; and cooperating with Polish NGOs that can better reach out to the CEE migrants. The city is appealing for more EU support (see Box 2.1).

**Accommodation:** In 2012, The Hague, together with job agencies, planned to set up two large short-stay hostels for labour migrants. Together with the Haaglanden region, The Hague came up with a plan to have 6,000 extra accommodation places for immigrants for the whole region. An agreement with housing corporations aims to create 1,500 extra short-stay rooms. The city has also created a shelter for homeless migrants who were not entitled to go to the regular shelters.

**Working with Polish NGOs:** The Hague is working together with two Polish NGOs: Barka and IDHEM, in the Perspektywa project. Barka, experienced in working with homeless migrants, uses a method in which a former homeless person and a psychologist approach homeless migrants and assess their needs. When migrants are not registered and thus have no right to stay in the Netherlands, they are helped to go back home. When they have rights to stay, they are helped to stay. The idea in returning to the home country is that people are better off receiving help in their own language and environment. The Perspektywa project, active between April 2012 and December 2014, is seen as a successful initiative that has reduced homelessness.

IDHEM is also undertaking other projects as well as providing assistance to the homeless. With volunteers from i.e. Poland, Bulgaria and Romania accessible two days per week, they give

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**Box 2.1 Public Opinion and the EU**

The Hague feels that the political climate is changing and that there is less tolerance. The city calls for more attention and support for the challenges posed by migration at the local level, as at the moment municipalities have to face these problems by themselves.

“Together we decided that we want free movement in Europe, but we should also come together to an agreement of how to make free movement as beneficial as possible to everyone involved: sending and hosting countries.”
migrants information in their own languages, answer questions they may have, assist them with finding jobs and with sorting out bureaucratic matters and if they want to return to their country of origin, IDHEM provides practical support.

“The labour migrants are also victims. They didn’t ask for this situation and they are not always aware of their rights. We say you shouldn’t accept this salary or work for that agency, but they don’t have many choices. On one hand you want to help and on the other hand they accept the situation.”

Language and Education: Not knowing Dutch is the main barrier to accessing better paid jobs and to being informed of one’s rights. To tackle this barrier, The Hague subsidises different language schools to provide affordable courses. One of them is called “Language in the neighbourhood”: 2 lessons a week for a minimum of 24 weeks for 20 euros. The classes are at the weekends or in the evenings. Labour migrants are the largest group taking these courses. Another project places educated Poles as interns with the police or healthcare organisations to show the advantages of having native speakers to help with language and culture issues. In another project, consultants are placed in schools with many EU migrant students, to help them, their parents and the school with any school oriented problems.
3 Greater London area, UK

3.1 Data and background: migration from EU Member States to London

London is a well-known migrant city that has always attracted people from all over the world. Between 1990 and 2003, more migrants came to London than to the rest of the United Kingdom. Post-2004 migration was dominated by large-scale migration from EU Accession countries, but was proportionately greater in the rest of the UK compared to London (Gidley & Jayaweera, 2010, p. 15). On average, many migrants from EU accession countries have gone to parts of the United Kingdom that had previously attracted only very few migrants. (Pollard et al, 2008, p. 6)

Still, citizens from the enlarged European Union – particularly from EU8 countries - form one of the most significant migrant populations that has come to London in the recent past. This population tends to be young, quite highly educated, economically active and dominated by single people. (Gidley & Jayaweera, 2010, p. 15) Many perceive London as a vibrant, tolerant and diverse city that provides many economic, social and cultural opportunities. (Pollard et al, 2008, p.43)

The arrival of EU8 migrants in London started immediately after the accession of those countries to the EU, and continued to rise until 2007. Between May 2004 and December 2007, over 750,000 EU8 workers came to London. (Gidley & Jayaweera, 2010, p. 15) Since 2007, the number of EU8 migrants coming to the United Kingdom has decreased however, due to (economic) developments in sending countries, diversion to alternative EU destinations, demographic patterns in sending countries and the devaluation of the pound. (Pollard et al, 2008)

In 2010, EU8 migrants made up 2 percent of London’s total population.

3.2 Impacts & Challenges

EU migrants, particularly from EU8 countries, have been the subject of considerable public and media attention in both London and the United Kingdom as a whole. They are highly visible in local economic activities, and play an important part in London’s daily life. Between 2004 and 2008, several hundred Polish delis were established throughout the UK. Even the supermarket chain Tesco now sells Polish food in more stores in the UK than in Poland itself. (Pollard et al, 2008, p.22)

In London, three in every four EU8/EU2 migrants is self-employed, predominantly in sectors including manufacturing, construction, distribution, hospitality and transport/communication. (Pollard et al, 2008, p. 35)

Migrants from EU accession countries have filled important labour market gaps. Today, there is even some concern that key skills and labour market gaps filled by A8 migrants are starting to open up again, due to the fact that the number of EU8 migrants returning to their home countries has increased since the start of the economic crisis. (Gidley & Jayaweera, 2010, p. 15)

However, despite the fact that EU migrants from accession countries are employed in sectors and jobs that are characterised by labour market gaps, many of these migrants are actually not (yet) making use of their actual...
skills. A survey of highly skilled Polish workers in London by the Center for International Relations in Warsaw found that many of the people who did work in jobs relevant to their qualifications were working in services only for the Polish community, such as Polish schools. (Pollard et al, 2008, p.37) Nevertheless, it also seems that those who stay on a long term basis eventually move into jobs that are more suited and relevant to their personal skills and qualifications(Pollard et al, 2008, p.38).

There are also migrants who are less fortunate. Just like migrants from non-EU countries, limited entitlement to benefits means that those who fail to find jobs, or who lose their jobs, can become homeless and destitute. In central London there has been an increase in rough sleeping, for example. In the mid-2000s, accession state nationals comprised up to half of recognised street drinkers in the London neighbourhoods of Hammersmith and Fulham and one in five of the rough sleepers in Westminster. Half the beds in the rolling night shelters run by central London churches in the winter of 2005/06 were taken up by accession state nationals. (Audit Commission, 2007, p.24)

This problem is exacerbated by the fact that London already has a housing shortage, and migrant workers add to the demand for affordable rented property. In London, 10 % of all privately renting households are now overcrowded and this is rising rapidly. There have been many examples of gross overcrowding, including the use of illegally converted attics, sheds and outbuildings (Audit Commission, 2007, p. 23). Several London boroughs, including Newham, Ealing and Brent, have set up squads of investigators to detect illegal housing (London Evening Standard, 2012).

Social isolation due to language barriers is a common phenomenon as well. This problem starts early at school. At the moment, many of London’s schools are overcrowded. The Greater London Authority has even complained that it would need another 70,000 (primary school) places and was even considering teaching in shifts (Booth et al., 2012, p. 29). In addition, the GLA has also considered turning its own unused buildings into schools to help alleviate the problem (London Evening Standard, 2011).

3.3 Policies

Education seems to be one of the few EU migration-related topics the GLA is directly involved in. This may have to do with the limited competence of the GLA, in contrast to the local authorities (boroughs) at the tier of government below the GLA. In addition, it may be a result of the fact that EU nationals have no specific budget lines or policies attached to them in almost any local or regional context in the UK (Email interview Ben Gidley, 2013).
4 Munich, Germany

Interview with Margarete Spohn, from the Office for Intercultural Affairs of Munich. Information also provided by Martha Doll and Magdalena Ziolek-Skrzypczak from Munich’s Municipality

4.1 Data and background

In the past 5 years Munich has had a 72% increase in foreign migration (from 26,798 foreign migrants arriving in 2008 to 46,580 arriving in 2012). In a city of 1.4 million inhabitants, 38.6% have a migration background (25% are foreigners and 14% are Germans with a migration background). Of the foreigners 11% are from EU countries; and 14% are non-EU nationals. The five biggest nationality groups are: Turkish, Greeks, Croatians, Italians and Austrians (see Fig 4.1). Between 2009 and 2012 the Greek population has increased 20% and the Polish population 34%. The Romanian, Bulgarian, Hungarian, Italian and Spanish populations have also increased. Currently Munich is receiving a hundred asylum seekers and refugees from Syria, Somalia and Iraq a day. The last time such an increase in refugees happened was in the 90s, during the Yugoslavian war.
The city also receives migrants from other parts of Germany, due to its role as one of the main business centres in Europe. Its economic performance is visible in the unemployment rate; more than two percentage points lower than the German average: in 2012, unemployment in Germany was 6.8% and 14.3% for foreigners; in Munich it was on average 4.9% and 8.7% for foreigners. Throughout Germany unemployment for foreigners is double that for Germans.

Types of immigrants: Munich receives highly and low skilled migrants. There are no seasonal flows, as they are more often found closer to agricultural areas, which is not the case in Munich.

4.2 Impacts and challenges: Housing, businesses and integration

Housing: Housing is the biggest problem for Munich’s population, not just for migrants. The city has one of the highest rents in Germany and the area around Munich is even more expensive. There are no special housing programmes for migrants and there is also no short-stay accommodation for temporary migrants, but some special accommodation is available for refugees. Specifically for newly arrived migrants and people on low incomes it is very difficult to find accommodation in the free market. Newly-arrived low-skilled (EU and non-EU) migrants live in very poor conditions, sharing houses with many people and sleeping in shifts. People who have not worked in Germany yet do not have access to the social housing sector. The city has an emergency accommodation programme for the winter. Schools, military areas and old bunkers are opened to accommodate homeless migrants and protect them from the freezing temperatures.

Labour Market: Highly qualified migrants come to Munich from all over the world. There is less qualified work in the tertiary sector. Self-employed workers are increasing consistently. In 2010, 40.5% of all declarations of businesses were from foreigners, compared to 48.1% in 2012. In 2011, 91.7% of all declarations of business in the building and construction industry were made by non-German nationals. These migrants are self-employed, but in practice they work for sub-contractors. Most of the self-employment declarations are from Romanian and Bulgarian nationals, as it is their only chance to get work in the EU. Similarly, between 2004 and 2008, the largest proportion of these declarations was from Poles; and between 2009 and 2011 from Hungarians.

In terms of businesses in the city, 35% are owned by foreigners. Every year there are 2,500 new enterprises and 1,000 cease trading. The rate of ceasing trading for foreigners is increasing (33.5% in 2010 to 37.5% in 2012), and decreasing for Germans (66.5% in 2010 to 62.5% in 2012).

Integration: Most migrants arriving in Munich intend to stay permanently. The city policies take this into account, and that is why the integration courses are for people who want to stay for at least one year. Nationally, Germany has problems with integrating people from workers’ families, with or without a migrant background, into the education system (Baez et al 2008, Thomasen 2012 and Die Welt 2012). However, according to a study by the University of Konstanz there is also structural discrimination: having a Turkish name can reduce the chances of getting a job by 14%.
4.3 Policies: Anti-spatial Segregation and Intercultural Mainstreaming

Anti-spatial segregation policy: Munich has, since the 1970s, had a policy of social mixture: mixing public housing, independent housing and owner occupied flats in every area. As a result, migrants are not concentrated in one area of the city. They are mostly evenly distributed throughout the districts, except in one out of the 25, districts in which 70.4% of the population has migrant background. There is also an even distribution of new migrants in each district. Every district has social workers and its own neighbourhood management structures, and this prevents problems in the neighbourhoods.

“In Munich, 38% of the population is migrant or has a migrant background. As we offer services to everyone in the city, we must open up the city administration in an intercultural way, so that everyone in the city feels accepted regardless of their ethnic or religious background.”

“Intercultural Mainstreaming”: the main integration policy in Munich. It aims to open up the whole city administration in an intercultural way. This reflects in intercultural training being given to all employees in all departments of the municipality but also in other measures connected to labour and education (See Box 4.1).

Labour Market: The “Federal Recognition Act” entered into force on April 1st, 2012 and lies within the responsibility of the federation. The act creates a legal right to the assessment of foreign professional qualifications. It applies to all persons regardless of nationality or immigration status and can be applied in Germany or from abroad. There are advisory services for CEE migrants including assistance on labour market questions, such as the minimum wage, security questions, and public health services, especially for poorly or unqualified migrants.

The city is preparing to give special assistance to self-employed foreigners in order to reduce the number of foreign businesses ceasing trading. At the same time, the city tries to make it more attractive for people with migrant backgrounds to apply for jobs in the city administration. The procedure for getting a job was changed, and now includes intercultural competences and other languages as a plus.

Regarding highly qualified migrants there is also a welcome and information centre with information about matters like housing, job search and educational system.

Education: The Integration courses were introduced in 2005. Each integration course consists of up to 900 lessons and includes a language course and a (60-hour) integration course. Every non-European willing to reside in Germany must take that course. Europeans can

Box 4.1- Intercultural Mainstreaming – examples: Intercultural training with the firefighters of Munich required one year’s preparation, in which firefighters were asked about their experiences with intercultural situations. Based on those data a curriculum was organised by the firefighters and intercultural specialists. Over 600 firefighters are undergoing training, and the programmes will now be included in the curriculum of all firefighters in Bavaria.

Also the Munich City Museum is undergoing an intercultural opening process. Two specialists were employed to help the museum integrate migration questions into all the exhibitions, rather than putting on one separate exhibition on migration.

Intercultural and religious aspects of the city were also integrated into the training that the 250 guides of the Tourism Office have to undergo, so
take the course if it is not fully subscribed. People are very interested in doing these courses. The courses cost 1 euro per hour, but for poor people the State can pay for the whole course. Also, if one finishes the course within a certain period, one can get some of one’s money back. Since January this year there have been more people from Greece, Italy and Spain doing these courses.

The city has intercultural pedagogues in every kindergarten, as in some of these up to 80% of the children are foreigners. There is a large project in which students who are studying to become German teachers go to the primary schools and teach German to children from third countries. As it is an EU-funded project under the Integration Fund, it cannot be used to teach children from EU countries. There are many other programmes to support children and students throughout the education system, but there is however a lack of evaluation.
5 Barcelona and Catalonia, Spain

Based on interviews with Ramon Sanahuja, Director of the Immigration Centre of Barcelona; Orland Cardona Perez, from the Immigration Directorate of Catalonia; and on information provided by Oscar Alvarez Gila, from the Basque Country University.

5.1 Data and background

According to the Spanish National Statistics Institute (INE), Spain has seen significant changes in its migration patterns in recent years (Table 5.1), showing a significant decrease in immigration and an increasing trend to emigrate (of both foreigners and Spanish nationals).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Net migration (Total)</th>
<th>Net migration (Foreigners)</th>
<th>Net migration (Spanish nationals)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>+310,641</td>
<td>+312,446</td>
<td>-1,804</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009</td>
<td>+12,845</td>
<td>+21,239</td>
<td>-8,394</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2010</td>
<td>-42,675</td>
<td>-32,936</td>
<td>-9,739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2011</td>
<td>-37,698</td>
<td>-17,669</td>
<td>-20,030</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5.1 - Net Migration in Spain between 2008 and 2011 (INE)

Box 5.1 - How many Spanish emigrants due to the crisis? There is lively debate on the real numbers of Spanish emigration. While the media report daily on cases of young people leaving Spain in search of job opportunities elsewhere, there are studies both refuting and supporting this hypothesis. González-Enríquez (2013) writes that only 40,000 of the currently registered 1,900,000 Spanish emigrants are natives who left the country because of the crisis, and the remainder are either naturalised former immigrants who emigrated, or naturalised relatives of former emigrants who have never lived in Spain. But, according to González-Ferrer (2013), the number of Spanish nationals emigrating between 2008 and 2012 is more likely to be 700,000. Consulting the statistics in the UK and Germany for recent numbers of registered Southern Europeans, González-Ferrer (2013) has observed that Spain had the highest increase in emigration to the UK, when compared to Portugal, Greece and Italy, and is now the 2nd country supplying most labour migrants to the UK, after Poland. New registrations of Spanish nationals in the German Population Office increased from 9,497 in 2008 to 29,910 in 2012. The official Spanish statistics estimate a more moderate increase: from 2,663 to 4,842.

The autonomous region of Catalonia and its main city, Barcelona, are witnesses to these changes. Catalonia, with a population of 7.4 million, has received 1.3 million migrants in the last 10 years but, as with the national situation, the number of foreign migrants arriving has systematically decreased since 2008. This has been accompanied by an increasing number of foreign migrants leaving Catalonia and moving to other Spanish regions or to other countries. The net migration of foreigners for the first time in 2012 reached a negative value of -3,404.

As for Barcelona, a city of 1.6 million inhabitants, the population has increased slightly in recent years, due to internal and foreign migration. This can be related to the unemployment rate of 21%, which has tripled since 2007 (7%), but is still lower than the 26% average in Spain. The city received 60,000 foreign migrants in 2006, but now sees many of them leaving. The net migration of foreigners between 2001 and 2009 was
Box 5.2 - Why are Spanish emigrants not registering at the Spanish consulates?

Registering as emigrants at the Spanish consulates can involve several costs: travelling to the city where the consulate (which often only opens in the mornings) is located, proving that one has been working in that country for a year (which is impossible if one has just arrived), de-registering from local registration in Spain, which can mean losing the chance of seeing one’s family doctor when back in Spain; and losing the opportunity of voting in Spanish local elections (González-Ferrer 2013).

Types of emigration: There are three types of emigration: that of highly qualified Spanish nationals, return migration and onward migration. The registered emigration of highly qualified Spanish nationals is lower than is portrayed by the media, but can be underestimated (see Box 5.1 and Box 5.2). The return migration is from immigrants or recently naturalised Spanish citizens with Central and Southern American origins going back to their home countries (Equator, Bolivia, ..). There is onward migration of former immigrants, with or without Spanish nationality, who move to other European countries where they have family ties (e.g. Moroccan immigrants moving to Belgium).

5.2 Impacts and challenges: Less pressure on the city

The main impact visible in Barcelona is of the decrease in immigration flows. This decrease has released the pressure put on the city by constantly arriving migrants. In the years of high immigration, schools were one of the institutions most affected, with new foreign students arriving all year round. The region of Catalonia introduced “welcome classes”, teaching Catalan and Spanish to the newly-arrived migrants. Currently, with the decrease in arrivals, this “welcome class” programme is reduced.

In terms of national impacts, for the first time in a decade Spain in 2013 is a net recipient of remittances (Mars 2013), which can be a result of all the different

Fig. 5.2 Numbers and origins of migrants in Barcelona in 2013 and the nationalities that decreased the most (middle column) and increased the most (right column). Source: Ajuntament de Barcelona 2013.

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types of emigration. So far, no other impacts have been observed regarding the recent emigration trend.

**Challenges with Data - Accurateness and Interpretation:** Many Spanish emigrants do not de-register from their municipalities (Box 1 and 2). This is a general problem: data on emigration tend to be far less reliable than data on immigration, because of the difficulty in recording departures, especially of nationals. In order to improve emigration data, the UN report (2010): *Guidelines for Exchanging Data to Improve Emigration Statistics* suggests that sending countries should consult the immigration data of receiving countries. Besides challenges with collecting data, Spain also has problems with data interpretation. Due to nationality policies there are many Spanish and Italian nationals who were originally born in South America. For instance, it is estimated that up to 45% of the Italian migrants in Barcelona have Latin American origins. Another example is the decrease in the number of Equatorians living in Barcelona between 2003 and 2013: from 30,000 to 13,688. Once acquiring Spanish nationality they are full citizens and are therefore not considered migrants, despite their migrant background. It is estimated that the majority of them have not emigrated but acquired Spanish nationality or moved to other municipalities in the metropolitan area.

“Leaving the country, working and studying abroad are natural things to do. What we are worried about is that emigrants lose the links with the country and will not want to come back.”

5.3 Policies: from hosting to integration and advising on mobility

The recent emigration trends have prompted the so-called “Immigration” departments at national and regional levels to again become more predisposed to deal also with emigration. For instance, to improve the visibility of emigration, the Centre of Immigration of Cataluña, in its new action plan, aims to develop ways to monitor emigration flows better.

“We do not encourage people to emigrate but we do acknowledge that emigration exists. So, now, we advise prospective emigrants on how to move to other EU countries and we provide them with practical information.”

Box 5.3 - Immigration from Sub-Saharan Africa: Some undocumented migrants from Sub-Saharan African countries brought by the State to Barcelona from the Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla are now living in old industrial warehouses, as the city of Barcelona has to find temporary accommodation for them at its own expense. There is a strategy to inform people from these countries of the reduced work opportunities in Spain. This is done at different levels: through embassies at diplomatic level, and by communicating with immigrant associations that have connections with the communities of origin.

The former “Immigration Centre” of Barcelona (SAIER), which served as a base for counselling immigrants, has turned into a “Human Mobility Centre” and now provides services on human mobility to both immigrants and prospective emigrants. The latter are informed of the practical aspects of emigration, such as how to obtain recognition of university certificates, labour legislation and health care rights in other EU countries. Immigrants considering returning to their home countries are also advised.
Another important change is that, with decreasing immigration flows, the city is seeing the opportunity to shift its immigration policies from hosting to integration: “we need to switch our focus from immigrant reception policies to policies geared to coexistence and aiding integration in Barcelona” (Immigration Plan 2012-2015).

**Box 5.4 - EU Integration Funds:** The city considers that there is a lack of support from the other levels (National, European) in dealing with the immigration issues, even with EU instruments such as the European Integration Fund in place. According to Barcelona, one should ensure that the EU Integration Funds get to the local level, which is ultimately where the problems arise.
6 Rzeszów and Subcarpathian region, Poland

Interview with Marek Cierpial-Wolan, Director of the Statistical Office of Rzeszów. Information also provided by Izabella Main from the Centre for Migration Studies, Poznan.

6.1 Data and Background

The Macroregion of Eastern of Poland is traditionally a region of emigration. The years following accession to the EU were no exception. Fig. 6.1 shows the net migration per region in Poland between the years 2002 and 2009, including internal and external migration. The region with the most positive net migration is Mazovia, where Warsaw is located; and the Eastern regions are those which lost most population. It is estimated that Eastern Poland lost 100,000 inhabitants (1.28% of the total population of the region in 2002) within this period. However, this figure must be underestimated as it refers only to registered arrivals and departures.

Fig 6.2 shows that the evolution of the foreign inflow and outflow (people leaving or arriving from abroad), as a percentage of the internal migration inflow and outflow (people moving within Poland) was not constant but showed fluctuations. It can be seen that the inflow from abroad has steadily increased since 2002 but the outflow to foreign countries decreased between 2002 and 2004 (maybe due to expectations regarding the entry of Poland to the EU). Both flows correspond mainly to Poles. The outflow to foreign countries increased 2.5 times between 2004 and 2006, the post-accession years, and has since decreased to 10% of the internal outflow. This decrease can be explained partly by the crisis affecting the countries of destination, and may indicate that foreign out-migration was relatively less permanent than domestic (Celinska-Janowicz et al. 2010).

Unemployment, but also a lack of well-paid jobs, seems to be highly related to emigration (Celinska-Janowicz et al. 2010).
This case-study focuses on the region of Subcarpathia, situated in the south eastern corner of Poland, bordering Ukraine in the East and Slovakia in the South. Historically this was an emigration (Kaczmarczyk and Okólski 2008) and less economically developed region, and still is now with few firms per inhabitant, Podkarpackie was the focus of an Operational Programme between 2007 and 2013 which had the aim of improving the economy and creating jobs (Inforegio 2013). Rzeszów, with 178,000 inhabitants, is the administrative capital of the 2-million-inhabitant region of Subcarpathia. The city has in most recent years had a positive migration balance, partly due to its lower unemployment rate (8.2% compared to 16.3% in Subcarpathia, and 21% in some subregions) stimulating internal migration from the surrounding region and leading to an administrative increase of the city’s limits.

In 2011, more than 178,000 emigrants from Subcarpathia were registered as staying abroad for more than 3 months. The main destination countries were: the UK (with 36,000), USA (31,000), France (11,500), Italy (11,000) and Germany (7764). It is difficult to estimate the real number of emigrants since many of them continued to be registered in Poland. Foreign outflows in 2012 were 592 from the urban areas, and 348 from the rural regions.

According to Marek Cierpiał-Wolan there are two types of migrants: those who are lower skilled and do seasonal work, and therefore are abroad for only a few months each year, and the younger and higher skilled who are less likely to come back.

6.2 Impacts and challenges: labour market and demographics

This section describes the impacts of emigration on the whole country (based on national reports and news), and on the areas of Subcarpathia that are experiencing net emigration. As the city of Rzeszów is not experiencing net emigration, there are no recorded impacts on the city.

“Poland wished to belong to the EU. The possibility of free movement is a consequence of that. It is known that in regions with low GDP/capita there are high levels of emigration. But, when we are educating young people we are building capacity which we should not lose or waste.”

Labour Market: Although a significant decrease in the unemployment rate in Poland (from 19% to 7%) was seen in the 2000-2011 period, studies showed that, despite a high level of correlation with emigration, the...
A decrease in unemployment is more related to post-accession changes in the business environment in Poland (Centre of Migration Research 2011).

The Subcarpathian region lacks workers in the construction and health sector. Salaries have been increasing incrementally in recent years to stimulate the supply. There is a small proportion of Ukrainian immigrants who take up jobs in these two sectors.

**Economy:** Remittances in Poland grew from 0.5 to 1.5 percent of GDP in 1995-2011, peaking at 2.5 percent of GDP in 2006-2007 (Migration Policy Institute 2010). The Subcarpathian is one of the regions with the highest percentage of households receiving income from overseas (Western Union 2012). In international experience return migration often turns to self-employment, and that is also the case in Poland, however, there has hitherto been no in-depth analysis of this matter (Centre of Migration Research 2011).

**Housing:** The prices for housing are decreasing in the region; however there is no problem with vacant houses, and it is observed that many emigrants come back to build their own houses.

**Social and Demographics:** Between 2002 and 2012, the number of divorces increased by 33% in Subcarpathia, and an increase in the number of single parent families was observed. It is suggested that this can be related to emigration (The Telegraph 2009). Single parent families are eligible to receive help from the state; so its increase can constitute a burden for governmental social services. There is a high proportion of older people in the region, who in some cases are living together with a single parent family (children and grandchildren). The number of children per woman is diminishing and currently the fertility rate is 1.3 (the replacement fertility rate is 2.1). In this context, it appears that emigration can reinforce the ageing of the population.

### 6.3 Policies: investing in jobs and entrepreneurship

In 2008 a governmental working group on return migration formulated a programme that aimed to provide potential returning migrants with information about the possibilities of returning; but not actively to encourage migration (Eurofond 2012). It appears that Poland’s approach to return migration has always changed according to the economic situation of the country (Eurofond 2012).

There is a governmental internet portal (“powroty.zielonalinia.gov.pl”), directed at potential returning migrants, giving information on the job vacancies in the different regions, on how to deal with formalities before and after returning and psychological guidance, amongst other topics.

As for Subcarpathia, the main aim of the policies in the region is tackling unemployment, and consequently emigration. For example, in Dębica, a town of 46,000 inhabitants, the Business Club association started the “Stay in Dębica” project in order to give information and promote activities that would prevent the migration of its inhabitants. It was directed towards secondary school pupils and the unemployed, and it worked through different means such as: an internet portal, training sessions, and jobs fairs (Celinska-Janowicz et al., 2010).

Initiatives supporting entrepreneurship which can also help to prevent brain-drain include the Academic Pre-incubator of the Carpathian Science and Technology Park and the Academic Incubators of Entrepreneurship, which aims to stimulate entrepreneurship, by supporting people who intend to start a business with assistance by experts in management, marketing, finance, and with specialized training, pursuing social and business projects on a national scale, gathering regional experts and outstanding young entrepreneurs and developing training, workshops, and business plans competitions.
Cross-border dynamics with Ukraine: Subcarpathia is a region of high emigration and of complex dynamics with its bordering countries. The Local Border Traffic Agreements allow permanent residents in EU border regions (50km) multi-entry and stays of up to 90 days per 6-month period in EU countries. Many Ukrainians benefit from this Agreement. Studies by the Polish Centre for Transborder Cooperation show that a high level of movement of goods and services is observed in this region, between Poland and Ukraine. In 2012 the expenditure by Ukrainians in Poland was estimated at 0.74 billion euro (Central Statistical Office 2013). Surveys show that there were 3,700,000 border crossings from foreigners from Ukraine to Poland in 2012. 90% of the border crossings by foreigners were for shopping, and 2% for either casual work or self-employment. 74% of the foreigners surveyed cross the Polish-Ukrainian border several times per week. It appears that some Ukrainians work in Poland but are not registered, and that despite the high level of unemployment in some subregions, many of the unemployed people are involved in the movement of goods and services between the two countries.
7 Vilnius, Lithuania

7.1 Data and background

Lithuania is a country that has been severely hit by the economic crisis. Faced with rising deficits in 2010, the Lithuanian government cut public spending by 30 per cent; public sector wages were reduced by 20 to 30 per cent, and pensions by around 11. In addition, various taxes were increased, leading to a saving equal to 9 per cent of GDP. (New York Times, 2010) That year, 83,000 people left Lithuania, a figure which was 4 times higher than the previous year. (Rakauskiene & Ranceva, 2012, p. 246)

Today, 3 years later, the Lithuanian economy seems to be recovering, as GDP is approaching its pre-crisis level and growth is expected to reach about 3.5 per cent in 2013. (IMF, 2013) Many people have been touched by the economic crisis in Lithuania though, and unemployment rose to almost 12% in 2013. Surprisingly, emigration from Lithuania has decreased in the past few years.

Ever since Lithuania gained independence in 1991 and became a member of the European Union in 2004, emigration from the country to other EU Member States has been steadily rising. In 2008, Lithuania even had the highest negative net migration in the entire EU (OECD, 2010 in Engbersen & Jansen forthcoming). In 2012, the number of emigrants dropped by 12,800, while the number of Lithuanian nationals who returned to Lithuania grew by 3,300. The number of people who emigrated still exceeded the number of those who immigrated by more than twice though. (The Baltic Course, 2013)

Most emigrants leaving Lithuania are of working age, with young people - often females - aged 20-34 years forming even more than half of all immigrants in 2011 (Sipaviciene and Stankuniene, 2012 in Engbersen & Jansen forthcoming). On average, Lithuanian emigrants are highly educated. One famous and appealing example is that of medical staff exchanging Lithuania for Norway, flying back and forth between Oslo and Vilnius every few weeks (Lietuvos Rytas, 2011). Norway in general is a popular destination, in addition to countries such as the United Kingdom, Ireland, Germany and Sweden.

Despite the high numbers of emigrants – interestingly - a study carried out by Lithuania’s market and opinion research centre showed that 73% of those surveyed had no intention of emigrating at all. Only 1.3% felt that permanent emigration was worth considering (Focus Migration 2007).

7.2 Impacts & Challenges

The effect of emigrants leaving Lithuania has various positive and negative aspects. It is estimated that Lithuanian unemployment would have been much higher if the high number of emigrants had not left the country, even though opinions on this matter differ. Either way, this seemingly positive effect may be overshadowed by the high number of young workers entering the labour market (Sipaviciene and Stankuniene, 2012 in Engbersen & Jansen, forthcoming). At the same time, the significant number of highly educated emigrants is leading to signs of brain drain (International Organization for Migration), while destination

“I had been working in Lithuania for 20 years, but then I had to deal with the restructuring of the hospitals, the job cuts and reduced salaries. I had to find a solution.”

Sandra, 39 years old

Source: Lietuvos Rytas, 2011

...
countries profit from the skills and expertise of young highly educated people (Rakauskiene & Ranceva, 2012, p. 246).

From a social point of view, emigration particularly triggers demographic changes that have important social consequences. Not only is the number of inhabitants in Lithuania decreasing, but fertility is also decreasing, while the number of divorces is on the rise as family members leave the country (Rakauskiene & Ranceva, 2012, p. 246).

Another impact is clear in the form of remittance flows - capital flows from emigrants to their home country – that account for almost 5% of Lithuania’s gross domestic product (GDB) (Engbergse & Jansen, forthcoming), however, there is not much clarity about how this money is spent by individuals, families and communities. That is why it is also very difficult to identify their actual (positive) impact on national development. (De Haas, 2007 in Engbergse & Jansen, forthcoming)

The impact of emigration on Lithuania’s cities is even more difficult to define. It appears as if cities, particularly the country’s two main cities Vilnius and Kaunas, are not as badly affected by emigration as rural areas. In 2012, Vilnius attracted 56 per cent more inhabitants than in 2011 and 67 per cent more than in 2010 (Lithuania Tribune, 2013), making the city an important destination for internal migrants. The negative demographic and related effects of emigration are expected to hit rural regions first, before having a strong influence on urban centres and regions.

7.3 Policies & programmes

Lithuania does not have any policies or programmes trying to discourage emigration (Rakauskiene & Ranceva, 2012, p. 246). However, it has implemented policies that aim to optimise the benefits of migration. The government is, for example, trying to develop effective diaspora policies that may have a positive impact on remittance flows to the country and the way they are spent.

There are people who encourage Lithuania to develop effective immigration policies, as migration and mobility still form largely unused resources for development and competitiveness in the Baltic Sea Region (Horgby & Nordlund, 2013, p.1). However, this is a sensitive issue in the Baltic region, with most immigrants coming from countries such as Belarus, the Russian Federation and Ukraine (Lithuania Tribune, 2013 & EMN, 2012). Either way, the number of immigrants at the moment is too low to balance the current high numbers of emigrants (EMN, 2012).
8 Conclusions

The case studies summarise for six cities (and regions) throughout Europe their current experiences with emigration and immigration, the various impacts and challenges, and the urban and regional policy responses to those challenges.

It should be noted that a sharp division between net emigration and net immigration regions and cities is unsustainable, as the case studies show. Even cities in countries and regions experiencing net emigration, such as Barcelona, Rzeszów and Vilnius, have to deal with issues of immigration and the participation of immigrants. But only Catalonia has to deal with the effects of both substantial immigration and emigration.

The Hague, the Greater London Area, Munich and Barcelona/Catalonia are cities and regions receiving significant numbers of mobile EU citizens (but also third country nationals). Comparing these cases, some characteristic differences and similarities are:

- Inflows of EU citizens seem to be significant and increasing in some cities (London, Munich, The Hague), including inflows from CEE countries and more recently also from Southern European countries.
- Immigrant reception and integration services and policies are mostly developed for third country nationals, but are increasingly being applied to mobile EU citizens, while specific policies and services are sometimes developed for them.
- Housing for immigrants is one of the major issues for all cities. The lack of housing is a major problem especially for migrants with lower incomes. To deal with this some cities promote the creation of accommodation for temporary labour.
- Regularly, low income immigrants concentrate in some areas of the cities. Urban policies have been developed to foster a social mix in each district of the city to prevent spatial segregation.
- The cities reported issues with homelessness of migrants, which are tackled by cooperating with migrants NGOs, or by creating improvised dormitories during the colder months.
- Mobile EU citizens are employed in both low and highly skilled professions. Those in low-skilled professions are often overqualified for their jobs. It seems that those who stay on a long term basis have more chance to move into jobs that are more suited to their skills.
- Acquiring the language of the hosting country is an important step towards integration and participation. All cities have programmes for learning the host language and culture for migrants. Munich goes a step further, and interprets integration as something that is not only up to the migrants, but also to the city administration throughout its departments, and developed intercultural training for all employees, together with other measures to open up the whole administration interculturally.
- Services have to adapt to the changing dynamics in migration patterns. For instance, Barcelona, with the decrease in the arrival of new immigrants, is focusing now on consolidating the integration of the immigrant communities, while the Immigration Centre has become a Human Mobility Centre providing services to both immigrants and emigrants.
- The cities voiced concerns about the lack of European support to deal with the challenges posed by intra-EU mobility, as subsidy by the European Integration Fund is possible only for the integration of third-country nationals.
Rzeszów/Subcarpathia, Lithuania and Barcelona/Catalonia are cities and regions facing substantial emigration. Comparing these cases, some characteristic differences and similarities are:

- Cities appear to experience less emigration than the surrounding rural areas. In general, cities attract population from the surrounding rural areas, even in regions of net emigration.
- Emigration has both positive and negative economic and social effects. For instance, in regions of high emigration divorce rates seem to increase, but on the other hand unemployment rates decrease, and remittances increase.
- Policies dealing with emigration focus on improving or creating job opportunities in the city and region to prevent emigration. There are also means of informing and advising emigrants who are considering returning home on the job opportunities at home and the administrative procedures to go through.
- The changing migration dynamics in Barcelona, with the increase in emigration, have prompted the “Immigration” departments at national and regional levels to become more predisposed to deal also with emigration, while the Immigration Centre has been transformed into a Mobility Centre. It advises not only immigrants, but also prospective emigrants on practical questions.

The case study cities also share some challenges:

- The need for more accurate data on inflows and outflows of EU nationals is a challenge that is common to both cities of origin and of destination. However, it is even harder to obtain data on emigration than on immigration flows. Better monitoring of the emigrant population can be facilitated through cooperation and shared information between sending and host countries. Immigrants are usually required to register for work locally when arriving in a new country; however this is not a requirement for short-term (less than 3 months) mobility of EU citizens. The city of The Hague has implemented a monitoring system for EU mobile citizens, based on a combination of data from registrations and other data files.
- The competences of the local authorities regarding issues such as housing, education and training vary from country to country. Thus, adequate coordination with higher and lower levels of government is required to address the challenges of emigration and immigration.
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